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Abstract 
 
Freedom is undoubtedly a central concept employed by Hannah Arendt in her political 
thought, yet I believe that it remains open to further interpretation. This thesis attempts to 
outline what Arendt means by the term and the implications of it for her thought more 
broadly. Advancing a nuanced methodology which seeks to understand the relationship 
between Arendt’s primary concepts, this thesis examines how a large body of terms come 
together to form her unique and heavily politicised theory of freedom. These ideas are often 
related to Arendt’s philosophy of speech, which draws heavily upon ancient Greek political 
understanding. The thesis proceeds with reference to her critique of totalitarian language and 
the problems that she associates with it, which is then compared specifically with the Greek 
account of rhetoric. From here the thesis proceeds toward Arendt’s ideal of political discourse 
which it is suggested also is heavily grounded in the German hermeneutic tradition. Combining 
the Greek and German influences, I conclude that Arendt’s account of freedom should be 
labelled freedom as rhetoric. Building upon this observation it is then claimed that Arendt is 
best understood as advancing a form of hermeneutic republicanism.  
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A Note 
 
Arendt supplied highly gendered language, often referring to humanity as ‘man’ or ‘mankind’. 
For the sake of staying true to Arendt’s language, I have not attempted to change this. I hope 
that this will not be interpreted in a negative manner.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Greek polis will continue to exist at the bottom of our political existence…for as long as 
we use the word ‘politics’ 
Hannah Arendt 
Men in Dark Times
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis seeks to examine what I believe to be the most important term for the writings of 
German political theorist Hannah Arendt (1906-1975): freedom. Within the following chapters 
I proceed with an analysis of the concepts that feed into her understanding of freedom, with 
the intention of granting the term further clarity. Throughout the thesis I attempt to show how 
her account of freedom is influenced by various observations regarding both the totalitarian 
phenomenon and traditional philosophy as founded by Plato. One of the central claims which 
influences proceedings is the vast influence that her theory of speech exerts over her thought, 
which culminates in my final description of Arendtian freedom as rhetoric. Using this account 
of freedom as rhetoric I then question how this impacts our understanding of Arendtian 
politics, focussing in particular on her republicanism. In this introduction I introduce Arendt’s 
philosophical method and then use this as a means of generating an appropriate method for 
the task of this thesis, which I label gravitational. Following this, I provide a quick summary of 
the arguments made throughout these pages.  
 
0.1 Understanding Arendt's Philosophical Method 
 
Close friend of Hannah Arendt, Mary McCarthy, has provided two of the most revealing 
descriptions of Arendt's writings. The first emerged during an exchange at a conference in 
Toronto, 1972:  
 This space that Hannah Arendt creates in her work and which one can walk into with 
the great sense of walking through an arch into a liberated area and a great part of it is 
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occupied by definitions. Very close to the roots of Hannah Arendt's thinking is the distinguo: ' I 
distinguish this from that. I distinguish labor from work. I distinguish fame from reputation.'...I 
think that the chance of invigoration and oxygenation does combine with some sense of 
stability and security. And that is through the elaboration, the marvellous, shall we say, 
unfolding of definitions. Each of her works is an unfolding of definitions, which of course touch 
on the subject, and more and more enlighten it as one distinction unfolds (after another) 
(McCarthy, 1979: 337-338) 
In response, Arendt acknowledged that she always initiated the study of topics via a 
definitional process. The second quotation is from McCarthy's eulogy 'Saying Goodbye To 
Hannah' published in The New York Review of Books a month after Arendt's sudden death in 
1975:  
 If I understood her, Hannah was always more for the Many than the One...She did not 
 want to find a master key or universal solvent...The proliferation of distinctions in her 
 work, branching out in every direction like tender shoots, no doubt owes something 
 to her affection for the scholastics but it also testifies to a sort of typical awe-struck 
 modesty before the world's abundance and intense particularity (2006: 33) 
Both quotations centre around Arendt's literary method of definition and distinction, 
identifying a practice which remains curiously ignored in the vast body of literature 
surrounding one of contemporary political theory's most divisive names. Examples of this 
structure abound: most conspicuously, it is found in the categorisation of the human activities 
in The Human Condition and the mental faculties in The Life of the Mind; In both cases, the 
definition of terms configure the development of the text with each term analysed separately; 
the main body of The Human Condition is comprised of three chapters corresponding to 
'labour', 'work', and 'action' (which, incidentally, succeeds a chapter on the public-private 
distinction), just as The Life of the Mind is a trilogy split between 'thought', 'will', and 
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'judgment'. On a condensed scale, some of the 'exercises in political thought' collected in 
Between Past and Future bear the hallmark of this approach; for instance, the chapter 'The 
Concept of History' clearly develops around the distinction between objectivity and 
impartiality (BPF: see pages 48-53). What this displays is a manner of political thinking 
consciously directed by a method of definition and distinction, and for this reason Mary 
McCarthy has revealed a particularly fruitful interpretative resource. To phrase it directly, 
Arendt very clearly thinks terminologically. I believe, therefore, that the abundance of terms 
which Arendt employs is her core strength, and is the source of interest for many people in her 
writings. Similarly, it is hard to find commentaries which are not led to a large extent by her 
terminological structures.  
 As far as I am aware, it seems that only one commentator, Seyla Benhabib, has cared 
to properly address this topic - albeit in a seemingly less exultant manner than McCarthy. Her 
suggestion, drawing upon some of the criticisms levelled at Arendt by others such as Jürgen 
Habermas and Hannah Pitkin, is that Arendt's "art of making distinctions often obscured rather 
than illuminated the phenomena at hand", and she traces the source to the "more basic 
dimension of her philosophical methodology, namely, her 'phenomenological essentialism'" 
(Benhabib, 2000: 123). Driven by the philosophical inheritance of Husserl and Heidegger which 
attempts a recovery of original experience and constrictively believes that "each human 
activity has its proper place in the world" (ibid: 172), Arendt's 'art of making distinctions' 
"frequently leads her to conflate conceptual distinctions with social processes, ontological 
analyses with institutional and historical descriptions" (ibid: 124). Despite these claims 
Benhabib's book misses an opportunity to investigate the broader question of Arendt's 
approach, and focuses instead on Arendt's much maligned distinction between the 'political' 
and the 'social', largely because the book is geared as much towards critique as interpretation. 
Throughout her text, Benhabib oscillates between praise and condemnation of Arendtian 
distinctions; on the one hand, she recognises the importance of definition and distinction for 
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political theory - "we can question the perspicacity of the distinctions we make, while 
admitting that all thought means distinguishing and connecting at the same time" (ibid: 131-
132) - and on the other she castigates its authority within her political analysis as a 
Heideggerian perversion. Even if there are problems with Benhabib's analysis, she does write 
of Arendt that:  
 For her, political philosophy became a method of narration to 'cull meaning from the 
 past,' an exercise in establishing distinctions that would enable us to think the 
 meaning of our  times and our actions, to 'think what we are doing'... My thesis is that 
 the greatness of Hannah Arendt's political philosophy and its continuing  contemporary 
 import lie precisely in the controversial distinctions that she creates and the tensions 
 that she identifies in the Western tradition of political thought  (ibid: 118) 
By this quotation, we can see that there is more in common between Benhabib and McCarthy 
than Benhabib's criticism would suggest. 
 Arendt was not one to spend much time discussing her own philosophical method, 
and such intentional disregard has caused significant difficulties for her interpreters. This 
question of definition and distinction is no difference. The subject does arise, albeit briefly, in 
an unlikely source: her chapter 'What is Authority?', in Between Past and Future. She writes: 
 It is obvious that these reflections and descriptions are based on the conviction of the 
 importance of making distinctions. To stress such a conviction seems to be a 
 gratuitous truism in view of the fact that, at least as far as I know, nobody has yet 
 openly stated that distinctions are nonsense. There exists, however, a silent 
 agreement in most discussions among political and social scientists that we can 
 ignore distinctions and proceed on the assumption that everything can eventually be 
 called anything else, and that distinctions are meaningful only to the extent that 
 each of us has the right 'to define his terms' (BPF: 95) 
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Arendt continues,  
 Yet does not this curious right, which we have come to grant as soon as we deal with 
 matters of importance - as though it were actually the same as the right to one's own 
 opinion - already indicate that such terms as 'tyranny,' 'authority,' and 'totalitarianism' 
 have simply lost their common meaning, or that we have ceased to live in a 
 common world where the words we have in common possess an unquestionable 
 meaningfulness, so that, short of becoming condemned to live verbally in an 
 altogether meaningless world, we grant each other the right to retreat into our own 
 worlds of meaning, and demand only that each of us remain consistent within his 
 own private terminology? If, in these circumstances, we assure ourselves that we still 
 understand each other, we do not mean that together we understand a world 
 common to us all, but that we understand the consistency of arguing and reasoning, 
 of the process of argumentation in its sheer formality (ibid: 95-96)  
It is clear from these statements that the question of making distinctions goes further than a 
strictly methodological concern. The issue at hand is the capacity for mutual understanding, 
and the modern age, Arendt repeatedly asserts, is an age which - for various reasons which 
will be the subject of certain chapters in this thesis - frustrates our capacity for understanding 
one another’s words as well as our ability to appreciate distinct and novel events. The above 
passage comes straight out of Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology, where a 
phenomenon is conceived as "that which shows itself in itself, the manifest" (Heidegger, 1962: 
51); the naming of a phenomenon 'lets something be seen', makes manifest "in the sense of 
letting something be seen by pointing it out" (ibid: 56). Our hermeneutic situatedness - that is, 
the linguistic 'world' which we are born and raised into - creates the possibility of reciprocal 
understanding through recognition of the same phenomenon at hand. Acts of definition and 
distinction, therefore, allow us to recognise the 'otherness' of different phenomenon as they 
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manifest themselves. The common linguistic world provides the ground of understanding, and 
its perceived loss amounts to the destruction of the signposts necessary for shared 
experiences. The rejection of the act of distinction, where we tacitly assume that 'everything 
can eventually be called anything else', creates significant political problems. Arendt, we must 
be aware, is conscious of the malleability of language, and this is not an argument on behalf of 
the (impossible) entrenchment of words with meaning. Correspondingly, her writings on 
'reflective judgment' promote a conception of judgment which does not view our hermeneutic 
situatedness as determinate, but recognises that judgment always occurs from a prior 
situation. This bears similarity with what Gadamer calls a 'prejudice'. Politically speaking, the 
authority of our political tradition (in language) maintains these prejudices that enable us to 
have the same objects in view, and a shared position through which to experience 'events'. As 
her analysis of totalitarianism suggests, the loss of the common world can blind us to the 
reality of events at hand; at best, this leaves us open to impotence and inaction, at worst, it 
creates the conditions for the unconditional adoption of fictional ideologies.  
 Before we explore this claim, let us examine how to relate this back to the question of 
definition and distinction. The chapter from which the above quotations are taken will serve 
the point well. In order to understand the term 'authority', Arendt claims that we must trace 
its emergence to the experience of a phenomenon - as the term emerged as a response to 
something. "What were the political experiences that corresponded to the concept of 
authority and from which it sprang?" (BPF: 104), she asks. The structure of this question, 
incidentally, we find mirrored throughout her writings; for example, the question 'what were 
the political experiences that corresponded to the concept of politics and from which it 
sprang?' would not be out of place in The Human Condition. This approach is different from 
pure etymology because it places precedence in the context of the experience of phenomena. 
She identifies the experience of authority as such: 
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 At the heart of Roman politics, from the beginning of the republic until virtually the 
 end of  the imperial era, stands the conviction of the sacredness of foundation, in the 
 sense that once something has been founded it remains binding for all future 
 generations...It is in this context that word and concept of authority originally 
 appeared. The word auctoritas derives from the verb augere, 'augment,' and what 
 authority or those in authority constantly augment is the foundation (ibid: 120-122) 
A 'binding force' of 'extraordinary strength and endurance', authority carries influence 
completely alien to command or coercion and takes the form of 'authoritative' advice. 
Institutionally, the Roman senate was considered the seat of authority.  
 In the manner we expect of Arendt, she distinguishes between tradition and past, 
which is best understood as a distinction between, respectively, ancient and modern forms of 
historiography. The idea of past is tied to modern time-consciousness as sequence, which 
thinks of history in terms of an engulfing process. By this world-view, "nothing is meaningful in 
and by itself" (ibid: 63), and meaning is only granted to history if the particular moment can be 
subsumed into a general process of causality. On the other hand, "Greek and Roman 
historiography, much as they differ from one another, both take it for granted that the 
meaning or, as the Romans would say, the lesson of each event, deed, or occurrence is 
revealed in and by itself...causality and context were seen in a light provided by the event 
itself, illuminating a specific segment of human affairs" (ibid: 64). This gives us a good idea of 
the link between authority and tradition, i.e. that which makes authority 'authoritative'. 
Roman history was considered as something akin to a "storehouse of examples taken from 
actual political behaviour, demonstrating what tradition, the authority of ancestors, 
demanded from each generation and what the past had accumulated for the benefit of the 
present" (ibid: 65). Authority, we can conclude from this opening analysis, is inherently tied to 
the remembrance of human actions which create the 'web of narratives' that bind us together 
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in the common world and provide what Arendt describes as "depth in human existence" (ibid: 
94) and our "measure of dignity and greatness" (ibid: 140).  
 Arendt identified similar attempts at authoritative founding in the revolutions in 
America and France at the turn of the nineteenth century, of which only the American 
example was 'successful'. Testament to this observation is the permanent presence of the 
founding fathers in American political discourse, within a culture of unparalleled constitutional 
patriotism. In light of this, Arendt suggests that the 'founding' of the founding fathers 
successfully maintained the "remembrance of the event itself...in an atmosphere of reverent 
awe which has shielded both event and document against the onslaught of time and changed 
circumstances" (emphasis added, OR: 204). We must be careful at this point to recognise that 
Arendt is not celebrating a kind of political stasis; the strength of political authority is derived 
from its capacity for augmentation, not consolidation. In constitutional terms, this translates 
as the capacity of amendment. As Arendt would confirm, "the amendments to the 
constitution augment and increase the original foundations of the American republic; needless 
to say, the very authority of the American Constitution resides in its inherent capacity to be 
amended and augmented" (ibid: 202). 
 The terminology which Arendt employs in her reflections on authority can serve a 
purpose for us in considering the wider issues surrounding the question of definition and 
distinction. Consider the following quotation: 
 Authority, resting on a foundation in the past as its unshaken cornerstone, gave the 
 world the permanence and durability which human beings need precisely because 
 they are mortals- the most futile and unstable beings we know of. Its loss is 
 tantamount to the loss of the groundwork of the world, which indeed since then 
 has begun to shift, to change and transform itself with ever-increasing rapidity from 
 one shape into another, as though we were living and struggling in a Protean 
9 
 
 universe where everything at any moment can become almost anything else (BPF: 
 94-95) 
The discussion of authority bears a striking correspondence with the prior claim by Arendt that 
the modern mistrust of distinctions denotes the loss of the common world where the 'words 
we have in common possess an unquestionable meaningfulness'. The tacit assumption in 
present times 'that everything can eventually be called anything else' belies a Protean world-
view which undermines the 'otherness' of phenomena - that "curious quality of alteritas 
possessed by everything that is", the  reason why "we are unable to say what anything is 
without distinguishing it from something else" (HC: 176). I believe that Arendt locates the loss 
of the authority of language, that is, our language has ceased to be an meaningful 
'authoritative' foundation for the analysis of human affairs. The loss of the authority of 
language amounts to the loss of faith in shared meanings as the two are mutually dependent.   
 The mistrust of definition and distinction represents a much more fundamental crisis 
of the interrelationship between language and the intersubjective experience which it 
discloses. If we have reached the point in political analysis where we simply 'define our terms' 
and 'retreat into our own worlds of meaning, and demand only that each of us remain 
consistent within his our private terminology' then does it not imply, by extension of Arendt's 
analysis, that the subject under investigation (and the language we use to study it) has lost its 
characteristic of being derived from common experience? Our mistrust of definition and 
distinction "testifies to an age in which certain notions, clear in distinctness to all previous 
centuries, have begun to lose their clarity and plausibility because they have lost their 
meaning in the public-political reality- without altogether losing their significance" (BPF: 101). 
Returning to the present example, the term 'authority' changed as the experience it referred 
to vanished, and the latter half of Arendt's chapter is devoted to understanding this process of 
terminological transformation rooted in political events. The concept of authority is now 
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widely considered associated with Weberian power, where authority is located in the 
institutional ability to influence others for a desired goal. This displays an absolute change in 
the meaning of the term which goes much further than semantic augmentation, and the 
complete transformation of the term 'authority' displays the complete cessation of the 
originary experience from the modern world. These comments must be seen as part of 
Arendt's broad critique of modernity as the age of subjectivism, which is the topic of the 
second chapter in this thesis. Arendt's argument that we allow definition and distinction only 
as long as it pertains to the 'consistency of arguing and reasoning, of the process of 
argumentation in its sheer formality' is derived from the observation that in the modern age 
"what men now have in common is not the world but the structure of their own minds" (HC: 
283). The principle of Cartesian doubt (where everything is doubtful) has facilitated the 
construction of a modern world-view in which everything exists only as a subjective object of 
consciousness, and this is evident in the loss of the meaningful authority of political language.   
 McCarthy's argument that the 'chance of invigoration and oxygenation does combine 
with some sense of stability and security' solicits similar sentiment. Even if it was not Arendt's 
visible intention to return solidity back to political terminology, we might argue that her 
proliferation of definitions and distinctions can be interpreted as an attempt to revitalise the 
stagnating discipline of Western political thought. Grounding our interpretation in a question 
of definition and distinction can greatly advance our understanding of Arendt's thought.  
 Certain thinkers such as Ben Berger have recently sought to counter a perceived 
inconsistency in Arendt’s terminological pool (Berger, 2009). He believes that we should 
renounce ‘literal’ readings of her works, and favour the incorporation of ‘figurative’ 
interpretations so as to draw out a more ‘cautionary’ form of political theory that doesn’t treat 
Arendt’s texts as ‘constructive’ outlines of how politics should look. These figurative readings, 
such as in the writings of Mary Dietz (see Dietz, 2000) seek to balance Arendt’s language 
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within a context of a broader philosophical vocation, thus softening the potential literal 
implications of her language.  
 Whilst Berger does not completely reject literal readings of Arendt, he does not 
properly outline the extent to which we should mute her more provocative statements. The 
inspiration to undermine Arendtian terminology seems to be pervasive within the literature 
surrounding her, and is obviously due to a collective unease among many of her readers that a 
commitment to her terminology opens her up to “charges of hypocrisy, blindness or radical 
inconsistency” (Berger, 2009: 171). There is an apologetic tone to this perspective, and seems 
to me to harbour a belief that Arendt somehow ‘went too far’ in some of her writings. The 
problem that I see with this is that it undermines the care that Arendt actually spent on the 
activity of definition and distinction, regardless of whether these concepts sometimes change 
over time. It does a disservice to some of the important claims which she repeatedly makes, 
largely because we disagree to the extent to which we believe her. I also find figurative 
interpretations (or hybrid interpretations such as Berger’s) to be lacking, primarily because 
they fail to account for the historical tradition of the terms which Arendt borrows. The 
meaning behind the word ‘freedom’ is not plucked out of thin air, but is part of a tradition that 
Arendt never sought to hide. If one accepts literal readings as being problematic, then this 
thesis will probably not please the reader – not because I attempt to outline an exact blueprint 
of Arendtian politics, but because I do not consider it the job of an interpreter to discard 
important terms if we find them unpalatable.  
 Interestingly, Berger links this question of interpretation with the activity of labelling 
Arendt. He states that literal interpretations of Arendt tend to push toward viewing her as a 
civic republican, and castigates them for taking her words at ‘face value’ (ibid: 157). For 
Berger, “the civic republican reading holds an untenable position” (ibid: 171), and it is clear 
that his mistrust of the literal Arendt is largely due to perceived issues with her civic 
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republicanism, which he believes is undeniably elitist. However, Berger seems to ignore the 
hermeneutic elements of Arendtian political theory, something which will be constantly 
referenced throughout this thesis, and which can be used to counter the claim of Arendtian 
republican elitism. Berger’s strength, however, is in his desire to “identify a dichotomous 
pattern of lesser-known, but equally important and integrally connected, concepts and 
metaphors that appears throughout Arendt’s works” (ibid: 159). With this in mind, we shall 
now turn to the question of how this insight may be used regarding this thesis’ method of 
interpretation.  
 
0.2 A Basic Method of Terminological Analysis 
 
What kind of method can an interpreter employ which remains open to Arendt’s distinctive 
form of terminological analysis? Before I attempt to answer this there is an interpretative 
problem which we will have to address. The first is what can be described as the holism of her 
thought. This is elaborated concisely by Canovan as such: "the trains of thought she herself 
spun linked themselves together as if of their own accord into an elaborate and orderly 
spiders-web of concepts, held together by threads that were none the weaker for being hard 
to see...this means that one cannot understand one part of her thought unless one is aware of 
its connections with all the rest" (1992: 6). This has direct implications for the task of 
interpretation, especially one which attempts to focus on the definition and distinction of 
specific terms. This is further complicated by the fact that Arendt's pool of interconnected 
concepts is not unveiled in a systematic manner. This is partly the result of the fact that she 
did not consider herself to be undertaking the organized task as found in traditional 
philosophy; her texts are rather reflections and exercises of thought - "invitations to think with 
her", as Minnich puts it (2001: 125). But this is also simply an after-effect of how prolific a 
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thinker she was. Bluntly, if she had attempted to clarify her thoughts in the manner of 
systematic philosophy she could not have written half of that which she did. It does, however, 
make her thought a rich resource for further investigations, and the increasing variety of 
topics to which her writings are applied suggests as much. I hope to aid such enterprises in this 
thesis specifically with reference to freedom. 
 The introduction of definitions and distinctions often does not take place within a 
clear textual ordering. A good example of this is the term 'principle', which, as is explored later 
in the thesis, is intimately connected with her theory of action, though it is not introduced in 
The Human Condition - containing her most complete reflections on action. She also has a 
tendency to quickly flit between terms, premising her arguments on others which may not be 
immediately apparent to the reader. And again, Arendt often introduces definitions or 
distinctions of great importance, yet does not spend much time clarifying them or explaining 
precisely why they have been introduced. The term ‘principle’, which is the subject of chapter 
four, for example, only appears in a handful of pages and is not touched upon again. These are 
the basic reasons why interpreters and commentators tend to stick to those definitions and 
distinctions which are most coherent within the texts. 
 There is also a further dimension to this, one which it is suggested we should analyse 
in more detail. It is worth returning to a sentence within one of the quotations by Mary 
McCarthy which this introduction opened with: 'Each of her works is an unfolding of 
definitions, which of course touch on the subject, and more and more enlighten it as one 
distinction unfolds (after another).' The latter half of the statement is particularly interesting: 
'more and more enlighten it as one distinction unfolds'. Arendt's thought, it has been 
maintained throughout, proceeds via the introduction of definitions, and the text develops 
around these. The expansion of the text operates in a similar manner - with the progressive 
introduction of sub-definitions and sub-distinctions which develop from the original 
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definitional distinction(s). What we can draw from McCarthy's insight is that these sub-terms 
are of equal importance as the parent term, and that understanding them is of great worth 
given the holism of Arendtian thought. In order to qualify the implications, I propose that we 
divide Arendt's conceptual apparatus into primary terms and satellite terms, which I am 
labelling the gravitational method. The word satellite has been chosen because it emphasises 
the interconnectivity of the terminology, which I feel is similar in nature to the gravitational 
relationship between celestial bodies. Just like the power of a moon upon its planet, focussing 
strongly on satellite terms means that our understanding of the primary term (such as 
freedom) is drawn into a different interpretive position than if we analysed it independently of 
its satellite. Thus, what this means is that interpretation must be just as aware of the influence 
of related terms as that which is specifically under investigation.  
 Traditionally, interpreters operate in the manner of progression from primary term to 
satellite term, with far greater emphasis placed on the parent term. Of course, this often 
seems like the most coherent manner of investigation, though in lieu of this discussion we 
should consider another approach. This thesis suggests that we reverse this method of 
interpretation and instead work backwards from the satellite(s) to the primary term. A close 
analysis of the satellites can potentially reveal more about the nature of the primary term than 
is often thought. The following chapters will follow this method, asking the question: how 
does the satellite alter our understanding of the parent term? Each chapter in this thesis has a 
primary term which is under investigation: speech, friendship, judgment, principle, and finally, 
freedom; these are then analysed with reference to satellite terms. The intention is that the 
terms explored in the first four chapters come to resemble satellites of the culminating 
chapter on freedom.   
 It goes to say that the purpose in highlighting satellite terms is not a broad statement 
on interpretative method, but is specific to Arendt. I am not attempting to promote a general 
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method which can necessarily be exported, rather, a practical solution to a problem found in 
the work of one individual. It may be that this might be of use externally, though I have not 
written this with that in mind. Furthermore, the intention is not so much of providing a 
conclusive reading of her work, but to show how some of the ignored aspects of her thought 
can provide valuable interpretative insights, enabling us to judge her writings better, and open 
up extra avenues with which to approach her thought. This is not, properly speaking, a 
rigorous ‘method’ as we might know from analytical philosophy; of course, there will be 
moments where the discussion moves away from a strict application of this method - though 
that should not stand as an indictment of it as device through which we can gain a better 
understanding of terminology. A close analysis of these satellites can help provide a richer 
interpretative experience. All of this will be done in an attempt to aid our understanding of 
Arendt's theory of freedom and the constitution of a free body politic.  
 
0.3 Thesis Summary 
 
The first chapter is concerned with understanding the broad politics of speech in Arendtian 
political theory, locating in her writings a linguistic critique of totalitarian ideology as well as 
traditional forms of (post-Platonic) philosophy. I introduce her engagement with the examples 
of Socrates and Karl Jaspers who are linked with her celebration of Greek political culture, 
specifically, the role of the concept of isēgoria, which has no equivalent English word. Isēgoria 
was introduced as the specifically Athenian way of thinking about freedom, which is attained 
through the equal participation of citizens in the sharing of their opinions through speech and 
rhetorical persuasion. This was contrasted with the form of speech that Arendt observes in 
totalitarian language which I term clichégenic.  
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 Chapter two builds upon this idea with reference, once again, to an ancient Greek 
term: friendship (philia). It is suggested that Arendt attempts to distinguish between ancient 
and modern forms of friendship in order to emphasise what has been lost and its implications 
for our notions of citizenship and political association. According to her analysis of modernity, 
Arendt asserts that the modern individual lives largely in a condition of loneliness, described 
as a kind of alienation from one’s peers. This kind of loneliness is linked to her analysis of the 
loss of the world and the subsequent rise of meaninglessness which has come about through 
certain modern events, reaching its political apogee in the totalitarian movements of the 
twentieth century. I argue that Arendt located the ancient spirit of friendship in the manner 
which Socrates and Jaspers sought to communicate with their peers, forming a basis upon 
which Arendt would come to think of authentic political citizenship and true political 
community.  
 In Chapter three it is argued that Arendt locates the source of political responsibility, 
which had been so evidently lacking in the totalitarian era, in the presence of friendship. I 
distinguish between personal and political responsibility, basing this distinction in Arendt’s 
critique of traditional morality. Our ability to ‘tell right from wrong’, it is claimed, lays in 
something greater than our own sense of guilt (the basis of personal responsibility), and this 
faculty is rooted in our capacity for judgment. The capacity to judge is dependent upon the 
presence of world, which creates a sphere in which the objects that we encounter are 
intelligible and meaningful. For Arendt, borrowing language from Kant, the necessary 
component for judgment is common sense - our ability to grasp the multifaceted perspectives 
regarding the objects that comprise the world. Central to this worldly insight, I argue, is 
understanding. Because of this, I claim that her political theory has a particularly hermeneutic 
element to it, as found in her accounts of citizenship which is dependent upon citizens being 
able to understand each other with reference to the world. Drawing upon theories of rhetoric 
as found in Gadamer and Perelman, I argue that Arendt believes that rhetoric enables 
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understanding through its disclosure of shared assumptions about the objects in the world, 
thus creating the foundation of political community. Following this, I return to the examples of 
Socrates and Jaspers as individuals who were aware that true responsibility can only be 
brought about through rhetorical communication as it fosters a recognition that we are not 
just responsible to ourselves for our acts and deeds but also the world.   
 The fourth chapter examines the role that the concept of principle plays in Arendt’s 
thought, a term which I argued has been largely ignored by commentators. The chapter opens 
with a discussion of what Arendt understands by the term through distinguishing it from other 
constituent elements of action. I suggest that principles are the hermeneutic prejudices which 
are necessary for judgment to take place. I then distinguish principles from values in Arendt’s 
writings, with values understood as something which lacks a basis in worldly phenomena, but 
have become the predominant ‘inspiration’ for action in the modern age. Principles, on the 
other hand, are always built upon the past action of others and the communication of that 
action among the present political community. I then apply Arendt’s theory of principle and 
critique of values to her theory of totalitarianism, and it is suggested that Arendt’s account of 
totalitarianism is dependent upon her distinguishing it from despotism, of which a theory of 
principle is necessary. Following this, I analyse the importance of her theory of principle for 
her analysis of the American and French Revolutions, which I argued are her greatest 
application of the topic. I conclude that Arendt strongly believed principles to be the necessary 
basis of a free politics, setting the argument for chapter five.  
 The final chapter focuses on the main concept under investigation: freedom. Bringing 
together the arguments of the prior chapters which often concern the politics of speech, I seek 
to reinterpret Arendtian freedom as rhetoric. I argue that Arendt’s account of freedom is 
established with reference to physical movement, from which she critiqued the post-Platonic 
philosophical tradition of freedom which identifies it in the mental faculty of willing. Following 
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this, I argue that this notion of movement is the base for her prominent theory of action, 
which she in turn identifies as the source of all political association. Section three explores the 
idea of founding as the highest manifestation of movement and Arendt’s grappling with issues 
surrounding it. I introduce Arendt’s underexplored notion of the ‘relatively absolute’ as her 
response to some of these issues, and particular attention is paid to her claim that authentic 
founding requires a strong consciousness of tradition, so that the founders view their activity 
as a fresh restatement of the old. This is then linked to the topic of the previous chapter - 
principle, and I argue that it is principles which are the content of the historical consciousness 
required for founding. I seek to wed this notion of principle with Arendt’s theory of judgment 
and her theory of friendship. It is argued that principles form the hermeneutic bedrock upon 
which judgment can take place and political community is achieved. Drawing upon the term 
isēgoria from chapter one, I argue that when principles inform judgment, freedom emerges, 
and I label this account of freedom: freedom as rhetoric. Thinking of freedom in this way, I 
propose, can help us to bridge the gap between different interpretative positions relating to 
action. The final section examines the implications of this move for our labelling of Arendt. I 
propose that Arendt’s theory of freedom as rhetoric necessitates a re-evaluation of her 
thought in hermeneutic terms. I finally suggest that she is best represented as endorsing a 
unique form of hermeneutic republicanism.  
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Chapter One 
 Politics, Freedom, and Speech 
 
It was noted in the introduction that Arendt constructs a theory of freedom which is closely 
connected to an account of speech. In this chapter we expand upon this claim, exploring this 
important association. This chapter opens with a brief introduction into the key debate 
surrounding Arendtian speech and examines its implications for her political thought more 
broadly. It continues with a historical account of what influences her prioritisation of speech 
through a distinction between the ancient Greek and Roman terms for freedom, claiming that 
Arendt emphasises the Greek concepts of eudemonia and isēgoria. We then consider two 
critiques: one of the tradition of post-Socratic political philosophy, and the other of the 
modern age and totalitarianism. It is suggested that Arendt presents two very different 
articulations of speech: one which is tied to the ancient concept of rhetoric, and the other 
which is tied to the modern condition of what I term clichégenic language. The examples of 
Adolf Eichmann and Socrates are used to present this distinction through human examples. 
The chapter concludes with the statement that Arendt presents us with a political theory 
shaped by the attempt to think about a 'politics against cliché’.  
 
1.1 The Puzzle of Political Action 
 
We shall begin this thesis with reference to one of the most difficult and puzzling elements of 
Arendt's thought. Any person with a cursory knowledge of Arendt will recognise a core claim 
of hers: politics is the realm of action. Yet the mode of this action is left deliberately vague. 
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George Kateb, one of the first serious commentators of her writings, phrases the puzzle in the 
following manner, and supplies his answer:  
 What is political action? Arendt frequently distinguishes between words and deeds, or 
 between talking and doing, as the basic modes of action. But given all that she 
 excludes as not properly political, the distinction cannot stand. It must collapse, with 
 the result that there is only on true mode of political action, and that is speech (1984: 
 15) 
The observation that political action is carried out through the mode of speaking has become a 
staple of the literature surrounding Arendt, and with this line of thinking we shall proceed with 
this thesis. In the following pages of this chapter we shall examine what speech means for 
Arendtian thought, so that we may continue to build upon it throughout successive chapters, 
culminating in her account of freedom.  
 Kateb is intensely sceptical of equating action with speech as he believes that it leaves 
the content of action particularly empty, limited to the activities of constitutional founding or 
defence (ibid: 17). He does recognise that Arendt imbues speech with further properties, 
though he argues that the apparent vagueness of her scattered writings on this issue 
frustrates any attempts at casting the net further. The result, he argues, is this limited account 
of political action as constitutional establishment, an account which remains open to the 
charge of immoralism. Kateb suggests that the way to move past this problem is to retain the 
equation of action with speech, but purge it of its existential-revelatory base through which 
the individual is disclosed. Once this has been achieved, we could revise Arendtian action "to 
create a view of the citizen as public actor whose will to act is accompanied by a moral sense 
that is not absolutist, yet although ordinary, may be more tested and complex than the 
ordinary morality of daily life, precisely because it is public" (ibid: 39).  
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 This task has been picked up by two major commentators of Arendt's thought: 
Maurizio Passerin D’Entrѐves, and Seyla Benhabib. They attempt to imbue the idea of action 
as speech with Habermasian themes, and have been somewhat successful in doing so. Building 
upon Kateb's comments, D’Entrѐves formally splits Arendt's theory of action into two models: 
the 'expressive', action which "allows for the self-actualization or self-realization of the 
person"; and the 'communicative', action which is "oriented to reaching understanding" (1994: 
85). In so doing, D’Entrѐves attempts to answer many critics of Arendt - such as Kateb and 
Martin Jay (see Jay, 1986) - who he believes have overly emphasised the existential-expressive 
dimension of action at the expense of the communicative. D'Entréves constructs an 
interpretation of Arendt as a thinker whose thought matures progressively toward 
communicative action, despite never being able to properly resolve the tension between the 
two. In the end, he claims, Arendt came to see politics as a sphere "based on mutuality, 
solidarity, and persuasion" (D’Entrѐves: 11), and action as a process of deliberative decision-
making.  
 Seyla Benhabib converts D'Entréves' language into a distinction between 'agonal' and 
'narrative' models of action. She describes the distinction as such:  
 Whereas in the first model action appears to make manifest or to reveal an 
 antecedent essence, the 'who one is,' action in the second model suggests that  the 
 'who one is' emerges in the process of doing the deed and telling the story. 
 Whereas action in the first model is a process of discovery, action in the second 
 model is a process of invention (Benhabib, 2000 :126) 
Benhabib identifies this tension in Arendt's writings between the influence, on the one hand, 
of ancient Greece, and on the other, modern politics; creating a tension between "the 
philosopher of the polis and of its lost glory", and "the modernist, the storyteller of 
revolutions, and the sad witness of totalitarianism" (Benhabib, 1990: 196). It is the interplay of 
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these two poles, Benhabib argues, which makes Arendt a 'reluctant modernist', as the title of 
her book indicates. For Benhabib, as with the previous two thinkers mentioned, the narrative 
form of action simply must be emphasised over the agonal, as the agonal is always at risk to 
descending into a theory of intensive political competition and acclaim. The choice is stark: 
embrace a reading of Arendt where the "presence of common action [is] coordinated through 
speech and persuasion", or embrace a politics driven by "a guarantee against the futility and 
the passage of all things human" (ibid: 193-194).  
 Ultimately, this discussion reveals a distinction between our attitude toward two 
different kinds of speech: performative and deliberative. Dana Villa attempts to illustrate the 
performative variety, as he attempts to provide an alternative interpretation of Arendt to the 
Habermasian (i.e. Kantian) positions outlined above. His criticism is that Benhabib (et al) lacks 
an understanding of "the intrinsic value of politics as an activity" (Villa, 1996: 77), 
instrumentalising action in the search for consensus and legitimacy. He agrees that "genuine 
political action is nothing other than a certain kind of talk, a variety of conversation or 
argument about public matters" (ibid: 31), but disagrees as to whether the performance of 
speech must have a specific end - in this case, as a means of uncovering ideological language, 
or the 'force of the better argument'. Arendt, he contends, "rejects as unpolitical any 
conception of deliberative politics that desires to replace the 'bright light' of the public realm 
with the more controllable illumination of the seminar room" (ibid: 73). Villa’s outline of his 
version of Arendtian speech is driven by a study of her appropriation, by way of Heidegger, of 
the Aristotelian praxis/poiēsis distinction - between acting and making. Action, and hence, 
speech, is a ‘self-contained’ phenomenon, unlike the activity of fabrication, it has no goal or 
clear end. This leads Villa to promote his performative interpretation as follows: 
deliberative speech in the political arena is never merely technical (as it is in the 
administrative sphere), since the ‘good’ to be attained is articulated concretely only in 
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the medium of debate about possible courses of action. Where all are agreed on the 
end, debate can take place, but it ceases to be political. Political debate is end-
constitutive: its goal does not stand apart from the process, dominating it at every 
point, but is rather formed in the course of the ‘performance’ itself (ibid: 32) 
Clearly, Villa contrasts this purified account of speech with Benhabib, outlining the key 
differences between speech aimed at consensus and agreement, and political speech proper. 
For him, the Habermasian interpretation of speech falls into the category of fabrication, not 
action. The very notion of freedom as Arendt understands it is at risk, as “freedom resides in 
the self-containedness of action” (ibid: 25). The danger is that politics becomes a stale, 
dispirited form of logical argumentation which views the rhetorical performance with 
suspicion, always on the verge of calling it blatant manipulation or a kind of heroic display of 
aesthetic greatness.   
 What we have, therefore, is a disagreement about speech which contrasts two 
interpretations and perspectives concerning Arendt's broader political ideals. I do not intend 
to provide an answer to this 'puzzle', as I have called it, as I address this issue in later chapters. 
In the following sections I will only attempt to provide a context to Arendt's discussions 
concerning speech, so that we may proceed with this in mind throughout subsequent 
chapters. A central claim of this thesis is that Arendt's theory of freedom is bound up with her 
theory of speech, so we will refrain in the meantime from deriving strong conclusions until the 
account of freedom has been fully explored. As the analogy of the conceptual satellites 
intends to convey, it is very difficult to fully appreciate the meaning of many of the concepts 
without adequate recourse to others.   
 
1.2 Speech in Antiquity 
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We shall now turn to the source from which Arendt's theory of speech is derived: the language 
of ancient freedom. In fact, the vast majority of Arendt’s conceptual language is drawn from 
ancient Greece and Rome; the central distinction within The Human Condition is Aristotelian, 
with the view that Aristotle was representing broader Greek cultural accounts of politics. This 
distinction, of course, is between the bios politikos and the bios theoretikos, the political and 
contemplative life. Whilst Greece certainly dominates in many of her discussions about 
politics, as was explained in the introduction to this thesis, Arendt is primarily interested in 
how and why certain concepts come into being, and this means situating the language within a 
broader context, the language of politics itself is rooted in the experiences of ancient Greece, 
or more specifically, in the formation of the polis, and carried over into the res publica.  
It has been repeatedly suggested that Arendt displays a certain romanticised 
Greacophillia (see Pitkin, 1981; Kateb, 1984) though this is a somewhat hasty analysis. In fact, 
as Taminiaux has convincingly pointed out (see Taminiaux, 2000), for all her celebrations of 
Greek political culture, Arendt held the example of Rome in equal, if not higher esteem. Her 
turn to Greece is by no means as final as some would have us believe, even if it does provide 
the phenomenological basis upon which her thought is shaped. The bond with Rome is 
developed through a discussion of authority, or auctoritas, and its relationship with freedom 
and the act of founding, which is examined closely in chapter five of this thesis. We will not, 
for the moment, be discussing this manifestation of freedom in Arendt’s writings, but will be 
committing this chapter specifically to speech. We can best proceed with reference to her 
statement in Between Past and Future:  
Let us therefore go back once more to antiquity, i.e., to its political and pre-
philosophical traditions...because a freedom experienced in the process of acting...has 
never again been articulated with the same classical clarity (BPF: 163-164) 
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As we have acknowledged that action is best thought of as a kind of speaking, the antique 
freedom which Arendt refers to must be related to a freedom brought forth in speech.  
Both Greeks and Romans thought of their freedoms as rights acquired by citizenship, 
not as innate rights of the sovereign body. Neither, furthermore, construed their freedom as a 
tension between the individual and the collective - such a way of thinking would have been 
alien to them. Ancient freedom of the Greek and Roman kind was, in effect, a civic right 
attributable to citizens of the polis or res publica; as Arendt remarks, “in Greek as well as 
Roman antiquity, freedom was an exclusively political concept, indeed the quintessence of the 
city-state and of citizenship” (ibid: 156). An individual who existed outside of these 
communities, or more specifically, the individual who was not a legal citizen of them, would 
never have been considered a free person. In both accounts, for example, slaves could never 
be said to have been free persons despite their residence within a Greek or Roman state. 
There are, however, crucial differences between the Greek and Roman accounts of freedom, 
and Arendt’s thought would be greatly shaped by their differences and similarities, something 
which has been ignored by her interpreters.  
 The Greeks had a general term for freedom, eleutheria, which Aristotle comments was 
the end - or telos - of democracy. Prior to Aristotle, the Attic orator Lysias claimed that the 
Athenians established a democracy because they believed that the 'freedom of all is the 
greatest consensus', emphasising its cultural importance. Eleutheria, Arendt argues, was 
derived from eleuthein hopōs erō, meaning 'to go as I wish', a early form of what we would 
now refer to as a negative right, the foundation of all free movement, and hence, action. The 
term had become commonplace in Greece from the fifth century BC, and would quickly 
become a term of eminent importance: in a decree in Priene, probably of the late third 
century, it was declared that ‘nothing is better for the Greeks than freedom’. Eleutheria was 
principally a freedom found in the self-determination of popular government, and nothing 
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could have been more important for the rise of eleutheria as a concept than the establishment 
of democracy in Athens in 508 BC. It was primarily an egalitarian notion of freedom prefigured 
on the equal rights of citizenship. The Greeks, furthermore, had a closely related term, 
autonomia, understood primarily as the independence of a city-state from external 
domination. The Spartans, according to Thucydides, used the autonomia of Greece as the 
principle for war against rising Athenian imperialism. We have, therefore, a conception of 
freedom based on the self-government and independence of a collective people. Greek 
freedom was inherently bound to the presence of a space characterised by internal, as well as 
external (i.e. inter-state), equality. 
 The Athenians would develop this understanding of freedom to incorporate speech, of 
which they developed two key terms: isēgoria, and parrhēsia. Isēgoria denoted the ability of 
all citizens to speak in the public forum of the Assembly and Council (claiming the positive 
right of ho boulomenos), and parrhēsia was the ability to speak about anything one wished, 
free from hindrance. Athenian freedom, therefore, could be seen to have comprised both a 
positive and negative right concerning speech. However, this is slightly misleading, particularly 
with the case of parrhēsia, which was, as D.M. Carter describes it, "a characteristic of citizens, 
an attribute" (2004: 198). Parrhēsia seems to have been a more general attitude to speech 
more generally, and could be used outside of the confines of citizenship (where it meant to 
speak with frankness). It was definitely not a legal right, for any citizen could be tried for any 
statements deemed too outlandish, for example, in the trial of Socrates. But despite this, 
parrhēsia tended to carry a great deal of political weight behind it as a 'characteristic of 
citizenship'; for example, one cannot imagine the extent to which Athenian playwrights 
ridiculed their statesmen occurring in many other contexts in the classical period (non-
Athenians considered this a very strange phenomenon), or the occurrence of the philosophical 
revolution instigated by the Sophists. Of the two terms, however, isēgoria is a much more 
influential concept for Arendt's political theory; what attracts her to it in particular is its 
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fundamental connection with the equality of participatory citizenship as evident in the culture 
of the polis. Strictly speaking, parrhēsia is a freedom which needs no reference to shared 
citizenship and is a freedom perfectly compatible with other forms of government - even of a 
tyrannical character. 
 After the publication of The Origins of Totalitarianism in 1951, Arendt started writing a 
book called Introduction into Politics, with the intention that it be a political complement to 
Karl Jaspers' recent philosophical work regarding the experience of communication. It was 
never published in her lifetime, though many of its core themes would come to form the basis 
of The Human Condition. Introduction into Politics is by far the most revealing of Arendt's 
posthumously published writings, and the reason for this is that she approaches the 
phenomenon of politics with a far greater directness than any of her other publications - even 
The Human Condition. Within it, in a section entitled 'The Meaning of Politics', she directly 
references isēgoria whilst discussing isonomia, the Greek term for a free constitution, which 
"all have the same claim to political activity, and in the polis this activity primarily took the 
form of speaking with one another. Isonomia is therefore essentially the equal right to speak, 
and as such the same thing as isēgoria" (PP: 118). Free constitutions are understood in spatial 
terms, as spaces of equal participation in speech: "the crucial point about this kind of political 
freedom is that it is a spatial construct" (ibid: 119). We shall be repeatedly drawing upon the 
pages of this text throughout this thesis.  
 The Roman concept of freedom, libertas, is definitely not the same as eleutheria and 
its corresponding terms. Libertas designates an equality before the law, binding for plebeians 
and patricians alike; it was constituted by a collection of personal liberties, supported by law, 
based on the distinction between slave and non-slave. Its greatest institutional manifestation 
was the office of tribune, whose job it was to check the power of the senate and magistrates. 
No such process existed in Greece. In this sense, we can say that Roman liberty was orientated 
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far more toward the right of the individual rather than the right of collective self-
determination. The Roman republic was never a democracy as the Greeks would have 
identified it, and the limited meaning of the term libertas, when compared to eleutheria, 
highlights this difference. Whilst eleutheria comprises rights of equal participation, libertas 
does not; as Wirszubski notes, in Rome “the right to govern was not considered a universal 
civic right” (1950: 14).  
 The simple fact is that Arendt never really discusses libertas in her considerations of 
political freedom, and when she does, she is dismissive of it: "this freedom of the political 
man, which in its highest form was coincident with discerning insight, has next to nothing to 
do with...the Roman libertas" (PP: 169). Thus, we can conclude that her conceptual 
appropriation on this matter owes much more to the Greeks than the Romans, primarily 
because of the role of language. I believe that Arendt distinguishes between two different 
types of freedom based entirely upon her distinction between the public and private realms, 
with the Greek form of freedom corresponding to the public realm, and the Roman to the 
private. The 'liberal attitude' of the Romans, Arendt argues, meant that "unlike the Greeks, 
[they] never sacrificed the private to the public, but on the contrary understood that these 
two realms could exist only in the form of coexistence" (HC: 59). When we compare eleutheria 
with libertas, we have what Arendt might call a division between the freedom of politics, and 
the freedom of society to act in self-interest. And when we view it like this, Arendt's 
reflections of Greece form more of an attempt to understand the phenomenon of politics in its 
most isolated form rather than a mere Greacophillic pining. Of course, as I have attempted to 
express, this means recognising the centrality of speech. Arendt is in fact highly critical of 
libertas, the theoretical representative of liberal freedom as non-interference, insofar as it is 
seen as synonymous with political freedom. This, she believes, is the acquired belief of the 
modern age, which in its early stages demanded a freedom of the individual from politics, and 
in a later (proto-totalitarian) form the freedom of productive and consumptive society from 
29 
 
impediment. These claims will be expanded upon in subsequent chapters, particularly chapter 
five.   
 
1.3 Speech and the Tradition of Political Philosophy 
 
By highlighting eleutheria, Arendt is laying the foundations for a radical critique of the 
tradition of post-Socratic political philosophy and what she considers its central theme of 
'speechlessness'. Freedom is no longer found in the give and take of linguistic interplay, but in 
speechless wonder. In The Human Condition, Aristotle is undoubtedly the most visible 
influence, despite her insistence that he appropriated the Platonic aversion to politics. 
However, she turns to Aristotle as the principal source in understanding the bios politikos 
because he "only formulated the current opinion of the polis about man and the political way 
of life" (HC: 27). Thus, building on Greek political self-understanding, he can be seen as a 
philosopher who documented the "experience of the polis...the most talkative of the bodies 
politic" (ibid: 26). In his Eudemian Ethics Aristotle supplied us with a rudimentary definition of 
man as 'communal animal'. A community is found wherever there is commonality of interest, 
but this is not a specifically human trait; a bee, for example, can be said to be a member of 
such a community. It is important to note that this relationship is instrumental in character. 
Aristotle's famous definition of man as 'political animal' emerges later in his Politics, in which 
speech serves as the interest of the political community; man is a political animal insofar as he 
is a 'living being capable of speech'. Obviously, this is not to suggest that those who existed 
outside of politics (barbarians and excluded groups such as women and slaves) did not have 
the capacity to speak, but rather that they were deprived "of a way of life in which speech and 
only speech made sense and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk with each 
other" (ibid: 27). The implication of this distinction between the two communities (political 
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and non-political) is that a non-political community's interest is homogenous, whereas a 
political community's interest is found in the plural heterogeneity of speaking. Arendt 
bemoans the latinisation of 'political animal' as 'social animal' because it fails to adequately 
distinguish between these two communities; in her words it "indicated an alliance between 
people for a specific purpose" (ibid: 23). Accordingly, the mistranslation loses the significance 
of the non-instrumental relationship between speech and politics. Likewise, the notion of the 
human individual as a 'living being capable of speech' soon became a 'rational animal', 
substituting speech for intellect - whose chief characteristic was that "its content cannot be 
rendered in speech" (ibid: 27), a perspective that she believes that Aristotle would in fact 
come to prioritise.  
 The supersedure of speech to intellect is a theme which animates Arendt's wider 
critique of the tradition of political philosophy. She locates this turn in Plato's fierce response 
to the failure of Socrates to persuade his peers of his innocence of the charge of impiety and 
the corruption of youth, for which he was soon executed. Persuasion held an elevated position 
within Greek political culture, and rhetoric, the art of persuasion, was considered as the 
supreme political art:  
 To be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words 
 and persuasion and not through force and violence. In Greek self-understanding, 
 to force people  by violence, to command rather than persuade, were prepolitical ways 
 to deal with people characteristic of life outside the polis (ibid: 25-26) 
Even those sentenced to execution would be persuaded to take their own life, a notion which 
seems ludicrous today. The command, in distinction to persuasion, amounts to an act of 
violence which "is by nature instrumental; like all means, it always stands in need of guidance 
and justification through the end it pursues" (OV: 51). Thus, Arendt's emphasis upon speech 
serves the function of promoting a vision of politics strongly distinguished from instrumental 
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rationality, whose logic pervades the non-political sphere. This notion of the relationship 
between rhetoric, freedom, and politics will be developed throughout the subsequent 
chapters.  
 Plato's reaction to Socrates' unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Athenian citizen-
judges was to reject the entire basis of a politics centred around opinion and rhetoric. The 
orator would come to be seen as an individual who speaks, at best, with style over substance, 
and at worst as a linguistic performer whose main intention is the manipulation of an 
audience. In his allegory of the cave, Plato distinguishes between the realm of opinion and the 
realm of truth, and at this point authentic speech is overcome by authentic vision. One does 
not require persuasion in the face of truth. Speaking becomes meaningless when one has seen 
the truth because the truth requires vision, not words, it is 'unspeakable', and this is key 
moment in the post-Socratic development of the tyranny of truth upon politics. Intellect was 
the mark of those fit to rule over the polis, and requires abstention from the noisy 'unquiet' of 
a politics composed of opinion, as "the philosopher's experience of the eternal...can occur only 
outside the realm of human affairs and outside the plurality of men" (ibid: 20). The result was 
an understanding of the ideal political order as stasis, one in which the philosopher would be 
able to practice their pure thinking activity unhindered by the apparent arbitrariness of 
opinions. This was a (non-)political condition in which "every movement, the movements of 
body and soul as well as of speech and reasoning, must cease before truth" (ibid: 15). With 
this move, the polis has become a truly safe haven for philosophising, to the detriment of 
political freedom itself. Arendt, whose political thought sets itself against this attitude, rejects 
the positive role of truth in the political space because 
 all truths- not only the various kinds of rational truth but also factual truth- are 
 opposed to opinion in their mode of asserting validity. Truth carries within itself  an 
 element of coercion, and the frequently tyrannical tendencies so deplorably obvious 
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 among professional truthtellers may be caused less by a failing of character than by 
 the strain of habitually living under a kind of compulsion (BPF: 235)  
Truth is compulsive because once the truth is placed in public it becomes just another opinion. 
And as the very notion of truth sets itself against opinion, it is in its nature to avoid the 
difficulties of persuasion, and therefore seeks to assert itself over others. As a result it 
becomes intrinsically tyrannical. Even truthtellers of the saintly variety, Arendt maintains, are 
set against the human condition of plurality as authentic speaking is sidelined by the 
compulsion of engaging the truth at hand. 
 If Plato rebelled against the ability of Socrates' prosecutors to influence his judges, 
then he must seek to found a space in which the inherent malleability of opinions cannot 
broach. In order to ensure the freedom of the Academy and secure the life devoted to 
contemplative truth, philosophers "had to be freed from politics in the Greek sense in order to 
be free for the space of academic freedom...liberation from politics was a prerequisite for the 
freedom of the academic" (PP: 131-132). The foundation of eleutheria resides in the positivity 
of equal rhetorical intercourse, and when this is sidelined by the appearance of professionals 
and experts (as is the ultimate conclusion of the Platonic community) the participatory 
element of politics is lost and politics becomes a closed sphere open to a very different kind of 
danger than Plato delineated. Certainly, factual truth can be used as a weapon against 
tyranny, but "the modes of thought and communication that deal with truth, if seen from a 
political perspective, are necessarily domineering; they don't take into account other people's 
opinions, and taking these into account is the hallmark of a strictly political thinking" (BPF: 
237). In this manner Arendt claims that truth can be the bearer of a truly 'despotic character'.  
 
1.4 Speech in Modernity 
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Arendt's critique of the post-Socratic tradition of political philosophy is only half the story of 
this chapter. Her account of speech is shaped in equal - if not greater - measure by her critique 
of totalitarianism, and bridging these two critiques is a highly charged description of the 
modern age and its flaws. As we have seen, much of the repulsion toward rhetoric that we 
find in various thinkers is directed at its ability to move fellow individuals to action through 
deception and linguistic trickery. In essence, the problem identified is that language can be 
used as a tool through which personal agendas can be advanced, and the truth of the matter 
at hand all too easily concealed. History is rife with examples of this nature, and the problem, 
as we know, was deemed by Plato to lay in the manipulability of opinion itself. Arendt, to a 
certain extent, accepts this problem. However, instead of indulging in the total opposition 
between speech (which discloses opinion) and thought (which discloses truth) which animates 
Platonic philosophy, Arendt takes aim at a very particular kind of speech. It is this kind of 
speech which she believes to be the dominant form of speaking in the modern age, and which 
she would develop further after her experience of totalitarianism and, more specifically, the 
trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961. Heidegger calls the form of speech in question 'idle talk' (see 
Heidegger, 1962), and whilst Arendt does not directly reference this term, she sometimes 
speaks of the language of clichés, which we shall refer to as clichégenic speech, whose 
character is very similar to idle talk. Whereas Plato castigates the ease at which one can 
deliberately deceive through rhetorical devices, clichégenic speech is quite different insofar as 
it a form of non-deliberate self-deception. And whereas Plato identified the tyranny of mass 
opinion as the natural condition of the demos, Arendt considers it to be unnatural. It is this key 
difference which shapes their entire respective political outlooks. Let us explore this point 
further.   
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 As one commentator has correctly noted: "virtually the entire agenda of Arendt's 
political thought was set by her reflections on the political catastrophes of the mid-century" 
(Canovan, 1992: 7). And it is my contention, which will be stated throughout this thesis, that 
her theory of speech is crucial to understanding the totalitarian ‘catastrophe’. In her various 
writings on totalitarian governance, which preoccupied a significant part of her early writings, 
Arendt is undoubtedly interested in how totalitarian bureaucracy destroys personal 
responsibility. Bureaucracy, the 'rule of nobody', works much like a machine with a system of 
human cogs: "each cog, that is, each person , must be expendable without changing the 
system, an assumption underlying all bureaucracies, all civil services, and all functions properly 
speaking" (RJ: 29). If the system one operates within eschews personal responsibility in favour 
of robotic functionalism, the capacity for the crimes of totalitarianism moves closer to hand. It 
was this shortcoming of responsibility which facilitated the complicity of individuals who were 
not committed ideologues within the totalitarian system of total terror.  
 Repeatedly, Arendt grapples with the question 'Who is responsible?', and emphasises 
the difficulties of providing a clear answer, primarily because "everybody...from high to low 
who had anything to do with public affairs was in fact a cog, whether he knew it or not" (ibid: 
30). She would argue that tracing the path of murder from the concentration camps leads to 
only to the bureaucracy itself, problematic because if one simply blames the system then 
either all or no-one can be deemed responsible. This legal quandary became evident 
immediately with the advent of the Nazi war trials, with many of the defendants declaring 
"not I but the system did it in which I was a cog" (ibid: 31).  To which Arendt asks, "and why, if 
you please, did you become a cog or continue to be a cog under such circumstances?" (ibid). 
Furthermore, in her analysis of the post-war trials we encounter an Arendt perplexed by how 
so many of the defendants seemed completely comfortable with themselves; she exclaimed:  
"those who are guilty of something real have the calmest consciences in the world" (EU: 259). 
These were not individuals bereft with guilt and regret, “their conscience [was] cleared 
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through the bureaucratic organization of their acts” (ibid: 129), and "unlike the villain, he 
never meets his midnight disaster" (PAP: 445). Often they voiced outright confusion as to their 
situation, displaying a “horrible innocence that transforms itself into a persecution complex” 
(EU: 259-260). Why them? Why prosecute the 'small fish'?- they frequently asked. The finger 
would predictably be pointed higher up the bureaucratic ladder, a ladder which frustrates any 
judicial attempt at "establishing responsibilities and determining the extent of criminal guilt" 
(RJ: 241). Arendt paints a portrait of the mindset of the bureaucratic jobholding functionary, 
whom she also refers to in her early texts as 'bourgeois': 
 When his occupation forces him to murder people he does not regard himself as a 
 murderer because he has not done it out of inclination but in his professional 
 capacity…If we  tell a member of this new occupational class which our time has 
 produced that he is being held to account for what he did, he will feel nothing 
 except that he has been betrayed. But if in the shock of the catastrophe he really 
 becomes conscious that in fact he was not only a functionary but also a  murderer, 
 then his way out will not be that of rebellion, but suicide (EU: 130) 
Perhaps, Arendt insinuates here, the phenomenon of mass suicides which gripped Germany in 
1945 as the system crumbled, responsibility was forced back upon them, and the reality of 
their actions apparent. They were no longer participants in a criminal system, but simply 
criminals.  
 It is with the problem of personal responsibility in totalitarian bureaucracy in mind 
that Arendt travelled to Jerusalem in order to report on the trial of the Nazi bureaucrat Adolf 
Eichmann, who by all accounts displayed the curious qualities outlined above. The ultimate 
'desk murderer', Eichmann oversaw the completion of many of Nazi Germany's most heinous 
crimes. As had struck Arendt in her early analyse of the bourgeois, Eichmann seemed the 
epitome of normalcy, and he took pains to emphasise his 'lack of prejudice' towards the 
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victims of Nazi crime. Again, the threadbare defence of earlier trials was regurgitated; "He did 
his duty, as he told the police and the court over and over again; he not only obeyed orders, he 
also obeyed the law" (EJ: 135). In essence, the subject on trial was an individual who did not fit 
the characteristic mould of an evildoer, yet his complicity had enabled gross criminality. This 
claim grounds her notorious conceptualisation of the 'banality of evil', which in her words, 
 meant no theory or doctrine but something quite factual, the phenomenon of evil 
 deeds,  committed on a gigantic scale, which could not be traced to any particularity 
 of wickedness, pathology, or ideological conviction in the doer, whose only personal 
 distinction was a perhaps extraordinary shallowness...not stupidity but a 
 curious, quite authentic inability to think (TMC: 417) 
Arendt would devote much of her time to analysing Eichmann's purported 'thoughtlessness' 
beyond the pages of Eichmann in Jerusalem, culminating in her unfinished Life of the Mind 
(1971). 
 I believe the key observation of Arendt's reflections on the near total cessation of 
responsibility under totalitarianism to be the self-deception of those involved. We are dealing, 
therefore, with a different phenomenon than that which informs the Platonic critique of 
rhetoric, which centres on conscious, premeditated deception. Whereas the crowd which 
Plato attacks is deceived by another speaker, I think that Arendt identifies that the deception 
is rooted in our own internal forms of speaking. As mentioned before, Heidegger's notion of 
idle talk is crucial to recognising this claim. According to Heidegger, in order to be understood, 
language must always have a base level of 'average intelligibility' with which we communicate. 
We are born into a linguistic world, and its basic rules we must adopt in order to speak and be 
understood. Language has already been given to us, so to speak. When we communicate "we 
have the same thing in view, because it is in the same averageness that we have a common 
understanding of what is said" (Heidegger, 1962: 212). This is the foundation of our everyday 
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understandings of ourselves as a Being and of the world we inhabit. In itself this is not 
problematic, as Arendt herself notes when she claims that "popular language, as it expresses 
preliminary understanding, thus starts the process of true understanding" (EU: 312). Popular 
language is therefore of the utmost importance. When Heidegger introduces the label of 'idle 
talk', however, Heidegger critiques this language, the language of das Man: the 'they', the 
'anyone', the 'one'. These idle talkers fail to move beyond preliminary understanding, they 
become mired in the everyday averageness of language; for Heidegger, Idle talk is "the 
possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one's own" (1962: 
213). It is the understanding of the mass, not the individual. Idle talk is, basically, speech mired 
in cliché: it is the recycling of words which are not your own. We should think of cliché as a 
form of repetitive speech which limits the individual’s capacity to engage properly with the 
objects of the world, including politics.    
 It is important to recognise that Heidegger's account of idle talk is set against the 
background of the broader existential question of the authenticity of the Self. How can I claim 
to live a life that is authentically 'my own' rather than 'theirs'? How can I exist, as he phrases it, 
in 'mineness'? Heidegger makes it evident that authenticity is a desirable quality, something 
which is lacking among the inauthentic 'They', and he attempts to prescribe a means of 
escape. Whereas Heidegger seeks answers to the demands of authenticity through the 
elucidation of concepts such death and guilt, Arendt, on the other hand, points to the realm of 
politics. She takes up this idea of mass man and politicises it in a way which Heidegger does 
not, buoyed by her analysis of the totalitarian mass movements. We might consider this the 
question of how one differentiates oneself authentically from the political mass, a question 
which guides The Human Condition in its attempt at uncovering the conditions under which we 
can speak of authentic political action. Through the recycling of clichés the individual blocks 
their own potential to engage in authentic forms of speaking, and hence, acting. Eichmann, 
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Arendt maintains, is such an individual, and she attempts to understand whether this has a 
connection with the deference of responsibility and the conditions in which banal evil occurs.  
 Arendt opens 'Thinking and Moral Considerations' with the following description of 
Eichmann, which it is worth citing at length:  
 He functioned in the role of prominent war criminal as well as he had under the Nazi 
 regime; he had not the slightest difficulty in accepting an entirely different set of rules. 
 He knew that what he had once considered his duty was now called a crime, and 
 he accepted this new code of judgment as though it were nothing but another 
 language rule. To his rather limited supply of stock phrases he had added a few new 
 ones, and he was utterly helpless only when he was confronted with a situation  to 
 which none of them would apply, as in the most grotesque instance when he had 
 to make a speech under the gallows and was forced to rely on clichés used in funeral 
 oratory which were inapplicable in his case because he was not the survivor. 
 Considering what his last words should be in case of a death sentence, which he had 
 expected all along, this simple fact had not occurred to him, just as 
 inconsistencies and flagrant contradictions in examination and cross-examinations 
 during  the trial had not bothered him. Clichés, stock phrases, adherence to 
 conventional, standardized codes or expression and conduct have the socially 
 recognized function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our 
 thinking attention which all events and facts arouse by virtue of their existence. If 
 we were responsive to this claim all the time, we would soon be exhausted; the 
 difference in Eichmann was only that he clearly  knew of no such claim at all (TMC: 
 417-418) 
The key thing which struck Arendt about Eichmann, as evident in the above passage, was his 
predisposition for speaking in clichés, epitomised in the 'grotesque silliness of his last words': 
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"In the face of death, he had found the cliché used in funeral oratory. Under the gallows, his 
memory played him the last trick; he was 'elated' and he forgot that this was his own funeral" 
(EJ: 252). The implication of this is huge, because what Arendt locates is the concealing 
character of speech, or, to phrase it differently, the ideological character of cliché. The 
"grotesque silliness of his last words" (ibid: 252) which had left him visibly 'elated', seems to 
represent the greatest manifestation of what she called his "great susceptibility to catch words 
and stock phrases, combined with his incapacity for ordinary speech" (ibid: 86). She continues: 
"It was as though in those last minutes he was summing up the lesson that this long course in 
human wickedness had taught us - the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying 
banality of evil" (ibid: 252). This statement is of great importance because it recognises the 
link between the phenomenon of banal evil with clichégenic language.  
 The portrait that Arendt paints of him is that of an individual who completely bypasses 
any reflection upon the language he uses. Eichmann himself recognised this, proclaiming that 
"Officialese is my only language" (as cited by Arendt, EJ: 48). His words emerged almost as 
automatic responses without thought, and Arendt again describes him with morbid curiosity:  
 officialese became his language because he was genuinely incapable of uttering a 
 single  sentence that was not a cliché...[there was a] striking consistency with which 
 Eichmann, despite his rather bad memory, repeated word for word the same stock 
 phrases and self-invented clichés (when he did succeed in constructing a 
 sentence of his own, he repeated it until it became a cliché) each time he referred 
 to an incident or event of importance to him...what he said was always the same, 
 expressed in the same words. The longer one listened to him, the more  obvious it 
 became that his inability to speak was closely connected with an inability to think, 
 namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else. No communication was 
 possible with him, not because he lied but because he was surrounded by the most 
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 reliable of all safeguards against the words and the presence of others, and hence 
 against reality as such (EJ: 49) 
Eichmann's 'adherence to conventional, standardized codes or expressions' manifest in cliché, 
Arendt repeatedly states, has the effect of inhibiting the 'reality' of the world. Ultimately, this 
is a sign of this 'thoughtlessness', his inability to question the received words of others and 
reflect upon his own appropriation of language. This insight has been touched upon before by 
some commentators. Maloney and Miller correctly (albeit briefly) note that clichés act as 
‘short-circuits’ for proper judgment (a theme developed in this thesis in chapter three), and 
that “Arendt often used cliché as a window into the public understanding of an event or social 
problem” (Maloney & Miller, 2007: 10). The idea behind this is that an analysis of clichégenic 
language can gather insights into areas of political discourse that has degenerated into mass 
thoughtless, and examples such as the Vietnam War are given.  
 For Arendt, thought and speech are inherently interlinked. To state that one has a 
causal effect on the other would be misrepresenting her, as they both emerge together; 
thought is as dependent on speech as speech is on thought. Arendt would state the political 
importance of thinking in the following manner: 
 Non-thinking...By shielding people from the dangers of examination, it teaches them 
 to hold fast to whatever the prescribed rules of conduct may be at a given time in a 
 given society. What people then get used to is less the content of the rules, a close 
 examination of  which would always lead them into perplexity, than the  possession of 
 rules under which to subsume particulars. If somebody appears  who, for whatever 
 purposes, wishes to abolish the old 'values' or virtues, he will find that easy enough, 
 provided he offers a new code, and he will need relatively little force and no 
 persuasion- i.e. proof, that the new values are better than the old- to impose it. The 
 more firmly men hold to the code, the more eager will they be to assimilate 
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 themselves to the new one, which in practice means that the readiest to obey will be 
 those who were the most respectable pillars of society, the least likely to indulge in 
 thoughts, dangerous or otherwise, while those who to all appearances were the most 
 unreliable elements of the old order will be the least tractable (Arendt, T: 177) 
It was one of those strange features of totalitarian government that its leaders were by all 
appearances respectable individuals - loving family members and earnest jobholders. The 
banal evil of totalitarianism emerged when the normalcy of the given code of judgment, with 
its obedience, turned against the human condition of plurality and made anonymity itself part 
of the desired social will. In addition, the code creates a structure for the individual to relate 
and respond to that which was happening around him, just as Eichmann was able to perform 
the roles required of him at the time. The cliché structures our relationship with the 
phenomena which we encounter, and therefore "destroys our authentic relation to things" 
(Heidegger, 1959: 13-14). In other words, it means that we respond to political experiences 
without reflection and in a habituated manner, aping the responses to experiences that are 
deemed normal at the time. When the totalitarian arose - a specifically new political 
phenomenon which required a specifically new response - thoughtless individuals were unable 
to authentically relate to that which was happening around them. These exceptional moments 
that arise require us to think and then respond in a manner which we have not done before. 
Clichés generate resistance to this necessary responsiveness because they fail to facilitate 
destructive thinking. In certain circumstances this can all-too-easily result in tragedy. As with 
Heidegger, I believe that Arendt provides a narration of the decline of authentic speaking in 
the modern age. We will examine this claim in greater detail in the next chapter, and for the 
mean time it is suffice to say that the totalitarian inability to think is the result of the forces of 
modern world alienation.  
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 In his article entitled ‘The Political Theory of the Cliché’, Jakob Norberg attempts to 
link the topic with a critique of social psychology and its application of criteria of normalcy to 
its subjects, whilst also protecting Arendt from the criticism that she is overly concerned with 
an ultimately superficial phenomenon (Norberg, 2010). Clichéd speech might at first glance 
appear to be an odd phenomenon to focus ire upon - particularly given the context of the 
holocaust - and it would seem that this was a factor in some negative responses to Arendt’s 
analysis. Norberg offers a strong defence of Arendt on this issue, correctly contextualising the 
discussion of cliché through Arendt’s political commitment to plurality, stating that “the 
problem with someone who only speaks in clichés and therefore hardly speaks at all is of 
course not that he is not normal, but that he is only normal and nothing else” (ibid: 88). The 
manifestation of cliché, he argues following Arendt, points to a “blindness to the plurality of 
views…the source of Eichmann’s guilt is his impenetrable ignorance of the plurality 
constitutive of politics” (ibid: 87). In his article, Norberg criticises the positivity of normalcy 
that orthodox psychology promotes, declaring that this perspective is at odds with politics and 
the plurality of perspectives that constitutes the political realm. Clichés help to maintain a 
normalcy which limits the scope of potential thought and action through closing the space of 
reflection. “In politics as Arendt conceives of it”, he continues, “there can be no normality, 
only viewpoints whose differences crystallize within a multiplicity that emerges through 
deliberation and contestation” (ibid: 89). Norberg’s interesting article helps to shed light on an 
under-studied of Arendt’s thought, and is correct in its claims that the concept of the cliché is 
a fruitful resource in understanding the broader questions surrounding speech and the 
political realm.  
 
1.5 Socratic Speech 
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We have been investigating Arendt's connection between clichégenic speech, thoughtlessness, 
and banal evil. Now we must turn to her proposal of how clichégenic speech may be 
countered, and to do so we have to explore her description of Socrates, a thinker who she 
believes had discovered the capacity to instigate thought amongst his fellow Athenian citizens. 
In her reflections on the activity of thinking Arendt repeatedly singles out Socrates as the 
model, 'purest' thinker, who significantly (according to Aristotle) also discovered the 'concept'. 
The important point for her is to note what Socrates did once he discovered it. Plato's early 
Socratic dialogues (which Arendt maintains are representative of the historical Socrates rather 
than the Platonic Socrates) centre around an attempt to understand the meaning of a word, of 
which our concepts are comprised, they "deal with very simple, everyday concepts, such as 
arise whenever people open their mouths and begin to talk" (TMC: 429). The presumption in 
this task is that the word "is something like a frozen thought which thinking must unfreeze, 
defrost as it were, whenever it wants to find out its original meaning" (ibid: 431). 
 These words, used to group together seen and manifest qualities and occurrences but 
 nevertheless relating to something unseen, are part and parcel of our everyday 
 speech, and still we can give no account of them; when we try to define them, they 
 get slippery; when we talk about their meaning, nothing stays put anymore, 
 everything begins to move (ibid: 429)  
These early Socratic dialogues are aporetic - that is, they do not go anywhere; at the end of 
the text we are left just as puzzled as we were at the beginning. They do not tell us what 
knowledge or piety is. At times, the word in question can even seem meaningless after the 
discussion. The dialogues are the Socratic extension of the thinking activity: they are 
destructive, and they do not yield tangible results. This is the basis of Heideggerian thinking as 
the hermeneutic movement 'from the clear into the obscure', to "take what has become 
obvious and make it transparent" (Heidegger, 2003: 7). The process of unfreezing the frozen 
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words which we can all-too-easily unthinkingly accept, Arendt likens to a battle, and "this 
battle can be refought only by language" (T: 115).The remarkable quality of Socrates is that 
the seeming lack of results of this 'battle' did not stop him from continuing this endeavour. 
This 'battle', if we may translate, was the battle against the cliché. It should be noted that in 
presenting Socrates in this manner Arendt seems to be adopting the distinction between the 
historical and Platonic Socrates, of which Plato’s early Socratic dialogues are considered the 
best example of the individual that was Socrates, rather than being a literary vessel for the 
voice of Plato himself.  
 In these texts of Plato's, Socrates describes his philosophic function in various ways: as 
a 'midwife', helping to 'deliver' the authentic thoughts of others; and as a 'gadfly', constantly 
biting his peers through his relentless questioning so that they can be accountable to what 
they believe, forcing them to examine their opinions. The most pertinent portrayal of Socrates 
is that of the 'electric ray': "the electric ray paralyzes others only through being paralyzed 
itself. It isn't that, knowing the answers myself I perplex other people. The truth is rather that I 
infect them also with the perplexity I feel myself" (as cited by Arendt, TMC: 431). Arendt 
claims that this paralysis has two effects: it creates the interruptive and reflective 'stop and 
think', and a 'dazing after-effect', the feeling "unsure of what seemed to you beyond doubt 
while you were unthinkingly engaged in whatever you were doing" (Arendt, T: 175). It is 
through Socrates' thinking-through words with others that wonder is brought forth. Wonder 
opens up the terrain of language as the source of enquiry, and thus enquires about the 
foundations on which our linguistic ontology is built. Because wonder enables thought, and as 
thought is a form of mental speaking, wonder makes possible our thinking through words and 
about words. Language becomes the source, object, and medium of thought and speech. 
When Socrates claimed that he causes perplexity through uncovering the slipperiness of words 
to others, Arendt claims, he "sums up neatly the only way thinking can be taught" (TMC: 431). 
The thinking about language that wonder brings: 
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 inevitably has a destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, 
 measurements of good and evil, in short, on those customs and rules of conduct we 
 treat of in morals and ethics. These frozen thoughts, Socrates seems to say, come so 
 handily that you can use them in your sleep; but if the wind of thinking,  which I shall 
 now stir in you, has shaken you from your sleep and made you fully awake and alive, 
 then you will see that you have nothing in your grasp but perplexities, and the best we 
 can do with them is share them  with each other (T: 175) 
In this manner, Arendt considers Socrates to be the person who understood the Greek political 
self-consciousness which was outlined earlier as well as any. For it was the sharing of words 
which they cherished - words were the bridge between what appears to each individual, for no 
one individual holds the key to absolute knowledge. Persuasion is important because it 
recognises that one's thoughts are malleable, not crystallised. Arendt places a great deal of 
trust in the personality of Socrates. So much, in fact, that much of her vision of politics relies 
upon it. In the Socratic dialogue she locates the spirit of political speech of eudemonia 
introduced earlier, and in this sense Arendt thinks of Socrates as the pre-eminent philosopher 
of the polis. In distinction with Plato, Socratic thinking is very much part and parcel of 
rhetorical speaking.  
 Arendt believes that personal responsibility is bound to the individual's capacity for 
thought. The 'two-in-one' of thought, where 'I am both the one who asks and the one who 
answers', is analogous to the development of what we call conscience. She credits Socrates 
with the discovery of conscience, for whom "the duality of the two-in-one meant no more 
than that if you want to think, you must see to it that the two who carry on the dialogue be in 
good shape, that the partners be friends" (ibid: 187-188). "Conscience," she details, "is the 
anticipation of the fellow who awaits you if and when you come home" (ibid: 191). In sum, a 
thinking individual of conscience will display a sense of personal responsibility because one 
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holds oneself accountable to oneself. The choice, therefore, for an individual of conscience in 
the deliberation of action or non-action is between self-respect or self-contempt. "Who would 
want to be the friend of and have to live together with a murderer? Not even another 
murderer" (ibid: 188), she clams. The murderer could only be at peace if they do not have 
conscience - if they were not aware of themselves as a murderer. A condition of 
thoughtlessness is analogous to a lack of conscience, and this helps explain Eichmann's and 
many other defendants' visible lack of guilt and constant deferral of responsibility.  
 On the other hand, Arendt looks at the example of non-participants existing amongst 
the 'deep moral confusion' of Nazi Germany: 
 the nonparticipants were those whose consciences did not function in this, as it were, 
 automatic way...Their criterion, I think, was a different one: they asked themselves to 
 what extent they would be able to live in peace with themselves after having 
 committed certain deeds; and they decided that it would be better to do nothing, not 
 because the world would then be changed for the better, but simply because only on 
 this condition could they go on living with themselves at all. Hence, they also chose to 
 die when they were forced to participate (RJ: 44) 
The non-participants Arendt is talking about - conscientious objectors of society, possessed 
the personal responsibility which demands that the individual holds themselves to account for 
their own actions. As should be clear from this discussion, the individuality of thought brings 
about the individuality of personal responsibility, and so long as clichégenic speech inhibits the 
internal conversation of the mind that is thinking, then personal responsibility will continue to 
be largely absent. Socrates’ insight shows how internal dialogue can only come about through 
the external influence of the language of others.  
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1.6 Politics Against Cliché 
 
What we have now is a polarity between two dominant forms of speech: rhetoric and cliché. 
One provides the basis of a free and equal politics, and the other, a politics of ideological 
constriction. It is hard not to accept the claim of D'Entrѐves that Arendtian action is based on 
'mutuality, solidarity, and persuasion', or Benhabib's that the 'presence of common action [is] 
coordinated through speech and persuasion', though I fear that they risk alienating certain 
important aspects of it when they criticise the influence of Greece. The choice is not quite so 
clear cut as they present it, and Arendt's attempts to draw upon concepts such as eleutheria 
prove as much. These concepts, it should be said, aided her in her attempt to understand and 
critique the phenomenon of totalitarianism and the experience of 'thoughtless' mass man. As 
her repeated turns to Socrates suggest, the question of how to regain a trust in a politics of 
rhetorical intercourse and the abandonment of clichégenic linguistic fiction is crucial to 
understanding the intention of Arendtian political thought. The Human Condition, a book 
which clearly celebrates political action does not aim at inspiring political action, but thought: 
"what I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing" 
(HC: 5). The book itself is based around a select core of words such as politics, public, private, 
action, work, and labour, as are her other books where we encounter thought, will, judgment, 
freedom, authority, morality (and so on...). Her writings insist exploration of these words upon 
the reader. As Socrates attempted within the walls of Athens, Arendt implores us to 
experience the perplexing nature of these words within the confines of the text. Arendt's 
writings are an assault upon our political clichés; those clichés of speech which result in the 
ideological cliché of the mind. They are words which stand against ideology and the mass 
codes of judgment brought about by thoughtlessness. She voiced admiration for Lessing's 
understanding of Selbstdenken - self thinking - which requires us to think without a 'banister', 
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and sought through her writing to disclose the misrepresentations of much of our dominant 
political language since Plato. 
 We have introduced the notion that clichégenic speech is the dominant form of 
speech in the modern age much to the detriment of political association, and in the next 
chapter we shall build upon this observation. The stage is set for Arendt's confrontation with 
the question of what she calls the 'living-together of men' which consists in our relationship 
with our peers. As she consistently declares, the modern age constantly frustrates our capacity 
for human connection, resulting in what she terms 'world alienation'.  
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Chapter Two 
Modernity and Friendship 
 
We closed the previous chapter with the claim that Arendt promotes an account of politics 
against cliché, motivated by a dual critique of post-Socratic political philosophy and 
totalitarianism. In the following chapter we further examine what the foundation of non-
clichégenic political language is, and in order to do so we must again return to the topic of 
totalitarian mass man as a means of analysis. The chapter proceeds with an examination of the 
political sociology of totalitarianism, in which we compare three prominent terms: solitude, 
isolation, and loneliness. The first two of these terms correlate in Arendt's thought with 
different kinds of physical and mental activities, whereas the third is purely negative and is not 
associated with any activity properly speaking. Particular attention is paid to loneliness 
because Arendt considers it to be the most influential social circumstance of the modern age, 
which she believes has profoundly influenced our understanding of politics, rooted in what 
Arendt calls the process of world-alienation. In Arendt’s thought, it is argued, loneliness is 
opposed to friendship: if loneliness is connected to worldlessness, then friendship is 
connected to worldliness. Following Arendt, I argue that her notion of friendship expressly 
political, it being based on a kind of discursive equality, examples of which she borrows from 
classical philosophy as well as her observations regarding her friend and one-time teacher Karl 
Jaspers. The kind of discourse which Arendt identifies as truly political takes place among 
friends, and it is only from within this sphere of friendship that freedom can be actualised. 
Recognising the importance of the relationship between the above terms, it is argued, is 
crucial to understand Arendt's critique of modern politics, as well as her cautious belief in free 
future possibilities.   
50 
 
 
2.1 Loneliness and the Totalitarian 
 
Arendt identifies the driving question of The Origins of Totalitarianism as "what kind of basic 
experience in the living-together of men permeates a form of government whose essence is 
terror and whose principle of action is the logicality of ideological thinking" (OT: 474). As we 
have explored so far in this thesis, the examination of the thinking activity and its relationship 
to a free politics is of huge importance to Arendtian political theory - to such an extent that it 
shapes her self-proclaimed intention of getting us to “think what we are doing” (HC: 5). It has 
been suggested that Arendt highlights speech as being of crucial importance in the fight 
against ideological thinking, which is referred to as a "self-compulsion...[which] ruins all 
relationships with reality" and as a "self-coercion...[which] destroys man's capacity for 
experience and thought just as certainly as his capacity for action" (OT: 474). The 'basic 
experience in the living-together of men' which Arendt is speaking of in this context is that of 
loneliness. Whilst Arendt does not consider loneliness to be an explicitly modern 
phenomenon, she does consider it to be the significant socio-political phenomenon of 
modernity. For Arendt, loneliness is "the common ground of terror, the essence of totalitarian 
government" (ibid: 475) and therefore is of critical importance for any post-totalitarian 
political analysis. Yet despite such a sweeping claim, Arendt only devotes a few pages to the 
term itself. Because of this we might conclude that Arendt never properly fleshes out a 
complete analysis of loneliness, and its relative disregard in Arendtian literature suggests that 
this is a common view among her commentators (Margaret Canovan, for example, dedicates 
only a couple of pages to the concept in her discussion of Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism; 
see Canovan, 1992: 91-92). However, such a position should definitely be avoided, mainly 
because the question of loneliness in Origins develops into the question of world alienation in 
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The Human Condition. And undoubtedly, the concept of world alienation plays a vital role in 
any attempt to piece together a picture of Arendt's understanding of the modern, led by the 
succinct quotation: "World alienation...has been the hallmark of the modern age" (HC: 254). 
But before we analyse this important aspect of her writings, we must ground it through an 
exposition of loneliness itself, and to do so we will need to distinguish it from two other terms 
that Arendt utilises which relate to the phenomenon of being alone.   
 The final section of Origins - in which we find Arendt's reflection on loneliness (though 
the term does appear intermittently throughout) - was added a few years after the book's 
initial publication. Holistically, it acts as a bridge between the Origins and The Human 
Condition, which suggests that the culminating socio-political claim of loneliness in the Origins 
prefigures and prepares the philosophical reflections we encounter in The Human Condition. 
Certainly, some of the key terms explored, such as the private-public distinction and the 'rise 
of the social' are derived in part from this central issue of loneliness. The final chapter, entitled 
'The Vita Activa and the Modern Age', can also be seen as the culmination of the philosophical 
ruminations surrounding loneliness and modernity.   
 Totalitarian movements, according to Arendt’s analysis, are "mass organizations of 
atomized, isolated individuals" whose "most conspicuous external characteristic is their 
demand for total, unrestricted, unconditional loyalty of the individual member" (OT: 323). 
Contrary to the trend of describing totalitarianism as a quasi-religious phenomenon, the 
totalitarian bond differs from the religious - whose loyalty is to the textual foundation of the 
religion itself - and therefore displays a certain regularity and predictability in action. By 
comparison, the Marxist-Leninist program, despite being clearer in intention than that of 
religious texts, was never an accurate guide for political behaviour in Russia, as the 
idiosyncratic interpretations generated by the leadership rendered the theoretical base 
completely disingenuous. And in the case of Nazi Germany, Hitler's 'greatest achievement' was 
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his unburdening of the Nazi movement from its early program (for example, the espousal of 
socialist sentiment), so that the party was used to a constant state of mobilisation as goals 
were set at will. The total slipperiness of totalitarian intentions hints toward a loyalty which 
goes beyond moral codes or political conditions, and points towards the allure of membership, 
as Himmler's phrase "My honour is my loyalty" (as cited by Arendt, ibid: 324) denotes. "Such 
loyalty" Arendt proclaims, "can be expected only from the completely isolated human being 
who, without any other social ties to family, friends, comrades, or even acquaintances, derives 
his sense of having a place in the world only from his belonging to a movement, his 
membership of a party" (ibid: 323-324). The crucial phrase here is 'place in the world'. Why 
does Arendt consider worldliness to be so important? And how does it relate to totalitarian 
loneliness? The answer to these questions can be gleaned from the following terminological 
analysis.  
There are three terms Arendt employs which relate to the state of individuation: 
solitude, isolation, and loneliness. And, whilst the language is similar, each term denotes a 
very different experience. Let us first examine solitude. It is clear that Arendt links solitude 
with the thinking activity; defined as "to be with one's self" (HC: 76) it is the "human situation 
in which I keep myself company" (T: 185), as found in the ‘two-in-one’ of thought. 
Contemplative in nature, solitude posits a removal from the world and into the privacy of the 
thinking mind, and for Arendt the solitudinous experience is most apparent amongst 
philosophers, who she sometimes disparagingly refers to as ‘professional thinkers’. The 
solitudinous individual freely chooses to remove themselves from the world; even the socialite 
Socrates, we are told, still found it necessary to withdraw himself from the company of others 
into the solitude of his home to think, and he was known to stand in public, immobile and 
unresponsive to others - in order to maintain his presence in the 'wind of thought'. One cannot 
enter into the internal dialogue of thought at the same time as one maintains dialogue with 
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the external other. In its extreme, this solitudinous withdrawal from the world can result in 
ignorance, apathy, or annoyance regarding the noisy goings on of the worldly space.  
 Isolation, in distinction, lacks the company of solitude - where the thinker shares 
company with themselves. It does allow, however, for the connection between the individual 
and the world. Unlike solitude, one can be isolated and still be a part of sensory shared world. 
Furthermore, isolation "not only leaves intact but is required for all so-called productive 
activities of men" (OT: 474) which create the 'objective' man-made artificial space of homo 
faber, and grants humanity physical permanence beyond the biological life-process. And in this 
sense, like solitude - isolation is freely chosen by the individual, for "man insofar as he is homo 
faber tends to isolate himself with his work", as the activity of fabrication "is always performed 
in a certain isolation from common concerns" (ibid: 475). In philosophical terms, the fabricator 
requires isolation because the idea, the "mental image of the thing to be" (HC: 161), is 
apparent only to the singular mind of the creator. The best example of this is probably found 
in the production of a work of art - where the input of others can serve only to move the 
artwork further from the original idea of the artist. Even when the finished product requires 
the conjoined specialisation of skills, the work is completed in isolation and organised into a 
whole afterwards: just as the medieval armament would have required the singular skills of 
armour smith, weapon smith, bowyer, fletcher, saddler etc. In art and craftsmanship, the 
widespread presence of the 'makers-mark' or signature certifies the individuality of this 
experience. Dissimilarly, the division of labour, the "multi-headed subject of all production", is 
specifically a joint enterprise as it "possesses the same togetherness as the parts which form 
the whole, and each attempt of isolation on the part of its members of the team would be 
fatal to the production itself" (HC: 161-162).  
 Isolation, however, is not to be strictly limited to the activities of homo faber, just as 
solitude is not limited to philosophers; the point is that it is in these specific fields that the 
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particular individuality of the experience is most lucid. Arendt often intends the term to be 
interpreted politically, and this is where the term discloses its significance, often highlighted 
through its relationship with the public sphere. Homo Faber, Arendt tells us, has his own public 
realm - the exchange market, "where he can show the products of his hand and receive the 
esteem which is due him" (HC: 160). In the "assemblage of shops" (ibid: 160) of the bazaar and 
medieval market districts, the individual is free to produce, display, and purchase worldly 
objects, yet this is a public space which is strictly concerned only with private interests and 
desires -  narrowed to the limited freedoms of manufacture and exchange. Interestingly, 
Arendt notes, it was the repeated desire of the Greek tyrants to transform the politicised 
agora into the non-political public sphere of the orient - the illustrious bazaars. This is the 
public space characteristic of pre-totalitarian tyrannies: worldly, yet isolated. The public world 
which is disclosed is strictly limited to the objects of human hands, not common affairs - which 
are conducted behind closed doors amongst trusted counsel: 
 political contacts between men are severed in tyrannical government and the human 
 capacities for action and power are frustrated. But not all contacts between men are 
 broken  and not all human capacities destroyed. The whole sphere of private life with 
 the capacities for experience, fabrication and thought are left intact (OT: 474) 
Politically speaking, isolation is a state of powerlessness and political 'impotence'; it is finding 
oneself "in a situation in which I cannot act, because there is nobody who will act with me" 
(ibid: 474). This is because the isolated public space is an extension of the private space, and, 
lacking the shared common world of speech and action required for political judgment - 
"nobody can any longer agree with anybody else" (HC: 58). This situation, Arendt claims, is 
fertile for the use of violence as a political means, as fear pervades. Continuing with this 
question of the 'basic experience in the living-together of men': tyranny is based on the 
experience isolation.  
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 Both solitude and isolation are necessary for the maintenance of the common public 
space: solitude for thought (which, as we saw in the last chapter is of the utmost importance), 
and isolation for building a shared 'objective' space. However, there is an inherent 
vulnerability towards loneliness in both of these experiences. The solitudinous individual 
becomes lonely "when I am alone without being able to split up into the two-in-one, without 
being able to keep myself company" (LTM: 185). And similarly: "In isolation, man remains in 
contact with the world as the human artifice; only when the most elementary form of human 
creativity, which is the capacity to add something of one's own to the common world, is 
destroyed, isolation becomes unbearable" (OT: 475). This loss of creative input means that the 
individual leaves no ontological trace. This condition, which Arendt refers to as 
superfluousness, "means not to belong to the world at all" (ibid: 475). In both cases, the 
existential significance of private individuation itself has been lost. Add to that the deprivation 
of a public space of action and articulation, and the circumstance, Arendt believes, becomes 
toxic. Presence within these spaces are important for the sense of a fulfilled life - the desire of 
which emerges as a brutal shock with the comprehension of the looming fact of death, and 
which no amount of struggle can suppress. For, Arendt explains, "loneliness concerns human 
life as a whole" (ibid: 475). Lacking the dignity of being able to distinguish oneself apart from 
others (the mark of being human), the lonely individual feels anonymous. These individuals 
face a kind of 'homelessness'; uneasy in private and public, unable to situate themselves 
comfortably in either. The lived-experience of loneliness is crucial for understanding world 
alienation and its political effects; whilst the terms are not one and the same, they are 
intrinsically related. 
 Totalitarian domination, Arendt argues, "bases itself on loneliness, on the experience 
of not belonging to the world at all, which is among the most radical and desperate 
experiences of man" (OT: 475). Within a space of three pages, Arendt provides a highly 
effective description of loneliness: it is finding oneself in a "situation in which I as a person feel 
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myself deserted by all human companionship" (ibid: 474), "the experience of being abandoned 
by everything and everybody" (OT: 476), and also, following the philosopher Epictetus, "the 
lonely man (eremos) finds himself surrounded by others with whom he cannot establish 
contact or whose hostility he is exposed" (ibid: 476). 'Desertion', 'abandonment', and 'hostility' 
- these are all responses centring around our human counterparts (one can only feel deserted, 
for example, if there is someone doing the deserting), and because of this, loneliness "shows 
itself most sharply in company with others" (ibid: 475). Loneliness is visible as this 
intersubjective, interactive deficit, and Arendt considers this to be the very condition of mass 
society, in which the constituent members are "all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own 
singular experience" (HC: 58). When each experience becomes disproportionately prominent 
among the living-together of men, the emergence of loneliness as a mass phenomenon 
becomes ever more likely as people join together in what she at one point describes as 
'negative solidarity', invoking a sense that totalitarian mass movements represent something 
of an alliance of the damned.  
 Worldlessness and loneliness are, as briefly mentioned before, counterparts of 
modernity itself. Totalitarianism is, according to Arendt, an unprecedentedly new - and 
particularly modern - phenomenon, primarily because it is derived from loneliness. Up till the 
modern age, loneliness had no major role to play in common affairs as it was a marginal 
phenomenon felt most strongly by the elderly. In Origins, Arendt briefly argues that loneliness 
has become so encompassing because of the "uprootedness and superfluousness which have 
been the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution" (OT: 475). 
This argument is not properly dealt with in Origins, but it is systematically analysed in the final 
chapter of The Human Condition, which reads as a historical narrative of modernity. Within 
this chapter, the problem, in contrast to the above statement, does not lay at the feet of 
industrialisation but with processes brought about by certain related events. This claim 
deserves much greater attention, which we shall now grant it.  
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2.2 The Path Toward Loneliness 
 
We know that loneliness is not a phenomenon specific to the modern age, though Arendt 
claims that its reach has been intensified due to the creeping loss of worldliness that 
accompanied the transition to the modern. She points directly at three specific events that 
mark the process of the loss of the world: the discovery of America, the Reformation, and the 
invention of the telescope. All three of these pre-modern events, Arendt asserts, have 
contributed in their own way to the recondite process of world alienation, and they are "still 
happening in an unbroken continuity, in which precedents exist and predecessors can be 
named", even if they do not display the "peculiar character of an explosion of undercurrents" 
(HC: 248). Of particular concern for Arendt is how each of these events contributed to the 
constitution of modern individuality, whereby the modern individual is 'thrown back upon 
themselves'. The initial process which these events engendered was earth alienation, the 
disconnection of the individual with the prior surety of sensory perception, embodied in the 
universal, cosmic stance of the Archimedean point of a modern science grounded in 
mathematics. The study of mathematics, considered as the mind's intrinsic form of 
measurement, has an existence completely dependent upon the mind; and following 
Heisenberg, Arendt  asserts that in the scientific world-view, with its emphasis upon 
instruments and measurement, “man only encounters himself” (ibid: 261). 
 Her point is clearly not to attack the strides of science in recent centuries. Her wish is 
to disclose how, as she phrases it: "both despair and triumph are inherent in the same event." 
(ibid: 262). On the one hand, modern science had opened the potential of mankind to ever 
greater models of explanation, the benefits of which are self-evident. And yet, the implications 
of modern science lead us onto a path towards the nightmarish conclusion that "man had 
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been deceived so long as he trusted that reality and truth would reveal themselves to his 
senses and to his reason if only he remained true to what he saw with the eyes of body and 
mind" (ibid: 274). The emergence of this modern nightmare "was almost inescapable once the 
true implications of the modern world view were understood" (ibid: 277), and for this reason 
Arendt identifies pessimism as the hallmark of modern philosophy - with its clearest 
incarnation in the principle of Cartesian doubt. Everything becomes doubtful, even the 
existence of the human mind, for it is "the outstanding characteristic of Cartesian doubt is its 
universality, that nothing, no thought and no experience, can escape it" (ibid: 275). Descartes' 
conclusion was that if nothing was certain, then perhaps doubt itself carried its own certainty, 
and as such the process of doubting became a reliable standard unto itself. This process, 
however, was enclosed with the limits of the subjective mind, and anything outside of it could 
not be certified in a similar manner.   
 Following on from this, she observes the correlation between modern philosophy and 
subjectivism, claiming that the hallmark of world-alienation can be observed in the vast 
majority of thinkers of the age. The move toward mental processes as the object of 
philosophical enquiry means that all sensory objects become objects of consciousness: "the 
'seen tree' found in consciousness through introspection is no longer the tree given in sight 
and touch, an entity in itself with an unalterable identical shape of its own" (ibid: 282). The 
objects we encounter, Arendt notes, therefore occupy the same reality in consciousness as an 
imagined object, or a memory. "Nothing could perhaps prepare our minds better" for later 
scientific revelations such as mass-energy equivalence, "than this dissolution of objective 
reality into subjective states of mind or, rather, into subjective mental processes" (ibid: 282). 
Instead of a shared common world of sensory experience, which allowed man to think of his 
vision as a guide to the visible world, "what men now have in common is not the world but the 
structure of their minds, and this they cannot have in common, strictly speaking" (ibid: 283).  
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 The Cartesian shift toward introspection, "the sheer cognitive concern of 
consciousness with its own content...must yield certainty, because here nothing is involved 
except what the mind has produced itself; nobody is interfering but the producer of the 
product, man is confronted with nothing and nobody but himself" (ibid: 280). The above 
phrase - ‘man is confronted with nothing and nobody but himself’ - is replicated in various 
forms within the pages of this chapter, and as such can be taken as one of its most significant 
statements. Introspection, however, is not the same as loneliness. Many of the following 
sections of the chapter in The Human Condition are a dense narrative history of how 
introspection becomes transformed into loneliness. At this stage it is important to recognise 
that introspection, brought about by the experience of earth alienation as found in scientific 
activity, started the process of man’s disengagement from his peers that Arendt is so keen to 
document. Arendt’s argument in ‘The Vita Activa and the Modern Age’ is breathtakingly 
sweeping and grandiose in intent, even by her standards. Over about fifty pages Arendt 
documents the speed at which modern introspection led a transition between two ‘victories’: 
the victory of homo faber, and then later, the victory of animal laborans. These transitions 
occur through several stages, taking place over approximately 300 years, and Arendt uses 
philosophical trends as a means of investigating these changes - in a similar manner to how 
she uses Descartes as the symbol of introspection.  
 Cartesian doubt, when taken as representative of the emergence of world alienation, 
highlights the turn from the prior philosophic attempts to understanding nature and Being, 
towards "things that owed their existence to man" (ibid: 298). And as certainty could only be 
found in the process of doubting, it was the very notion of process itself which came to 
dominate, observed most visibly in the supremacy of the experiment. Derived from our asking 
‘how’ (as opposed to ‘why’ or ‘what’), the scientific experiment’s power is located in its ability 
to properly document the process unfolding under its specified conditions. If we cannot truly 
grasp the ‘thing itself’, we can at least know its processes. And how do we determine the 
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correctness of a scientific claim? Look at how that claim works in practice. Nothing validates 
something better than witnessing it in action, and it would be absurd to argue against such a 
position. As Arendt phrases it: "In order to be certain one had to make sure, and in order to 
know one had to do" (ibid: 290). The experiment is therefore an act of fabrication, creating the 
conditions under which processes can be observed with the intention of gleaming knowledge. 
Furthermore, the instruments of measurement necessary for experimentation need to be 
produced by an individual with a certain technological expertise and nous: someone capable 
of seeing utility in an otherwise useless body of matter. The experiment is inherently tied to 
fabrication in the twin facts that it requires specialist fabrication to exist, as well as being an 
act of fabrication in of itself. For this reason, the activity of fabrication is among the “highest 
ideals and idols of the modern age” (ibid: 296), driven by the assumption "though one cannot 
know truth as something given and disclosed, man can at least know what he makes himself" 
(ibid: 282). According to homo faber, only that which can be measured can be judged, and 
hence the activity of contemplation, the basis of philosophy, comes to be seen as a redundant 
activity of charlatans or the misguided. As homo faber is inclined to bestow meaning and 
significance upon those phenomena that have a function within the process of fabrication 
itself, philosophy has increasingly been ascribed the value of meaninglessness in the face of 
the physical and theoretical triumphs of a modern science. This phase of modernity, the 
victory of homo faber, signifies the victory of isolation over solitude, destroying the 
prioritisation of thinking that came with Cartesian philosophy and raising the activity of 
making in its stead. I believe that it is best to read ‘The Vita Activa and the Modern Age’ as a 
narrative history documenting the movement from solitude to isolation, and then to 
loneliness; it begins with the radical solitude of Descartes as found in introspection, then the 
isolation of homo faber, and finally, to the loneliness of animal laborans. This transition, based 
in the three types of individuation, is crucial to understanding Arendt’s dual critique of 
modernity and the totalitarian.  
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 How did work become supplanted by labour? Arendt argues that the change is based 
on a further radicalisation of process itself, or as she phrases it, in the development of an 
“even more modern principle of process” (ibid: 308), and the generation of the ‘self-evident 
truth’ that human “life, and not the world, is the highest good of man” (ibid: 318). Insofar as 
the activity of work is connected to the world through the creation of objects that are 
designed to last, labour is not: “their consumption barely survives the act of their 
production…although they are man-made, they come and go, are produced and consumed, in 
accordance with the ever-recurrent cyclical movement of nature” (ibid: 96). Objects of labour 
are designed for consumption or else they decay, and this grants labour a ‘destructive’ 
character when compared with work. Arendt remarks that work is used in speech as a verb 
and noun whereas labour is strictly a verb, suggesting the non-objective quality of the 
labouring activing exemplified in the phrase ‘the fruits of our labour’, compared to the 
objective ‘work of art’ - a tangible, worldly object as well as an activity. Both have, of course, 
their immutable place in the human condition alongside action. The labouring mentality draws 
upon life itself as its ultimate point of reference, for the sustenance of life is the very basis of 
the activity itself. And the elevation of life as the ‘highest good’ in modern society means that 
everything is subservient to human life, measured according to its place in biological 
maintenance and development. This anthropocentric belief leads to the belief that “the 
ultimate standard of measurement is not utility and usage at all, but ‘happiness,’ that is, the 
amount of pain and pleasure experienced in the production or in the consumption of things” 
(ibid: 309).  
 The radicalisation of process under labour is based on a change in the basis of 
instrumental logic. Homo Faber, Arendt argues, considers the object which they created as an 
‘end in itself’, “an independent durable entity with an existence of its own” (ibid: 157). The 
fabricator considers the process of fabrication to be over. However, under conditions of 
cyclical labour which is tied to the repetitive rhythm of biological life, the entire notion of an 
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end-point to the activity is complicated. Production is viewed simply as a precursor for 
consumption, and the proper distinction between the two is destroyed. What we are faced 
with is the perpetual process of production and consumption as no worldly object exists 
outside of it as an end in itself. We experience constant process, the “limitless 
instrumentalization of everything that exists”, a state of worldless flux in which nothing lasting 
and meaningful truly exists, faced with a “process of growing meaninglessness where every 
end is transformed into a means and which can be stopped only by making man himself the 
lord and master of all things” (ibid: 157).  
 With the victory of animal laborans the stage is set for loneliness. As the activity of 
labouring has no connection to worldliness it can be recognised as facilitating the feeling of 
superfluousness that Arendt identified in modern totalitarian mass man. She would claim that 
"a peculiar loneliness arises in the process of labor...this loneliness consists in being thrown 
back upon oneself; a state of affairs in which, so to speak, consumption takes the place of all 
the truly relating activities" (EU: 21). In Origins, she describes the transition between isolation 
and loneliness - which should be read historically as the modern transition between homo 
faber and animal laborans - in the following manner:  
In isolation, man remains in contact with the world as the human artifice; only when 
the most elementary form of human creativity, which is the capacity to add something 
of one’s own to the common world, is destroyed, isolation becomes altogether 
unbearable. This can happen in a world whose chief values are dictated by labor, that 
is where all human activities have been transformed into labouring. Under such 
conditions, only the sheer effort of labor which is the effort to keep alive is left and the 
relationship with the world as a human artifice is broken. Isolated man who lost his 
place in the political realm of action is deserted by the world of things as well, if he is 
no longer recognized as homo faber but treated as an animal laborans whose 
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necessary 'metabolism with nature' [Marx] is of concern to no one. Isolation then 
becomes loneliness. Tyranny based on isolated generally leaves the productive 
capacities of man intact; a tyranny over 'laborers,' however, as for instance the rule 
over slaves in antiquity, would automatically be a rule over lonely, not only isolated, 
men and tend to be totalitarian (OT: 475)  
Loneliness is not terroristic in of itself, though it is always potentially terroristic as it is 
characterised by a negative relationship with others as explained in the previous section. To 
become terroristic it needs to tie itself to a language of hope and meaning, both of which the 
lonely individual lacks and desires. Modern ideologies, which we discussed in the previous 
chapter concerning clichégenic speech, offer themselves directly to lonely mass man. The 
mantric clichés of the totalitarian language of community and designable futures occupies the 
space which the world previously occupied. A substitute world is constructed, one which has 
no basis in ‘objective’ reality and assumes the status of fiction. The implication of Arendt’s 
analysis is that under worldly conditions, when loneliness is a marginal phenomenon, 
totalitarianism could not flourish.  
 Arendt’s controversial notion of the ‘rise of the social’ is based on the narrative of 
modernity and the different forms of being alone as described in the rise of the society of 
labourers and the subsequent rise of loneliness. The ‘theoretical glorification of labour’ led by 
individuals such as Smith and Marx “has resulted in a factual transformation of the whole of 
society into a labouring society” (HC: 4), and hence a lonely society. The individuals in this 
social formation think of what they do purely in terms of sustaining their consumption; their 
profession is treated purely as a source of income, and even those at the top consider it their 
job to maintain this situation. Society takes the form of a single functional organism with 
productivity and wealth accumulation as the primary collective interest. The interests of the 
‘household’ become synonymous with the public concern, and according to Arendt’s analysis, 
64 
 
therefore, worldlessness becomes de facto public policy. What is lost is the public realm as 
Arendt understands it, and little can exist independently of this economic bureaucratisation. 
Under these circumstances the individual is, to use Arendt’s repeated phrase, ‘thrown back on 
themselves’ in lonely alienation. Sadly, the role that loneliness plays in Arendt’s broader 
thought has been ignored among her commentators; for example, one of the greatest critics 
of Arendt’s concept of the ‘social’, Hannah Pitkin, eschews any mention of the concept of 
loneliness, wrongly casting a discussion of alienated labour in terms of isolation (see Pitkin, 
1998: 167). As I have hoped to have shown, careful distinction is required when we discuss 
many of Arendt’s terms as these distinction form the foundation of her political outlook.  
 
2.3 Re-thinking Modern Friendship 
 
Up to this point we have been tracing the connections Arendt draws between the modern age, 
loneliness, and totalitarianism. Now we must look at how Arendt responds to these 
observations, which centres, I argue, around her attempt to re-think the concept of friendship. 
In order to do this she attempts to draw upon the classical experience of citizenship in order to 
advance a politicised account of friendship, a kind that stands in stark contrast to loneliness. 
The form of togetherness characterised in the spirit of friendship of the classical era is a kind 
of friendship very different to what we commonly understand the term to mean now. This 
difference is key, as it represents for Arendt the profound movement toward loneliness in 
modernity. The clearest difference between the two can be summarised in the following 
manner: classical friendship is public, and modern friendship is private. Modern friendship is 
closely linked with intimacy, manifest as a close emotional bond between two persons. She 
does not believe that the desire for intimacy is negative, or that it is a modern phenomenon in 
and of itself - rather, she wants to understand precisely why the exaltation of intimacy 
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emerged so strongly in the modern era. In this way, Arendt's analysis of intimacy should be 
read as an attempt to understand a symptom of a deeper crisis of the individual in the modern 
age as identified in mass loneliness and the ‘rise of the social’. She describes the crisis in the 
following manner:  
Since the rise of society, since the admission of household and housekeeping activities 
to the public realm, an irresistible tendency to grow, to devour the older realms of 
political and private as well as the more recently established sphere of intimacy, has 
been one of the outstanding characteristics of the new realm (HC: 45) 
Let’s examine this claim further with reference to friendship.  
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau is considered by Arendt as the first philosopher to react to the 
growing force of society with recourse to intimacy. Modern privacy, which intimacy is related 
to, is invoked functionally as a protection of the intimate, a sheltering from the penetrative 
gaze of increasing mass society. Rousseau, we are told, rebelled against society's "unbearable 
perversion of the human heart, its intrusion upon an innermost region in man which until then 
had needed no special protection" (ibid: 39), and this would become a theme which would 
even inflect his theory of the general will, in which inside each individual is his or her own 
antagonist. For Arendt, Rousseau's rebellion of the heart perfectly represents "the modern 
individual and his endless conflicts, his inability either to be at home in society or to live 
outside it altogether, his ever-changing moods and the radical subjectivism of his emotional 
life" (ibid: 39). The decline of the 'public arts' such as architecture, and the 'astonishing 
flowering' in the modern era of intimate art forms such as poetry and music, as well as the 
dominance of the novel as the literary form, all testify to the "close relationship between the 
social and the intimate" (ibid: 39) and the flight of modern man into his or her private emotive 
condition and away from the world. What united Rousseau and the Romantic movements of 
the modern era was a 'rebellious reaction against society', against the levelling conformism 
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perceived within it. Arendt would certainly empathise with this sense of defiance. But whilst 
modern intimacy arose to protect the individual from society's inquisition, it does so to the 
detriment of one's worldliness, as "the intimacy of the heart...has no tangible place in the 
world" (ibid: 39): it cannot be made manifest in public, it can only be felt. Certainly, we can 
witness people acting in an intimate manner, but we can never experience their intimacy for 
ourselves as it is a strictly private phenomenon. Always "a flight from the whole outer world 
into the inner subjectivity of the individual” (ibid: 69), intimacy has been celebrated so 
strongly in the modern age because the private realm, intimacy’s home, has been increasingly 
penetrated by social coercion and, hence, conformism - as found in the notion of the ‘rise of 
the social’.  
 Our common understanding of friendship reflects this reactionary movement to 
intimacy; a friend is someone whom we have grown close to and share the intimacy of an 
emotional bond. There is nothing modern or unnatural about this. However, Arendt is keen to 
emphasise that the primacy of this subjective bond of the heart in accounts of friendship has 
come to shape human relations for the worse. In Men in Dark Times she qualifies this point:  
We are wont to see friendship solely as a phenomenon of intimacy, in which the 
friends open their hearts to each other unmolested by the world and its demands. 
Rousseau…is the best advocate of this view, which conforms so well to the basic 
attitude of the modern individual, who in his alienation from the world can truly reveal 
himself only in privacy and in the intimacy of face-to-face encounters (MDT: 24) 
Loneliness, if we remember, is not a condition of being alone - it is an alienation from our 
peers, characterised by emotions such as desertion and hostility. It seems natural enough, 
then, that the closing of the sphere of friendship to those who we are intimate with is a result 
of world alienation and loneliness. Under conditions of mass loneliness, intimacy is grasped as 
the only answer; Rousseau’s notion of the indivisible will, for example, was built upon the 
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experience of the bonds of love, kinship, and intractible companionship. Intimacy, however, is 
a fleeing from the dilemma at hand. It is cast as a form of escapism, with society in general as 
the object that we wish to hide from. “How tempting it was,” Arendt remarks of her German 
peers, “simply to ignore the intolerably stupid blabber of the Nazis” (ibid: 23) and shield 
oneself from the persons and views that we encounter in the world.  
 The epitome of intimacy is obviously love, and love therefore represents the purest 
form of worldlessness. Arendt often speaks of love beside the language of fire: "love…is killed, 
or rather extinguished, the moment it is displayed in public" (HC: 51). Elsewhere, she describes 
love and modern friendship as a moment in which “the world goes up in flames” (PP: 202). The 
equation with love as fire seems particularly apt because it conveys the intensity of the 
emotion as well as its worldless intangibility. In her texts Arendt consciously attempts to fight 
the conflation of love with political community. This is best observed in her response to 
Gershom Scholem’s claim that she lacks love for the Jewish people: “I have never in my life 
‘loved’ any people or collective…the only kind of love I know of and believe in is the love of 
persons” (JP: 246). Attempts to elevate love to the status of the political bond are heavily 
criticised in her book On Revolution, in which she argues that the failure of the French 
Revolution is due in large part to the overwhelming feeling of compassion among the 
revolutionary elite toward the French people, in reaction against the prior indifference of high 
society. But “because compassion abolishes the distance, the worldly space between men 
where political matters, the whole realm of human affairs, are located, it remains, politically 
speaking, irrelevant and without consequence” (OR: 86). In this sense compassion is closely 
related to love in the way that they are both manifestations of worldless intimacy. It is with 
this compassionate revolutionary tradition in mind that Arendt describes love as “perhaps the 
most powerful of antipolitical human forces” (HC: 242). Following this, one cannot help but 
connect the demands of totalitarian ideologies for total loyalty with the unbreakable bond of 
love - a bond desperately fetishized by mass society in general.  
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 To conclude, the elevation of modern friendship is negative because it is modelled on 
a singular experience. For this reason it is inherently opposed to the plural existence of 
political community. With her reflection on the intimate and the social, Arendt paints a picture 
of the modern individual stuck in a rut: with the increasing depersonalisation of society 
through labour the individual craves intimacy, which in turn facilitates the very 
depersonalisation which they are reacting against as they turn away from what little is left of 
the world. Her response to this quandary is to highlight a form of friendship which is not 
intimate: what Aristotle called philia politikē, which demands a “kind of ‘friendship’ without 
intimacy and without closeness; it is a regard for the person from the distance which the space 
of the world puts between us, and this regard is independent of qualities which we may 
admire or of achievements which we may highly esteem” (HC: 243). To be clear: Arendt does 
not want to banish intimate friendship, her critique is based on an analysis concerning the 
destruction of public friendship as described in the above quotation, and the subsequent 
belief that intimate friendship corresponds with political community.   
 In order to supply us with a new account of friendship that moves beyond intimacy 
and loneliness, Arendt turns to classical philosophy. Certainly, there is little to be gleaned from 
modern political thought, where the notion of friendship has been largely absent. Its presence 
can perhaps be felt in contractualist philosophy; in Kantian morality and in the model 
rationality of reciprocal relationships as found in Hobbes and Locke. Yet without a doubt, this 
is insignificant in comparison to the interest in the relationship of friendship displayed by 
Classical thinkers. Of particular relevance is Greece, in which an account of friendship (philia) 
developed which undoubtedly is alien to the modern reader, and which Arendt’s reference to 
Aristotle conveys. What is shared by every account of friendship, however, is the basic 
recognition of the equality necessary for individuals to be friends. This seems to have aroused 
some interest in recent commentary on Arendt: Danielle Celermajer, for example, has argued 
recently that Arendt’s concept of friendship harbours a strong ethical component (Celermajer, 
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2010); Marguerite La Caze has also promoted something similar, recognising that political 
friendship is the site of respect, forgiveness, and promise in Arendtian thought (La Caze, 2010). 
What is lacking in both accounts, however, is a proper grounding of the discussion in relation 
to its classical sources, which I believe are paramount to understanding the proper nature of 
what it means to be friends in Arendt’s terms.  
Friendship was an important topic for the Greeks. By all accounts, the Greeks valued 
friendship as highly as any culture since. Friendship was a constituent part of heroic culture 
and drama, which usually took place within a group of friends, often centring on two great 
individuals (examples include Theseus and Pirithous, Orestes and Pylades etc.). It was 
generally displayed as a passionate relationship between men, 
each supporting the other in his best efforts and aims, mind assisting mind and hand 
in hand, and the end of the love residing not in an easy satisfaction of itself, but in the 
development and perfecting of the souls in which it dwelt (Dickinson, 1947: 186) 
This idea is clearly related to Homeric legend and soon became an institution in and of itself, 
sometimes manifesting itself in the very constitutions of communities, Sparta being the most 
obvious example. Greek philosophers considered the question of friendship a topic as 
important as almost any other; the Epicureans, to use but one example, considered it to be 
the most important human quality, a foundation for distinguishing between human and 
animal. It was the Athenian politicisation of friendship, though, that Arendt found most 
compelling, as represented in Aristotle’s Politics. 
 Fifth century Athens underwent a linguistic revolution that completely changed its 
political landscape. A new kind of civic discourse emerged in which, as W. Robert Connor 
convincingly argues, “the individual’s relation to the polis comes to be spoken of in ways that 
had formerly been reserved almost exclusively for his relations to persons” (Connor, 
1971:100). One of the constituent elements of this form of friendship was their duty to the 
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city, which was as much an important expectation as the personal relationship between 
friends themselves. And for individuals such as Socrates, it seems, private and public 
friendship were totally compatible notions. This linguistic move, as practiced by individuals 
such as Pericles and Cleon, was based on an attempt to move beyond the factionalism of prior 
Athenian politics, and publicise politics away from secretive wrangling for power and 
influence. Now, the politician was rhetor, public individuals who "led by their eloquence" (ibid: 
116) in speaking. This revolutionary notion of friendship cast a wide net to incorporate the 
interpersonal bond found in shared political citizenship. 
 We cannot be certain as to whether this linguistic change was a result of broader 
cultural attitudes, or whether it was instigated by the rhetorical strategies of Athenian 
politicians. Similarly, we can never be sure of the sincerity of such proclamations of conveying 
friendship to the polis at large, or whether it was a strategic method. Though whether the 
orators meant it or not, one thing is clear: the demos felt a strong connection with the 
language being used, and it became appropriated within the political culture of Athens and 
beyond. Centuries later, Cicero, the famous Grecophile, would articulate such a stance in his 
discourse on friendship, De Amicitia. Now, we shall explore what I believe Arendt draws from 
the classical account, and why she sees it as the opposite of loneliness, the source of 
totalitarian terror.  
 
2.4 Classical Friendship 
 
Shin Chiba explores in a brilliant article the complexity of Arendt’s philosophical engagements 
with the concept of love, arguing that she uses it as a base for thinking about a new public 
bond (Chiba, 1995). This new bond is apparent in two of Arendt’s concepts - forgiveness and 
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friendship - of which the latter is the primary consideration, stating that “friendship should be 
looked upon and understood as a root metaphor for public activities” (ibid: 519). Central to 
this observation is that friendship incorporates a philosophy of ‘resistance’ insofar as it is 
opposed to hierarchy, and hence, notions of rulership. What Chiba correctly notes is that 
friendship is fundamentally a “fellowship based on debate and deliberation”, and represents a 
“unique discursive sphere” (ibid: 519-520), one which should be considered separate from the 
modern affiliation with the social realm. I agree with what I consider to be her most significant 
statement in the article, that “friendship for Arendt is the due attention and regard with which 
friends or peers hold one another. There-fore, friendship embodies for her, as well as for the 
ancient Greeks, a unique discursive reality and its sphere” (ibid: 522). Let’s consider further 
this connection with classical friendship.  
 Central to Arendt’s notion of friendship is speech, as examined in the previous chapter 
through words such as isēgoria, the attribute of equal citizenship created through collective 
discussion. She argues that for the ancient Greeks, whose political culture she explicitly draws 
upon, "the essence of friendship consisted in discourse. They held that only the constant 
interchange of talk united citizens in a polis. In discourse the political importance of friendship, 
and the humanness peculiar to it, were made manifest" (MDT: 24). Friendship was viewed 
from the perspective of political community, not from the individual. In other words, Arendt 
attempts to re-think friendship as a spatial relation beyond simply those in which we have a 
purely subjective emotional connection. The public realm, consequently, is thought of as a 
space of intersubjective friendship based around speech. Against the ideal of intimate human 
friendship she argues that "humaneness should be sober and cool rather than sentimental... 
humanity is exemplified not in fraternity but in friendship... that friendship is not intimately 
personal but makes political demands and preserves reference to the world" (ibid: 25). One of 
the problems with equating friendship with intimacy is that its spatial quality is limited; for 
example, political movements based on brotherliness and fraternity, the bond between group 
72 
 
members is personalised, and creates a wall between the members of the group and those 
considered outside of it. This understanding of friendship is opposed to the Greek spirit of 
friendship represented in the term philanthropia - the love of man - which "manifests itself in 
a readiness to share the world with other men" (ibid: 25). We don’t need to delve far into the 
annals of history to provide examples of how an unwillingness to share a space with others 
can end in monstrous evil. 
 Whilst Arendt delights in the political culture of Ancient Greece, she was also aware of 
the tensions within the polis and the moments in which it veered from its ideal. Ancient 
Athenian democracy was famously agonal, and she bases Socratic philosophy within this 
context: "Socrates seems to have believed that the political function of the philosopher was to 
help establish this kind of common world, built on the understanding of friendship, in which 
no rulership is needed" (PAP: 436-437). The idea that Arendt appropriates from such a notion 
is that friendship is the very foundation for equal self-governance, and that this form of equal 
friendship can only be achieved through authentic communication. When one enters into 
discourse, as with Socrates, the dialogue is not educational in the sense that it does not aim at 
the expression and impartation of knowledge, but at the uncovering and contestation of 
opinion. The very manner in which this discourse is orientated prefigures a certain civic 
equality: 
The equalization in friendship does not of course mean that the friends become the 
same or equal to each other, but rather that they become equal partners in a common 
world- that they together constitute a community (ibid: 436) 
At this point it is helpful to turn to Arendt's chapters on Karl Jaspers, who represents to her 
one of the rare individuals to embody the essence of Classical friendship. She would state of 
him that 
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  where Jaspers comes forward and speaks, all becomes luminous. He has an 
 unreservedness, a trust, an unconditionality of speech that I have never known in 
 anyone  else…That was really my most powerful postwar experience. That there can be 
 such conversations! That one can speak in such a way! (EU: 22) 
 His central influence upon Arendtian thought is the idea of humanitas (Arendt also sees a 
similar humanitas in the thought of Kant, which we will discuss in the following chapter).  
 When asked to write a eulogy for Jaspers, what we have is a tangible display of 
Arendt's confidence in the public person and the spirit of togetherness among friends. The 
form of a eulogy, Arendt proudly proclaims, harks "back to an older and more proper sense of 
the public realm, a sense that it is precisely the human person in all his subjectivity who needs 
to appear in public in order to achieve full reality" (MDT: 72). Contrast this with the modern 
obituary, which tends to be a far more technical textual experience.  Drawing a line between 
the 'individual' that was Jaspers and the 'person' that was Jaspers. The individual constitutes 
the 'subjective' element of the Being, whereas the personality is the 'objective' quality. It is the 
latter which interests Arendt, and, in-keeping with her thought she removes sentimentality 
from the eulogy - even though her affection is obvious. Recognising that she herself has not 
become a public figure like Jaspers she declares   
 we are all modern people who move mistrustfully and awkwardly in public. Caught up 
 in our modern prejudices, we think that only the 'objective work,' separate from the 
 person, belongs to the public; that the person behind it and his life are private 
 matters, and that the feelings related to these 'subjective' things stop being genuine 
 and become sentimental as soon as they are exposed to the public eye (ibid: 72) 
Her attestation of timidity aside, Arendt is speaking about the pervasiveness of modern 
intimacy. Jaspers, she contends, fought against this public prudity through his 'venture into the 
public realm', aware that "personality is anything but a private affair" (ibid: 72). He ‘dared to 
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be naked’ in front of others, willing giving himself over to public scrutiny. To elucidate this 
claim, Arendt turns to the Greek idea of the Daimon, the "personal element in man, [which] 
can only appear where a public space exists; that is the deeper significance of the public 
realm" (ibid: 73). Socrates is the perfect example of this: he wrote nothing, produced nothing, 
yet he stands as one of the strongest personalities of ancient history, still perplexing us today. 
Simply with the utterance of his name his personality almost seems to speak to us from the 
grave. Another individual might publish prolifically, but their person remains distant (think, 
perhaps, of Heidegger or Plato). Humanitas, the Roman spiritual equivalent of the Daimon 
represented the "very height of humanness because it was valid without being objective" 
(ibid: 73) and could only disclose itself in the light of the public space. Humanitas, we might 
say, is the human form of objectivity. This is because "humanitas is never acquired in solitude 
and never by giving one's work to the public. It can be achieved only by one who has thrown 
his life and his person into the 'venture into the public realm'...Thus the 'venture into the 
public realm,' in which humanitas is acquired, becomes a gift to mankind" (ibid: 73-74). Surely, 
the 'gift' of Socrates would never have been given if he had remained in the shadows outside 
the public realm. And we can be sure that a great many people over a great many centuries 
have considered Socrates a gift.  
 Disclosure of one's person is a courageous act, especially in the modern condition of 
subjective intimacy. In Arendt's words, Jaspers not only 'was' but 'appeared'. Jaspers' 
willingness to disclose himself was marked by a mindful resistance to the modern 'inner 
emigration' "from public life to anonymity" (ibid: 22). Not a constructed self, as this would be a 
shallow showmanship dependent on social mimesis, but a willingness to allow exposure of 
one's daimon with a "a confidence that needed no confirmation" (ibid: 76). This appearance is 
human, objective, real, and stands against the exactingly scientific understanding of the 
individual which has pervaded modern society and shaped our political relations. Nobody is 
strictly aware of the person as they appear to others - that person can only be disclosed in 
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action and speech. However, one can take responsibility for how one acts and how one 
speaks. Jaspers did not claim to be "representing anything but his own existence" (ibid: 76), 
and this is illustrative of what responsibility really means for Arendt. Arendt, through her use 
of the Socratic invocation 'living together with others begins with living together with oneself' 
seems to be saying that the willingness to disclose oneself publicly, to truly take responsibility 
for oneself, creates a space in the spirit of togetherness. This is brilliantly articulated in a 
sentence concerning the 'light' of the public sphere:     
 Whatever stands up to light and does not dissolve in vapours under its brightness, 
 partakes in humanitas; to take it upon oneself to answer before mankind for every 
 thought means to live in that luminosity in which oneself and everything one thinks is 
 tested (ibid: 75) 
As should hopefully be apparent, this posits an understanding of friendship and togetherness 
very much in opposition to the 'negative solidarity' of the totalitarian movements and their 
basis in the phenomenon of modern loneliness.  
 As we know, friendship "to a large extent, indeed, consists of this kind of talking about 
something that the friends have in common”, and “by talking about what is between them, it 
becomes ever more common to them" (PAP: 435). Jaspers referred to authentic 
communication as a ‘loving struggle’, the reason being that the constituent part of true speech 
is found in the assertion of a distinction between each other whilst also accepting themselves 
as being united through language. Through the activity of speaking in a non-clichégenic 
manner, in which one converses with a willingness to be responsible for your own actions and 
opinions without falling back upon common obscurant tropes, a certain worldly community 
comes about. One section is particularly meaningful: 
 Community is what friendship achieves...The political element in friendship is that in 
 the truthful dialogue each of the friends can understand the truth inherent in the 
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 other's  opinion. More than his friend as a person, one friend understands how and in 
 what specific articulateness the common world appears to the other, who as a person 
 is forever unequal or different. This kind of understanding- seeing the world (as we 
 rather tritely say today)  from the other fellow's point of view- is the political kind of 
 insight par excellence (ibid: 436) 
What Arendt is alluding to here is our faculty of judgment, with its demand for non-intimate 
critical distance, which will be the topic of the next chapter.  
 
2.5 Friendship and Political Association 
 
We should now have a good understanding as to why and how Arendt appeals to classical 
friendship - what she was writing against, and what she was writing for. For her the modern 
predicament is stark. I have tried to sharply distinguish between the situations of loneliness 
and friendship in order to convey a further dimension to her political writings. When we read 
into her theory of friendship, one finds a key concept that shapes the direction of her theories 
of action, power, and freedom, because all of these are prefigured on our capacity for true 
intersubjective association. I believe Arendt's reflections on friendship are crucial to 
understanding the ‘sociological’ criteria (if we may call it that) required for freedom to be 
objectively manifest, which will become increasingly important as the argument of this thesis 
develops. As Chiba notes, “friendship is the basis of Arendt’s vision of citizens’ politics of 
freedom” (Chiba, 1995: 531), and we will explore this idea in greater depth shortly.  
 As I have hoped to have displayed throughout this chapter, Arendt carefully separates 
out certain forms of individuality - all of which are either anti, or a-political, and form the 
bedrock of her critiques of both the post-Platonic philosophical tradition and totalitarianism. 
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In both of these cases which are based respectively in solitude and loneliness, the individual is 
not a part of the world and therefore lacks a proper relation to their peers. I have focussed on 
Arendt’s support for the human and theoretical example of Jaspers because he seems to 
articulate a certain way of being in public which offers an alternative to these two distinct 
forms of individuality. This alternative is driven by the belief that communication is the central 
driving force of true political community, building upon the ancient Greek understanding of 
the equality of citizenship in the polis. In the next chapter we will examine further the content 
and effect of this form of communication, how it achieves this community bond and its world-
building capacity. A large part of it will be devoted, therefore, to how rhetoric, the art of 
persuasion, creates a responsible and judging collective of individuals - of friends. 
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Chapter Three 
Judgment and Political Responsibility 
 
In the past two chapters we have been concerned with connecting Arendt’s concept of speech 
with her critique of totalitarianism: firstly, through an analysis of clichégenic speech, and 
secondly, through an analysis of modern loneliness. It has been argued that Arendt’s thought 
reacts strongly against these two interconnected phenomena toward an ideal of political 
community prefigured on communication. In the following chapter this idea will be connected 
to Arendt’s concept of judgment. The chapter opens with a discussion of Arendt’s critique of 
morality with reference to her observations regarding the totalitarian phenomenon; she was 
interested in basing our faculty for ‘telling right from wrong’ and our sense of political 
responsibility in something other than the application of moral principles, and to do so she 
turned to developing a theory of judgment. Central to this is the concept of understanding, 
which she argues is the basis of political community. Because of this it is argued in this chapter 
that Arendt’s account of judgment, and hence her political theory, is profoundly hermeneutic. 
The chapter then briefly examines what aspects of Arendt’s theory of judgment can be 
considered hermeneutic, focusing particularly on her description of citizenship and rhetoric, 
which is compared with the thought of Hans Georg Gadamer. It is then briefly argued that a 
certain form of rhetoric is encouraged by Arendt, one fostered toward reaching and 
articulating understanding: epideictic speech, a form of pluralist rhetoric which discloses 
shared assumptions about the world. Following this, a distinction is drawn between personal 
responsibility and political responsibility, with the latter being considered the principal 
outcome of authentic judgment and understanding. Again, the examples of Socrates and 
Jaspers are promoted as enshrining the spirit of political responsibility through their 
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endeavours to foster accountability among their peers through rhetorical communication. This 
manner of speaking, it is claimed, promotes the development of a communal responsibility, 
the loss of which Arendt believes underpins many of the problems encountered in the modern 
era.  
 
3.1 The Moral Lessons of Totalitarianism 
 
So far in this thesis we have broached the topic of totalitarianism several times given its 
importance in Arendtian theory and her frequent attempts to base theoretical discussions in 
what she would refer to as ‘factual’ experiences. If you recall from Chapter One, Arendt’s most 
pressing concern regarding the totalitarian was comprehending the reasons behind the lack of 
personal responsibility displayed at large, particularly among the defendants of the Nazi war 
trials such as Eichmann. Of particular interest was Arendt’s claim that totalitarian evil was the 
result of mass thoughtlessness, aided by what I termed clichégenic speech, the expression of 
ideological language. Thinking, according to Arendt, is always destructive, and hence is the 
natural enemy of ideology. Under conditions of cliché, when words are adopted unthinkingly, 
moral and political principles can be shifted and changed with ease as the individual is not 
concerned with the content of these principles, only that they follow something. Modern 
loneliness, too, has facilitated the creation of the ‘bourgeois’ jobholding functionary, an 
individual whose concern is primarily personal and who is particularly susceptible to 
thoughtless social acquiescence. Being such an individual is not, in itself, a problem; it might 
carry all the existential baggage well documented by the philosophers of the period, but an 
element of conformism is necessary to live any social life. Similarly, it would be ‘exhausting’ (as 
Arendt phrases it) to attempt to constantly subject everything to the scrutiny of thinking.   
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 Problems arise, however, in those moments when, as Arendt liked to phrase it, ‘the 
chips are down’, instances in which unprecedented events occur which require unprecedented 
responses. In these moments the constitution of community is fundamentally tested, and 
sadly, based on the experiences of the twentieth century, Arendt has little optimism for the 
capacity of modern mass society to adequately respond. The obvious example that Arendt has 
in mind is Nazi Germany, her analysis of which led her to claim “witness to the breakdown of 
the whole structure of morality” (EU: 328). She argues that Germany underwent a slow moral 
disintegration, “hardly perceptible to the outsider” (RJ: 25), which would suddenly descend 
into total moral collapse with the onset of war. Specifically, Arendt is speaking about the loss 
of the Christian moral code as found in the Ten Commandments which had imparted upon 
society seemingly immutable principles such as ‘Thou shalt not kill’ and ‘Thou shalt not bear 
false witness’. The softening of moral principles which took place with the early 
‘Gleichschaltung’ created the conditions for the imposition of a radically new moral code 
through the manipulation of the woes of modern man, who proved willing to sacrifice all 
belief, honour, and human dignity for economic relief and stability (EU: 128); and “each time 
society, through unemployment, frustrates the small man in his normal functioning and 
normal self-respect, it trains him for the last stage in which he will willingly undertake any 
function, even that of hangman” (ibid: 129). It took the “Satanic genius of Himmler” (ibid) to 
recognise how the dehumanising element of modern superfluousness could make a mockery 
of moral constraint.  
 With the Gleichschaltung, the Nazi regime fabricated a set of principles and structured 
a legal system around them with relative ease, suggesting to Arendt that “that everybody was 
fast asleep when it occurred” (T: 177). When she discusses the moral collapse under Nazism 
she often likes to employ the metaphor of sleep to emphasise the nature of thoughtlessness 
(which she also referred to through the metaphor of sleepwalking) as well as the speed at 
which the transition occurred, which felt like it had happened overnight. This was further 
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demonstrated with the ‘re-education’ of Germany after the totalitarian event, of which 
denazification was in fact the exact same phenomenon happening in reverse. Society adopted 
the new principles and “believed in the ‘new order’ for no other reason than that that was the 
way things were” (RJ: 43). A nation that had acquainted itself with the Nazi bureaucratic 
system seemed unnaturally comfortable with its loss - in a period of just over ten years a 
country had twice seemed to metamorphose itself completely with little difficultly. Because of 
all this, Arendt argues that traditional ways of thinking about morality have proven to be 
inadequate in comprehending what occurred during the totalitarian moment. We are not 
dealing with criminality and responsibility as it has existed before, we are dealing with the 
“intrusion of criminality into the public realm” (ibid: 24). The notion that what had happened 
in Germany could have been halted if the Germans had been ‘more moral’, is a notion that 
Arendt thinks completely disproved; given the radically new nature of totalitarian evil, the 
capacity for traditional morality to constrain evil has been fundamentally eroded. 
Furthermore, she observes that the individuals who claimed fealty to a moral code were in 
fact the most susceptible to moral transformation under conditions of cliché and loneliness 
because what they actually valued was the possession of the code, not the specific content of 
it. Those who, for whatever reason, chose to reject moralistic strictures were the least easily 
assimilated into the new structure, with non-participation acting as their silent form of 
rebellion. Thinking has a curious protective quality in Arendtian thought: the philosopher 
attempts to shield themselves from the noise of the world through solitude, and the rebel 
attempts to shield themselves from complicity through non-participation in those ‘dark times’ 
“when everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does” (T: 192). Arendt 
claims that the latter can be a political act in itself in times of crisis because of its ‘freezing’ 
effect, the ‘stop-and-think’ of the Socratic ‘electric-ray’. The fact remains, however, that 
because thinking is a negative enterprise, it can only really prevent the individual from 
following an action. It stops the individual from making choices which they would not be 
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comfortable with, though it cannot prescribe what to do. When thinking becomes political it 
always adopts the form of restraint, either in the manner of stopping an individual from being 
an actor or participant through introspection, or in the manner of slowing or stopping others 
from pursuing an act through thoughtful conversation; thinking “does not create values; it will 
not find out, once and for all, what ‘the good’ is” (ibid: 192).  
 At certain points Arendt proclaims that traditional morality is now meaningless in the 
face of banal evil and its “crimes which the Ten Commandments did not foresee” (EU: 242). 
We know from chapter one that Arendt believes morality to be the side-effect of the broader 
activity of thinking because it creates conscience, with Arendt describing the activity of 
thinking as a kind of internal conversation between ‘me and myself’, of which conscience is a 
by-product as the individual holds themselves accountable, and no individual wants to harbour 
internal conflict between these two entities. Hence, morality exists in close proximity to 
philosophy due to the contemplative nature of conscience, and she argues that this is the very 
foundation of personal and moral responsibility. It is no surprise, then, that in the age of 
thoughtless mass society a bureaucratic system built on the structural exemption of 
responsibility would develop. The constraining nature of widely-held moral principles held no 
real power over the action of individuals; and in fact, moral principles had in their own way 
exacerbated the problem by normalising their possession. True morality requires thought, and 
it would be wrong to think that mere obedience to societal norms constitutes a moral choice. 
In an age characterised by thoughtlessness, morality is by no means a protection against evil 
because the very basis of all authentic moral decision-making has been eroded. Traditional 
morality designates that the evildoer intends to do wrong, and as she wrote of Eichmann, he 
“never realized what he was doing” (EJ: 287).  
 There is a further reason why Arendt considers traditional morality to be inadequate, 
which is related to the above point. Morality always concerns the “individual qua individual” 
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(T: 95) because the fundamental moral question is ‘what ought I to do?’, prefigured by the 
implication as to “whether I shall be able to live with myself in peace when the time has come 
to come to think about my deeds and words” (ibid: 191). And as we know from the previous 
chapter, such individualistic considerations are deemed non-political to Arendt because they 
concern the individual in a solitudinous private rather than public sense. The personal 
experience of conscience and guilt is not something which is shared between individuals, it 
may act as a protection against thoughtless action, though it does nothing for the creation of 
political community through the fostering of friendship and mutual understanding. The mental 
activity which performs this political role is judgment, the faculty of the mind in which we 
come to a shared understanding of worldly phenomenon “without being able to fall back upon 
the application of generally accepted rules” (RJ: 37). Such a faculty is clearly hugely important 
for Arendt if she wishes to provide an alternative form of politics from totalitarianism and its 
ideological clichégenics, as well as being an attempt to provide an alternative to the 
philosophical tendency toward the supersedure of morality over politics; most of Arendt’s 
texts which touch upon the faculty of judgment tend to be instigated with reference to the 
predicament of being an individual in a mass society dominated by clichégenic speech; as she 
phrases it: “how can I tell right from wrong, if the majority or my whole environment has 
prejudged the issue? Who am I to judge?” (ibid: 18). Judgment, which Arendt describes as our 
capacity to ‘tell right from wrong’ and ‘beautiful from ugly’, is brought about by the 
destructive element of the thinking activity; she refers to the activity of thinking as a kind of 
‘liberation’ in the sense that it is the foundation for individuality against automation, though 
this individuality requires judgment to be made manifest (T: 193). Whereas thinking is 
dependent upon the individual and is by nature frustrated by the presence of others, 
judgment can only come about through the presence of others through the activity of 
authentic communication. Because judgment is communicative it can only concern shared 
phenomena and how these phenomena appear to us, and it therefore seems consistent that 
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her reflections on judgment would focus upon the aesthetic with reference to Kant’s third 
critique, the Critique of Judgment. As she writes, Kantian judgment’s “point of departure is the 
World and the senses and capabilities which made men (in the plural) fit to be inhabitants of 
it” (as cited by Beiner, 1992: 141). It is the question of how we can arrive at standards of 
action which retain a sense of worldliness and human interpretation rather than ideological 
consistency or philosophical introspection which is paramount to her political theory. It is 
important to recognise that the form of communication required for judgment is the kind of 
rhetorical conversation that occurs between friends, but before we broach the topic of 
rhetoric it is important to examine what judgment actually is, and what its requirements are. 
After we have done this, I suggest that Arendt paves the way toward a new form of 
responsibility, moving focus from personal morality to the sphere in which political activity is 
situated.   
 
3.2 Judgment as Political Understanding 
 
It is very clear from the prior chapters of this thesis that Arendt identifies a patent crisis of 
judgment in the modern age, which the totalitarian phenomenon makes manifest in various 
ways. In order to illuminate this mental faculty, Arendt turns to Kant's Critique of Judgment. 
We will leave aside questions as to whether Arendt supplies an accurate reading of Kant. The 
Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy - Arendt's most complete reflections on judgment that 
we have available to us, proceed from the identification of two basic interpretative premises: 
Kant's method of philosophical critique, and his belief in the inherent sociability of man. These 
lectures are founded upon the attempt to link these two aspects together, through judgment, 
into a political philosophy. The Age of Enlightenment, for Kant, was the Age of Criticism. As he 
famously remarked: "Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to such criticism 
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everything must submit." (as cited by Arendt, K: 32). The Enlightenment, understood as 
Humanity's emergence from immaturity, extols the motto Sapere aude: dare to know. Thus, 
the Enlightenment revolves around a 'negative spirit of criticism' resulting in "liberation from 
prejudices, from authorities, a purifying event" (ibid: 31). Kantian philosophical critique, 
developed conspicuously in The Critique of Pure Reason, seeks to discover the 'sources and 
limits' of reason, and therefore scatter the doctrinaire philosophies which constrain the mind's 
capacity for self-enlightenment. Through promoting within philosophy the method of critique, 
"he had actually dismantled the whole machinery that had lasted, though often under attack, 
for many centuries, deep into the modern age" (ibid: 34). Therefore, Kant's critical method 
was acutely political; "the result of such criticism is Selbstdenken, to 'use your own mind'" 
(ibid:32), and therefore, "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (ibid: 38). The 
parallels with Arendt’s analysis of Socratic speech, which we examined in depth in chapter 
one, is very strong; she comments of Kant that,  
 to think critically, to blaze the trail of thought through prejudices, through 
 unexamined opinions and beliefs, is an old concern of philosophy, which we may date, 
 insofar as it is a  conscious enterprise, to the Socratic midwifery in Athens. Kant was 
 not unaware of this connection. He said explicitly that he wished to proceed 'in 
 Socratic fashion' and to silence all objectors 'by the clearest proof of [their] ignorance' 
 (ibid: 36) 
Opposing metaphysical dogmatism and its converse, scepticism, Kant walked his thought along 
a critical pathway which demanded that we "succumb to neither" (ibid: 32), and 
simultaneously "analyse what we can know and what we cannot" (ibid: 33). This is the critical 
spirit of Kantian and Socratic philosophy that Arendt wishes to preserve, motivated in part by 
her observations of modern clichégenic language.    
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 Arendt continues by linking critique with sociability through a discussion of Kant's 
understanding of political freedom, which at all times is construed as 'to make public use of 
one's reason'. It is through this principle of publicity (which presupposes human sociability) 
that Kantian critique garners further political merit. Arendt quotes him: 
 how much and how correctly would we think if we did not think in community with 
 others to whom we communicate our thoughts and who communicate theirs to us! 
 Hence, we may  safely state that the external power which deprives man of the 
 freedom to communicate his thoughts publicly also takes away his freedom to think 
 (as cited by Arendt, ibid: 41) 
This, as Arendt notes, contrasts with Spinoza's understanding of political freedom as libertas 
philosophandi: the freedom to philosophise - a progeny of Platonic anti-politics. For Kant, the 
freedom to think (and, therefore, philosophise) depends on the "freedom to speak and to 
publish" (ibid: 39), for "'without the test of free and open examination,' no thinking and no-
opinion-formation are possible. Reason is not made 'to isolate itself but to get into community 
with others'" (ibid: 40). Our capacity for thought is intrinsically tied with language (see chapter 
one), and insofar as we can publically communicate, we can understand and examine these 
thoughts, we can critique. Thinking, as we are aware from our discussion in chapter two, is by 
nature solitudinous. "Yet," Arendt asserts,  
unless you can somehow communicate and expose to the test of others, either orally 
or in writing, whatever you may have found out when you were alone, this faculty 
exerted in solitude will disappear. In the words of Jaspers, truth is what I can 
communicate…What it must have, what Kant demanded in the Critique of Judgment of 
judgments of taste, is 'general communicability.' 'For it is a natural vocation of 
mankind to communicate and speak one's mind, especially in all matters concerning 
man as such.' (ibid: 40) 
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From this, we can gather a strong sense of how this thesis has laid out the foundations for a 
proper investigation into judgment: from thought and language, to sociability (or friendship), 
and now to judgment with its basis in 'general communicability'. 
 For Arendt, and following Kant, the judgment of objects is dependent on two faculties: 
imagination and common sense (the sensus communis). Imagination, "the faculty of having 
present what is absent" (ibid: 66) re-presents through representation the object to the 'eyes of 
the mind' after the original sensory experience has passed. The object concerned transfers 
from the 'outer senses' through imagination to the 'inner senses'. What is important is the 
distance which imagination brings between the originary experience and the imagined 
representation that we remember (memory, as well, depends on the re-presentation of 
imagination): 
 one now has, by means of representation, established the proper distance , the 
 remoteness or uninvolvedness or disinterestedness, that is requisite for approbation 
 and disapprobation, for evaluating something at its proper worth. By removing the 
 object, one has established the conditions for impartiality (ibid: 67) 
Whilst it may be tempting to bracket imagination as a mental faculty that operates solely 
alongside judgment, it is in fact more closely tied to the thinking activity; imagination 'de-
senses' objects and transforms them into 'thought-objects' such as the concept or idea. It is 
the imaginative activity, therefore, which enables the move from thought into judgment, and 
is why the faculty of judgment is dependent upon the faculty of thought. Imagination, through 
the process of de-sensing an object into a mental representation, prepares the object for 'the 
operation of reflection', which "is the actual activity of judging something" (ibid: 68). In 
chapter two we discussed Arendt’s critique of modern intimacy, being comfortable around 
only those who we have a close emotional bond, and the distance formed through proper 
judgment is the way in which the positivity of intimacy is further challenged within her 
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philosophy; intimacy means that the impartiality required for judgment, the removal of the 
object away from the realm of subjectivity, is blocked. 
 Before we attempt to analyse what Arendt means by the term 'reflection', we must 
first examine her use of the term 'taste', which appears throughout her Kant lectures. Taste is 
based upon the initial experience of a particular sensation, it is "immediate, unmediated by 
any thought or reflection" (ibid: 66) and the "it-pleases-or-displeases-me is immediate and 
overwhelming" (ibid: 64). 'Discriminatory by nature', it says 'I like this' or 'I don't like this'. 
Therefore, taste is characterised by its choosing - we say that we either have a taste for 
something or we don't. We may have a taste, say, for oysters, whereas plenty of others do 
not. In this sense, taste alone deals with a strictly individual response to something, and our 
taste amounts to a personal idiosyncrasy. It is the prospect of overcoming the intrinsic 
subjectivity of taste that interests Arendt so much: "No argument can persuade me to like 
oysters if I do not like them. In other words, the disturbing thing about matters of taste is that 
they are not communicable" (ibid: 66). This point becomes particularly salient in the context of 
our aesthetic judgments concerning the beautiful, in which we express our taste for an object 
of beauty. Kant, Arendt asserts: 
 was highly conscious of the public quality of beauty; and it was because of their public 
 relevance that he insisted, in opposition to the commonplace adage, that taste 
 judgments are open to discussion because 'we hope the same pleasure is shared by 
 others,' that taste can be subject to dispute, because it 'expects agreement from 
 everyone else.' (BPF: 218) 
The key phrase here is 'being subject to dispute'. If I declare that 'writing a thesis is the 
greatest joy', I must be able to communicate why I believe it to be so, rather than leaving it 
there. Arendt is not content to consider our faculty of judgment limited to the subjective mire 
of idiosyncratic choices - if that were the case, our tastes would not be subject to dispute at 
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all. And it is our capacity for reflection, brought about by the imagination, which enables us to 
overcome the subjectivity of taste; "Private conditions condition us; imagination and reflection 
enable us to liberate ourselves from them and to attain that relative impartiality that is the 
specific virtue of judgment" (K: 73). 
 Reflection takes matters of taste and enables us to take a further step away from the 
object: we can now subject our taste to critical 'approbation or disapprobation'. Kant supplies 
an example: "The joy of a needy but well-meaning man at becoming the heir of an affectionate 
but penurious father" (as cited by Arendt, ibid: 69). The man in question finds satisfaction in 
the situation due to the alleviation of the monetary burden which the father placed on him. 
This pleasure, in hindsight though, may displease him: we have the immediate 'taste' - the 
pleasure at the father's death - and then, after reflection, the subsequent disapproval at the 
earlier reaction. Or, to use another example, a widow might later approve of the initial 
displeasure she felt in her partner's death. In other words, "one can approve or disapprove of 
the very fact of pleasing [or displeasing]" (ibid: 69). What has happened here is judgment. If, in 
an ideal situation, we approve of taking pleasure in something (the writing of a thesis, 
perhaps): 
 at the time...you may be vaguely aware that you are happy doing it, but only later, in 
 reflecting on it, when you are no longer busy doing whatever you are doing, will you 
 be able  to have this additional 'pleasure': of approving it. In this additional pleasure it 
 is no longer the object that pleases but that we judge it to be pleasing (ibid: 69) 
The imagination, which brings about a certain uninvolved 'remoteness' through the de-sensing 
the object of one's pleasure and displeasure into a representation, allows to us judge. Arendt 
then asks the question: what is the measure for our choices between approval or disapproval 
(approbation and disapprobation)? In asking this question, Arendt is attempting to 
comprehend the observations made earlier: how can we judge right from wrong? Arendt 
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answers as such: the medium is communicability (language), and the standard is found in the 
sensus communis - the community sense - "an extra sense - like an extra mental capability- 
that fits us into a community" (ibid: 70). The sensus communis is an 'enlarged mentality' which 
unchains the human mind from its subjective shackles and, as she eloquently phrases it, trains 
the imagination to go visiting. “Judgment”, she continues,  
always reflects upon others and their taste, takes their possible judgments into 
account. This is necessary because I am human and cannot live outside the company 
of men. I judge as a member of this community and not as a member of a 
supersensible world (ibid: 67)  
Judgment presupposes the presence, and hence, perspectives of others, and because of this it 
fits quite neatly into Arendt's well known desire to reconcile politics with pluralism, "the fact 
that men, not Man, live on and inhabit the world" (HC: 7). She does not mince her words when 
dealing with the significance of the sensus communis: "it is the very humanity of man that is 
manifest in this sense...[it] is the specifically human sense because communication, i.e., 
speech, depends on it" (K: 70). Through the medium of language, which enables us to hold the 
same objects in our mind’s eye, we can communicate our very personal perspectives to 
another, and therefore claim a validity beyond ourselves, that is, towards something of an 
intersubjective position. One never completely leaves the subjectivity of one's position, but it 
enables the creation of an 'objective', 'real' world to open up between individuals, a world 
which, to borrow the language of the previous chapter, is synonymous with communal 
friendship.   
 We have spoken throughout this thesis about Arendt's preoccupation with the 
relationship between politics and speech, and her account of judgment is obviously 
inseparable from such considerations. Her reasons for the political interpretation of Kant's 
understanding of aesthetic judgment now become apparent. Similarly, it puts into context her 
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assertion in The Human Condition that politics operates within a space of appearance - that is, 
a worldly space in which objects become open to our judgment. It was noted in the first 
chapter of this thesis that Arendt took aim at clichégenic speech, and Arendtian judgment can 
imbue this claim further. Clichégenic speech is dangerous because it limits the plurality of 
perspectives necessary for judgment to take place, and in such instances the world is not 
authentically objectified as something open to question or debate. In spatial language it is as 
though everyone were observing an object while occupying the same position, rather than 
being separate individuals observing the phenomenon from distinct positions. Judgment is 
based on our capacity for mental transformation as found in the ‘enlarged mentality’ which 
allows the bridging of the chasm between individuals who occupy a unique position around 
the world as if it were a table. This should also make clearer as to why Arendt made such 
striking comments regarding the applicability of morality in the political sphere. Morality, as 
Arendt alleges, strictly concerns the self and is not other-regarding, and as such is not part of 
the world of judgments. Furthermore, as morality is necessarily introspective, it could never 
adopt the ‘distinterested’ stance required in judgments: 
 Taste judges the world in its appearance and in its worldliness; its interest in the world 
 is purely 'disinterested,' and that means that neither the life interests of the individual 
 nor the  moral interests of the self are involved here. For judgments of taste, the world 
 is the primary thing, not man, neither man's life nor his self (BPF: 219) 
The requirement of disinterestness, which should never be mistaken for callousness, should be 
apparent as something which goes against the modern trend toward intimacy. Distance 
between individuals is the necessary component of the activity of critique as there are no 
external forces holding sway over your evaluation.  
 A further dimension to this discussion is found in the essay 'Understanding and 
Politics'. In it Arendt draws parallels between the faculty of judgment and our faculty of 
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understanding; "understanding [is] so closely related to and inter-related with judging" (EU: 
313). We were speaking earlier of a crisis of judgment, and Arendt certainly also construes this 
as a crisis of understanding. In the introduction to this thesis we explored the idea that a term 
always emerges as a response to some kind of phenomenon which we share an experience of. 
This terminological formation highlights what it means to understand; understanding between 
individuals occurs not because you can directly experience what the other individual 
experiences, but because one shares an understanding of the language. Therefore, the act of 
reaching an understanding about a subject/object (totalitarianism, to use the example given 
before) can only come about through the medium of language. If we say that two people or a 
group are 'talking past each other', we mean that they have failed to understand each other 
because they have failed to each grasp the object of their discussion which exists between 
them. Understanding, just like judgment, is prefigured on what is communicable between 
persons. Again, imagination is at the core of the notion of understanding: 
Imagination alone enables us to see things in their proper perspective, to be strong 
enough to put that which is too close at a certain distance so that we can see and 
understand it without bias and prejudice, to be generous enough to bridge abysses of 
remoteness until we can see and understand everything that is too far away from us 
as though it were our own affair. This distancing of some things and bridging the 
abysses to others is part of the dialogue of understanding, for whose purposes direct 
experience establishes too close a contact and mere knowledge erects artificial 
barriers (ibid: 323) 
Note that understanding is referred to as a 'dialogue', as something which appears like a 
dialogue between imaginations. She continues, 
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 Without this kind of imagination, which actually is understanding, we would never be 
 able to  take our bearings in the world. It is the only inner compass we have. We are 
 contemporaries only so far as our understanding reaches (ibid) 
The widespread inability to understand each other, therefore, results in feelings of alienation 
and loneliness. Clichégenic speech, too, fails as a substitute because it is not pluralistic, but 
based off a singular standpoint. Without understanding, we are separated by an unbridgeable 
divide, because the objects of our subjective consciousness lack any communal meaning, and 
the result of true understanding is the generation of meaning. It helps to orientate us in a 
world which would otherwise seem alien, and ultimately, unintelligible. The tendency within 
existential philosophy to focus on the apparent absurdity of the modern age is just another 
way of describing the lack of understanding in the modern age. As she would state with a 
particularly hermeneutic inflection, understanding is "an unending activity by which...we come 
to terms with, reconcile ourselves to reality, that is, try to be at home in the world" (as cited 
by Beiner, 1992: 94). We shall now examine this hermeneutic dimension of her political theory 
with reference to hermeneutics and seek commonality between her thought and this 
philosophical movement. In particular we will focus upon the similarities between their 
attempts to reclaim the notion of rhetoric from its strategic associations toward a 
community/world-building concept.    
 
3.3 Hermeneutics and the Binding Power of Rhetoric 
 
Such a strong emphasis upon understanding as the foundation of friendship and political 
community inevitably means that Arendt’s thought verges closely toward the discipline of 
hermeneutics, the study of interpretation. On the face of it, hermeneutics definitely does not 
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bear the traditional hallmarks of political theory, and strictly speaking it is not a political 
discipline. However, the implications of hermeneutic theory are of increasing interest to 
political theorists, especially since Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action and his 
conversations with Hans Georg Gadamer over the politics of language and critique (see 
Mendelson, 1979). If hermeneutics is characterised as the attempt to outline the conditions of 
interpretive understanding, then Arendt would certainly fit within its bracket - endorsing a 
radically politicised version of it, which Habermas in fact credits as the source of his 
communicative turn (see Habermas, 1980). We have already explored in this thesis’ 
introduction how Arendt's approach to the study of political phenomena shares similarities 
with hermeneutics, placing emphasis upon preliminary judgment and prejudice. Not far 
removed from this philosophical stance is a further attempt, derived from her account of 
ancient Greek political culture, to outline how the political sphere is the primary space of 
human understanding and the necessary ground of our intersubjective experience. Arendt's 
intention is to relay how the notion of the political is inseparable from the notion of 
hermeneutic considerations - i.e. from the notion of understanding. For this reason, I believe 
that Arendt can be thought of as a political hermeneuticist. Where Arendt perhaps differs from 
other hermeneutic thinkers, perhaps, is that her argument is derived from political discussion 
rather than artistic as with Gadamer (see Gadamer, 2012) or epistemological such as with 
Rorty (see Rorty, 1979). This is apparent in her repeated attempts to unite understanding with 
the political responsibility that comes with citizenship which we will consider shortly.  
 We must be wary, however, of throwing Arendt into a philosophical conversation 
which she had no desire to partake in. The philosophical language of hermeneutics is not 
something which she wished her political theory to completely submit to. Yet, despite this, 
there is an unmistakable hermeneutic sensitivity to Arendt's writings which is too often 
overlooked in favour of the existential; certainly, the 'existential' elements of her thought are 
over-emphasised in comparison to her hermeneutics, often with reference to the influence of 
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Heidegger. But as Scott and Stark correctly note of her method: "In operational terms, the 
meaning of radicalism Arendt inherited from Husserl, Jaspers, and Heidegger was more of a 
hermeneutic than an Existenz, dedicated to removing textual obstacles to 'interpretation'" 
(Scott and Stark, 1996: 178). Of course, distinguishing hermeneutic from existential 
statements is no easy task, if not impossible at times. However, I still feel that the hermeneutic 
needs to given interpretive priority due to its focus upon the conditions of understanding 
rather than the conditions of authentic Self. There is one potential inconsistency in this claim 
which is found in the figure of Jaspers (a founder of existentialism), though this problem is 
lessened by the fact that Arendt considered him to be the exception rather than the norm. 
 Marieke Borren displays a rare awareness of the hermeneutic qualities found in 
Arendtian judgment, stating that “the neglect of Arendt’s hermeneutic-phenomenological 
background has caused much confusion and misunderstanding” (Borren, 2013: 228). Borren is 
more interested in the implications of the hermeneutic reading of Arendt relating to 
transcendentalism and empiricism, rather than politics; however, certain statements are 
important. In particular, the following claim fits our present analysis: “the kind of validity that 
common sense judgments achieve is intersubjectivity, or what could be called situated 
impartiality, or representativeness” (ibid: 244). What is at stake in Borren’s analysis is whether 
Arendtian judgment is open to the criticism of what this thesis has termed ‘cliché’, being 
dependent upon “the arbitrary rules of conduct prevailing in a particular community at a 
particular time” (ibid), as well as the polar opposite – the belief judgment has a very particular 
universal content. In response, Borren successfully argues that judgment is “something which 
emerges in the space between a plurality of actors and spectators, in our perceptual 
interaction with the common world, and which maintains the common world at the same 
time” (ibid: 248). We shall now examine how this intersubjective understanding relates to 
hermeneutics.  
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 The cornerstone of Arendtian hermeneutics is found in rhetorical discourse. There is a 
strong similarity here with the writings of Gadamer, who argues that rhetoric: 
 from the oldest tradition has been the only advocate of a claim to truth that defends 
 the probable, the eikos (verisimilar), and that which is convincing to the ordinary 
 reason against the claim of science to accept as true only what can be demonstrated 
 and tested! Convincing and persuading, without being able to prove- these are 
 obviously as much the aim and measure of understanding and interpretation as they 
 are the aim and measure of the art of oration and persuasion (Gadamer, 1997: 318) 
Through advancing rhetoric, Gadamer draws a distinction between the truth disclosed in 
conversation and scientific knowledge. The conversational/rhetorical model that Gadamer 
proposes, derived from the Socratic dialectic, is based on the conviction "that one does not try 
to argue the other person down but that one really considers the weight of the other's 
opinion" (2012: 361). This rhetorical interplay, where each individual submits their opinion to 
the questioning of the other, operates in a context within which the perlocutionary force of 
persuasion is the very foundation of the activity. Rhetorical intercourse is directed toward 
opinions, recognising the malleability of them, and shaping them into new forms. The 
conversational model is therefore fundamentally opposed to dogmatism. It does not intend 
toward conclusive proof but toward the maieutic quality of Socratic midwifery, what Arendt 
describes as giving birth "to what they themselves thought anyhow, to find the truth in their 
doxa" (PAP: 434). Every individual has their "own opening to the world" (ibid: 434), their 
opinion. The method of questioning, therefore, admits to the fundamental difference between 
individuals and their opinions and presupposes plurality of perspective. Despite this, our 
opinions are not fully formed outside of dialogue, as Arendt writes: "just as nobody can know 
beforehand the other's doxa, so nobody can know by himself and without further effort the 
inherent truth of his own opinon. Socrates wanted to bring out this truth that everyone 
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potentially possesses" (ibid: 434). This process of conversational questioning reveals opinion 
"in its own truthfulness", and Socrates sought to "make citizens more truthful" (PAP: 434). 
Thus for Socrates, Arendt claims, "maieutic was a political activity, a give and take, 
fundamnetally on a basis of strict equality" (ibid: 434), an equality which comes to form the 
basis of isēgoria and friendship.    
 She describes this dialogue as something which arises between friends; and as we 
know, friendship "to a large extent, indeed, consists of this kind of talking about something 
that the friends have in common. By talking about what is between them, it becomes ever 
more common to them" (ibid: 435). Arendt categorically states that this was an imperative in 
such an agonistic political culture as ancient Greece, where the quest for glory could often be 
antagonistic in nature. What this friendly, rhetorical conversation achieves is what Gadamer 
calls the "coming-into-language of the thing itself" (2012: 371) where we, as speakers, 
recognise the reality, the objectivity, of the shared phenomenon - what the Greeks called the 
'unity of an aspect'. As Gadamer states: 
 [In conversation] something is placed in the centre, as the Greeks say, which the 
 partners in dialogue both share, and concerning which they can exchange ideas with 
 one another...in a successful conversation they both come under the influence of the 
 truth of the object and are thus bound to one another in a new community. To reach 
 an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward and 
 successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into a 
 communion in which we do not remain what we were (ibid: 371)   
Politics, as Arendt frequently asserts, takes place in and belongs to a 'space of appearance'. It 
is constituted and concerned with objects as they appear to us. She refers to this as the 'thing-
character of the world', and the activity of 'placing something in the centre' is a task of 
rendering these things intelligible, to give them worldly tangibility and opening them up as 
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objects of judgment. A phenomenon always appears to us in uniqueness, but rhetorical 
conversation creates a bond of mutual agreement about its properties. Through speaking 
about phenomena the world is manifest; for "to live together in a world means essentially that 
a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those 
who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same 
time" (HC: 52). Through rhetorical conversation the bonds between subjective individuals are 
strengthened as is the objectivity and reality of the world they inhabit: "the reality of the 
world is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all...and whatever lacks this 
appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our own but 
without reality" (ibid: 199). The risk of the world’s loss, which amounts to the loss of common 
sense is found in “a noticeable increase in superstition and gullibility” (ibid: 209). Under 
conditions of alienation, which she considers the condition of modernity and the foundation 
upon which the totalitarian empires were built, no friendship can exist. To be equal is to exist 
in a space in which the inequality of rulership has been exorcised, as to understand another 
individual can only be realised in equivalent communion. Importantly, Arendt attributes the 
bond of understanding with the bond of citizenship.  
 Furthermore, in the political space of conversational friendship, the individual 
emerges in "his unique distinctness, appears and confirms himself in speech and action" (ibid: 
207). This individual - the 'who' which she often references - can only materialise through 
communication. As she would say of Jaspers and of the Kantian judge: they engage in 
humanitas (see chapter two), acquiring the "very height of humanness because it was valid 
without being objective" (MDT: 73). Those who disclose their persona, aid the creation of a 
worldly space and become 'citizens of the world', performing functions similar to Socrates 
over two thousand years ago. This is not based on a 'will to disclosure', a false projection of 
the self, but rather a commitment to publicity, and hence, the political sphere. The willingness 
to enter the public sphere and engage communicatively through judgment and understanding 
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is to be true political citizen as Arendt would describe it; for understanding “makes it bearable 
for us to live with other people, strangers forever, in the same world, and makes it possible for 
them to bear with us” (EU: 322). As loneliness facilitated the desire for intimate uniformity, 
friendship rejoices in the positivity of prejudice that is embodied in the faculty of judgment. 
The idea is not to dissolve the space between us, but to be strengthened and connected 
through our very difference. She would phrase her stance beautifully in the following 
quotation: 
The political element in friendship is that in the truthul dialogue each of the friends 
can understand the truth inherent in the other's opinion. More than his friend as a 
person, one friend understands how and in what specific articulateness the common 
world appears to the other, who as a person is forever unequal or different. This kind 
of understanding- seeing the world (as we rather tritely say today) from the other 
fellow's point of view- is the political kind of insight par excellence...If such an 
understanding- and action inspired by it- were to take place...then the prerequisite 
would be for each citizen to be articulate enough to show his opinion in its 
truthfulness and therefore to understand his fellow citizens (PAP: 436-437) 
As her notions of common sense and worldliness suggest, individual judgment must be based 
on shared assumptions, and how these assumptions come to be shared is of great interest to 
us.  
 The kind of speech that fits with this ideal of communicative community is the form of 
rhetoric often described, particularly by Chaim Perelman (following Aristotle), as epideictic 
(see Perelman, 1979). This account of rhetoric is considered a kind of display which articulates 
shared judgments about the world to the audience, resulting in the “forming [of] a community 
of minds” (Perelman, 1979: 7). Kenneth Burke refers to this rhetoric as ‘identification’, “the 
use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings” (1950: 43). The 
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performance of the orator is not a form of ornamental exhibitionism whereby the individual 
attempts to display skill. Instead, it is motivated by the desire to articulate the principles of a 
community so that these principles may be recognised as something shared, contested, or as 
an inspiration for further action. The disclosure of the individual through this form of rhetoric 
is borne from love of community and the potential political power latent within all 
communities of peoples. Perelman describes the political element of rhetoric in the following 
manner:  
 the goal of the orator in the epideictic discourse is to contribute to the enhancement 
 of values, to create a spiritual communion around common values. This holds true 
 whether they are abstract values such as liberty or justice, or concrete values, such as 
 Athens or soldiers fallen in combat (Perelman, 1984: 131) 
The greatest example of this kind of speech for both Arendt as well as Perelman is Pericles’ 
funeral oratory as recounted in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. Arendt writes 
that his exhortation of the “innermost convictions of the people of Athens” (HC: 205) was 
powerful enough to “inspire men to dare the extraordinary” (ibid: 206), and therefore his use 
of epideictic rhetoric became a form of political action without succumbing to the deceptive 
strategies that we associate with the rhetoric of today. Ultimately, the success of this kind of 
rhetoric is dependent upon the mutual understanding of the spectators - whether they share a 
common world which connects to the rhetorical appeals. Its strength lay in its capacity to 
inspire action among the audience with recourse to the shared principles of the political 
community, and as we shall examine in the next two chapters this quality of rhetoric is of the 
utmost importance for Arendt’s account of freedom. 
 The risk with emphasising this form of speech is to blur the distinction between cliché 
and rhetoric, as the articulation of common ideals might be understood to bear similarity to 
modern clichégenic speech. The difference for Arendt relates to the ground upon which the 
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rhetorical conversation takes place, which in the classical context took place in a sphere 
comprised of pluralistic common sense and in the modern context takes place in a sphere 
without meaning and in which ideologies provide non-pluralist fictions. Furthermore, a 
rhetoric rooted in a common world makes judgment possible whilst not determining the 
outcome of the judgment itself. Under clichégenic conditions the opposite is the case: speech 
determines the perspective that the listener will adopt. One is open to contestation, whereas 
the other is not. Because epideictic rhetoric centres on the objects that we have in common 
and that we understand, it facilitates the growth of a kind of responsibility that differs from 
the personal responsibility that we recognise in our moral tradition. We shall now explore this 
notion of political responsibility, again with reference to the human examples of Socrates and 
Jaspers which we should now be well acquainted.  
 
3.4 Responsibility for the World 
 
As was discussed earlier, Arendt was concerned by the destruction of personal responsibility in 
totalitarian bureaucracy, the peculiar form of government described as the ‘rule of nobody’. 
Those who adopted a role within the totalitarian machine rarely accepted their responsibility, 
pointing up the bureaucratic ladder to the individual who gave them the orders, and such a 
ladder ultimately leads to the individual at the top. However, it is another one of those 
particular features of totalitarianism that no truly totalitarian leader would accept 
responsibility because they consider themselves to be merely instigators of a natural historical 
process (we will speak about this more in the following chapter). In other words, the leader’s 
actions follow the strict logic of ideology. What we are left with is an entire form of 
government, from top to bottom, which is comprised of individuals unwilling to recognise 
their role as something consciously chosen. And for reasons discussed above, Arendt 
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dismissed the idea that a retrenchment behind moral principles was the answer to this 
modern phenomenon of wilful human mechanisation, since the following of a moral principle 
does not necessarily mean that the principle was chosen by a thinking individual.  
 Being responsible for oneself is obviously important and can have a protective quality 
in moments of crisis, however, it is clear that Arendt wants to move beyond its subjective 
limitations. “In the center of moral considerations stands the self; in the centre of political 
considerations of conduct stands the world” (RJ: 153), and with this in mind I would now like 
to emphasise a distinction that Arendt makes between personal and political responsibility, 
correspondent with a distinction between responsibility to the self and to the world. This 
distinction, I would like to argue, is crucial to understanding the kind of community that 
judgment achieves. However, we must recognise that personal responsibility is the necessary 
component of political responsibility; as she would state of Socrates, what he "was driving at 
(and what Aristotle's theory of friendship explains more fully) is that living together with 
others begins with living together with oneself" (PAP: 439). In other words, political 
responsibility is unlocked by personal responsibility. Before we look at this connection I think 
that we should examine the distinction itself first, which is best understood with reference to 
the idea of ‘collective responsibility’, which Arendt spoke about within the context of ‘German 
guilt’. 
 The post-war proclamations in Germany of ‘we are all guilty’ concerned Arendt. What 
she believed was that the (well-meaning) language of shared guilt is actually a 
misunderstanding: one cannot feel guilt for something that one has not done, but one can feel 
responsibility. Guilt is a phenomenon of conscience, and thus the phrase ‘we are all guilty’ is 
actually “a declaration of solidarity with the wrongdoers” (RJ: 148). There is, however, “such a 
thing as responsibility for things one has not done” (ibid: 147), as found in collective, or 
political responsibility. This exists so long as we exist as members of a collective “which no 
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voluntary act of mine can dissolve” (ibid: 149), and “we can escape this political and strictly 
collective responsibility only by leaving the community” (ibid: 150), which is nigh on 
impossible. Political responsibility is defined as responsibility for the actions of one’s peers, 
though this definitely does not imply guilt - one is a focus upon your own actions, and the 
other is a focus upon your community’s actions. As actions and responsibility are always 
judged with hindsight, what we are talking about is the manner in which our collective history 
affects us: “we are always held responsible for the sins of our fathers as we reap the rewards 
of their merits; but we are of course not guilty of their misdeeds, either morally or legally, nor 
can we ascribe their deeds to our own merits” (ibid: 150). The negative side of this historical 
responsibility is collective shame, and the positive is found in the authority of tradition. The 
two examples of this that Arendt most frequently draws upon are Germany and America, 
respectively. Authority is an important concept here, though we will have to abstain from 
investigating it until the next chapter.  
 How can the individual practise worldly responsibility? The answer lies in the idea of 
public disclosure and judgment. Collective responsibility is of a different nature, it stems from 
the individual's entrance into the public sphere through word and deed, in other words, 
making their words and deeds an object of shared judgment. In the past chapter we 
introduced the idea that Jaspers represents for Arendt the true spirit of civic friendship in 
polar opposition to totalitarian loneliness, and now we must link it with the present discussion 
regarding judgment.  
 Selbstdenken, critical thought, is not something which is simply applied to external 
ideas and concepts - it must be internalised as well, because "it is precisely by applying critical 
standards to one's own thought that one learns the art of critical thought" (K: 42). The internal 
questioning of one's own convictions characteristic of Selbstdenken and the basis of critical 
thought,  
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 presupposes that everyone is willing and able to render an account of what he thinks 
 and says...Logon didonai, 'to give an account'- not to prove, but to be able to say how 
 one came to an opinion and for what reasons one formed it...The term is itself political 
 in origin: to render accounts is what Athenian citizens asked of their politicians, not 
 only in money matters but in matters of politics. They could be held responsible (ibid: 
 41)  
Arendt even goes so far to claim that Greek philosophy was the result of this political culture 
which demanded the "holding oneself and everyone else responsible and answerable for what 
he thought and taught" (ibid: 41). In turn, we can say that the pre-Platonic philosophy 
(exemplified by the Sophists and Socrates) we attribute to Classical Greece also fed back into 
the democratic and rhetorical qualities we associate with the political culture of the Greek 
polis. But it is not enough to state that intersubjective responsibility consists simply in being 
able to 'give an account' of one's opinions and actions, and here, judgment comes to the fore. 
Arendt's concept of judgment always lingers in the background as the example of Greek 
political culture is held up; with their  
 incessant talk the Greeks discovered that the world we have in common is usually 
 regarded from an infinite number of different standpoints, to which correspond the 
 most diverse points of view. In a sheer inexhaustible flow of arguments, as the 
 Sophists presented them to the citizenry of Athens, the Greek learned to exchange his 
 own viewpoint, his own 'opinion'- the way the world appeared and opened up to him 
 dokei moi [sic], 'it appears to me,' from which comes doxa [sic], or 'opinion'- with 
 those of his fellow citizens. Greeks learned to understand- not to understand one 
 another as individual persons, but to look upon the same world from one another's 
 standpoint, to see the same in very different and frequently opposing aspects (BPF: 
 51) 
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We have not, however, really touched upon how this 'incessant talk' resultant in the judging 
'enlarged mentality' creates the intersubjective aspect of being truly responsible. This can only 
occur if we recognise the importance Arendt bestows upon disclosure. To understand what 
intersubjective responsibility means we need to commence from where the previous chapter 
finished - from her account of the reasons why she held such deep respect for Karl Jaspers, 
"the only disciple Kant ever had" (K: 7). If we recall, it was argued that Arendt builds her notion 
of citizenship upon the ancient Greek understanding of 'friendship' which is 'sober and cool' 
rather than intimate. This kind of friendship, the 'spirit of togetherness', manifests itself as a 
'readiness to share the world with other men'. The spirit of togetherness, brought about 
through the amazing qualities of language, has the dual function of constituting true 
individualism (humanitas) and true community. What interested Arendt so much about 
Jaspers was his consistent emphasis and comfort in appearing in public, in disclosing himself.  
 Disclosure always operates in a space of appearance, and it is within this space of 
appearance that judgment operates. But Jaspers did not enter the public realm, give himself 
over to the public, for reasons that we might call selfish or shallow (for example, for political 
influence or fame). He did not project an 'image' of himself, instead, he gave himself over to 
the spotlight of public scrutiny, claiming not to be 'representing anything but his own 
existence'. Through doing so, he revealed himself as an individual; this revealing can only occur 
in public, the "revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are 
with others and neither for nor against them- that is, in sheer togetherness. Although nobody 
knows whom he reveals when he discloses himself in deed or word, he must be willing to risk 
the disclosure" (HC: 180). Jaspers recognised the role which the public realm plays in the 
constitution of true individuality. Philosophically, Arendt attempts to reconcile the individual 
with the community through stressing their absolute mutual dependence: 
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Wherever people judge the things of the world that are common to them, there is 
more implied in their judgments than these things. By his manner of judging, the 
person discloses to an extent also himself, what kind of person he is, and this 
disclosure, which is involuntary, gains in validity to the degree that it has liberated 
itself from merely individual idiosyncrasies (BPF: 220)   
The most basic element of this is to hold one’s own ideas to account, and expect the same of 
those others that join within the space brought about through communication.   
  Socrates, as we know, tirelessly questioned people about terms. Jaspers, too, saw his 
function as a facilitator of communication in a similar manner. These terms become objects of 
judgment, communicable between us, and a shared understanding arises from this, not just of 
the objects themselves, but of the importance of the plural contestation of those objects. The 
focus has shifted away from the specific objects of judgment and onto the space in which this 
communication occurs between unique spectators. As Arendt would state: 
 Under the conditions of a common world, reality is not guaranteed primarily by the 
 ‘common nature’ of all men who constitute it, but rather by the fact that, differences 
 of position and the resulting variety of perspectives notwithstanding, everybody is 
 always concerned with the same object. If the sameness of the object can no longer 
 be discerned, no common nature of men, least of all the unnatural conformism of 
 mass society, can prevent the destruction of the common world, which is usually 
 preceded by the destruction of the many aspects in which it presents itself to human 
 plurality (HC: 57-58) 
Her attacks on modern subjectivism and the desire for brotherly fraternity (where you and I 
view each other as the same) point to the dilemmas faced for anyone who thinks of the public 
realm in the manner of Socrates, Jaspers, and Arendt. The modern public space thought of as 
incredibly constrictive, disallowing space between people. The reality of the public space can 
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only be maintained by the constant presence of a plurality of perspectives which are given to 
us by the simple fact that we all each occupy a unique position as a physical and mental being.  
 Like Socrates, Jaspers cast himself as an example of responsible citizenship. His 
responsibility, we can say, was both to himself and the public. He recognised how articulating 
his opinions and the objects in his view created the conditions for communicable judgment 
and understanding. Through operating within this space, he set an example of intersubjective, 
worldly responsibility. Responsibility shifts away from concern with the self, and to a concern 
with the space in which the self becomes humanly intelligible to others; if the point of 
reference for subjective responsibility is the individual subject, then the point of reference for 
intersubjective responsibility is the world. His responsibility was always to himself, but 
ultimately it was also to the space within which this self was articulated. It is to see value in 
maintaining the space between people, so that "those who are gathered around...know they 
see sameness in utter diversity" (HC: 57). And in these situations the individual themselves 
become an example: “Responsibility, in its essence: to know that one sets an example, that 
others will 'follow'; in this way one changes the world” (Arendt as cited by Williams, 2007: 12). 
Garrath Williams adopts a similar stance, stating that there exists “an integral connection 
between the actor’s self-disclosure and the responsibility for the world which, Arendt says, 
‘arises out of action’” (Williams, 2015: 38). What distinguishes Williams’ work from others is 
his awareness of the distinct political psychology behind Arendt’s theory of action and its 
connection with the human example - our acceptance that we as individuals set examples 
through our acts. This setting of an example “demands recognition that one will indeed be 
judged by others, as an actor in one’s own right. By virtue of not knowing whom one discloses, 
the actor is beholden to others – who, seeing the world from their distinct perspectives, may 
act and respond on their own accounts” (ibid: 46). The Arendtian actor is an individual for 
whom publicity is critical, as accepting the disclosive nature of action implies a broader worldly 
responsibility beyond personal considerations. Williams and I seem to be in total agreement 
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that for Arendt, “willing appearance before others and concern for their judgment are 
elementary conditions of responsibility” (ibid: 45). A further implication of this I believe can 
identified in the manifestation of principles, in which the stories that we tell about public 
action influences the development and awareness of communal bonds through the creation 
and maintenance of a common language based on human examples. We will discuss this 
statement further in the next two chapters.  
 Comparing Jaspers' form of communicable philosophising with the responsibility of 
the statesman, Arendt argues that 
 Jaspers's affirmation of the public realm is unique because it comes from a 
 philosopher and because it springs from the fundamental conviction underlying his 
 whole activity as a philosopher: that both philosophy and politics concern everyone. 
 This is what they have in common; this is the reason they belong in the public realm 
 where the human person and his ability to prove himself are what count. The 
 philosopher- in contrast to the scientist- resembles the statesman in that he must 
 answer for his opinions, that he is held responsible. The statesman, in fact, is in the 
 relatively fortunate position of being responsible only to his own nation, whereas 
 Jaspers, at least in all his writings after 1933, has always written as if to answer for 
 himself before all mankind (MDT: 74-75) 
Being politically responsible is the recognition that one sets a human example through the 
manner in which one acts and speaks and that this example becomes part of the world. 
Thinking about responsibility in this manner makes the individual not only accountable to 
themselves (through conscience) but accountable to our peers. This is based on the knowledge 
that our acts and language are a part of the world and will be judged, that our speech and 
deeds will still exist once we are gone, that our presence in the world will survive us and 
continue to have an influence. Acknowledging this fact is of the utmost importance because it 
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shifts emphasis away from our own sense of guilt and toward our lasting impact upon the 
world. If there is one aspect of Arendt's thought which we can take from this discussion it is 
this: it is the responsibility of citizens to be participants in the unending discourse of humanity. 
Her analysis of totalitarian irresponsibility insists as much. We might therefore be willing to 
accept Rorty’s argument that it is the job of hermeneutic philosophy "to keep the conversation 
going rather than to find objective truth" (Rorty, 1979: 377). In so doing we may come to 
promote a form of friendship which is in tune with a responsibility which takes the form of 
“citizens’ dispassionate and yet dedicated commitment to the welfare of the world” (Chiba, 
1995: 531-532).  
 
3.5 Towards Connecting Judgment and Freedom 
 
Just as we have analysed distinctions in the previous chapter (rhetoric and cliché, loneliness 
and friendship) we have introduced a new one: between personal responsibility and political 
responsibility. The former is a subjective experience, and hence is a non-political form of being 
responsible, and the latter is an intersubjective experience in which the communal bonds 
between citizens produce a broader responsibility which incorporates politics. I have argued in 
this chapter that Arendt felt that the experience of the totalitarian phenomenon further 
necessitated this theoretical division on the grounds that the condition of the modern age has 
eroded not just political responsibility but also the personal, which often has a restraining 
effect upon the actions of individuals. As has hopefully been conveyed, and in keeping with 
the emphasis upon speech through this thesis, judgment is the means through which the 
worldly quality of political responsibility comes into being. The validity of our judgments is 
created and maintained only through recourse with the common sense, the pool of 
observations of past actions and events. The result of this worldly reference point is 
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understanding, understanding between persons with reference to the objects as they appear 
to us in the world. For this reason, I have argued that Arendt’s theory of judgment is deeply 
hermeneutic insofar as it is concerned with the conditions through which understanding takes 
place. I have emphasised the importance of her theory of rhetoric for this point, pointing to 
Gadamer’s ideas concerning conversation and Perelman’s notion of epideictic speech. It is this 
ideal of rhetorical speech which underpins her ideas of community and friendship, and 
ultimately our ability to judge authentically. Following from this, I have argued that Arendt 
considers political responsibility to be the result of this manner of speaking, using the 
examples Socrates and Jaspers to highlight this. The cornerstone of political responsibility is a 
recognition that it is the duty of the members of a political community to create and maintain 
the sphere in which judgment takes place through discourse, and that the example one sets is 
not just of personal, but public interest. In the next chapter we examine the topic of political 
principles, which for Arendt are the basis of all free activity. These principles, it is argued, are 
prefigured upon our judgment of past human action. These judgments come to form 
prejudices which we hold and which form the basis of political tradition. Our sense of political 
responsibility, therefore, is crucial to the proper formation of these traditions.  
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Chapter Four 
Action and Principle 
 
The following chapter draws upon Arendt's understanding of 'action', "the political activity par 
excellence" (HC: 9). We have so far limited the use of the concept from our inquiry as we have 
been attempting to investigate specific terms such as modernity and judgment. Its 
importance, however, should never be understated, and any text of this nature must account 
for it, as the majority of interpretative or critical literature rightly does. Even this thesis, which 
claims freedom as the central term, cannot proceed without analysis of action and recognition 
of its formative role in Arendt's political thought. In keeping with previous chapters, we will 
analyse action by recourse to a secondary term: 'principle'. It is suggested that Arendt's theory 
of action is incomplete without a complementary theory of principles, and this chapter seeks 
to connect the two via a discussion of the primary role principles play in her understanding of 
totalitarianism and her analysis of the French and American Revolutions. Before we can do 
that however, we must carefully examine what a principle actually is - as the first section 
attempts to do. Political principles are distinguished from what Arendt deems to be the four 
constituent elements of action, and it is suggested that principles are best understood as the 
hermeneutic prejudices that are necessary for judgment to take place. In section two, these 
principles are related to Arendt’s critique of social values, and it is argued that principles offer 
Arendt an opportunity to theorise an alternative to them. In order to ground the terminology 
in something more substantial, we then relate the concept of principle to her concept of 
totalitarianism; Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism is dependent upon her distinguishing it from 
despotism, of which her theory of principle is necessary to include. Building upon this 
observation, section four analyses the importance of her theory of principle for her analysis of 
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the American and French Revolutions, and in so doing the strange nature of principles is better 
understood. I conclude that Arendt strongly believed that principles are the necessary basis of 
a free politics, a topic which is built upon in chapter five.  
 
4.1 Defining Political Principle  
 
In the previous chapter we were discussing how Arendt attempts to provide a basis for 
political responsibility in the human example, citing Socrates and Jaspers as illustrations of 
this. Their quests for publicity and public disclosure facilitated judgment among spectators, 
creating a worldly sphere of shared understanding and meaning prefigured on plural 
communication. As was argued throughout, Arendt intended to provide an account of what 
she considered to be a specifically political form of thinking, free of the coercion of 
philosophical truth or ideological logic, a quality of mind whose constitution was actually 
strengthened by the imperfection of human opinion and which unlocked a public sense of 
responsibility. Under scrutiny was the application of moral principles in the modern age, which 
developed into the provocative argument that morality belongs outside of the sphere of 
politics as it is a strictly personal, not public, phenomenon. It has been suggested that this 
attempt to think about politics and morality in separate spheres amounts to amoralism (see 
Kateb, 1984). It has also been suggested that Arendt is confused on these issues because the 
clarification of political, as opposed to moral judgment, is itself flawed (see Lasch, 1983: xi). 
Being able to give an account of what a principle is, addressing why this is an important 
concept for her, as well as emphasising the various contexts in which it is applicable, is of the 
utmost importance in contesting these claims. I believe that the concept of principle 
desperately needs to be recognised as one of the key concepts at play in Arendt’s thought, not 
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just something which is nodded towards in passing. Lucy Cane has stated something similar to 
this, arguing convincingly that “for Arendt, principles of action are not brought to politics from 
without, to regulate or constrain it. Rather, the manifestation and contestation of principles is 
politics” (Cane, 2015: 72).  
 The reason why 'principle' has not been granted much space in Arendtian literature is 
obvious: Arendt never says that much about it. Most curiously, the term is absent from her 
intensive engagement with and re-conceptualisation of action in The Human Condition. Yet 
when she does address it, it is apparent that the term is of great significance to her political 
thought. There are two notable examples of this: the final pages of her ‘Introduction into 
Politics’, and the chapter ‘What is Freedom?’ in Between Past and Future. Both are concerned 
with the topic of the freedom and meaning of political action, and the discussion of political 
principle is prefigured by a discussion of ends and goals and their relation to politics. In 
particular, she is interested in distinguishing the political from the instrumental (and hence, 
violent), supplying a careful distinction between four constituent elements of political action: 
goals, ends, meaning, and principle. “[T]he goals of politics”, she states, “are never anything 
more than the guidelines and directives by which we orient ourselves…[goals] set the 
standards by which everything that is done must be judged” (PP: 193-194). Ends, in distinction, 
are the material conclusions of action - the product of the act itself. Both goals and ends are 
independent of the act itself: one is a related idea, and the other is the physical manifestation 
of that idea. Meaning, however, is tied to the act as a unique phenomenon; it is possible for 
goals and ends to be shared by individuals and groups who exist in different times or spaces, 
whereas it is impossible for the meaning of each act to be the same or shared as meaning is 
particular. The meaning of an act is created by the spectacle of the action and its 
interpretation among spectators as an object of judgment. It is something distinct from the 
goal or end, and as such cannot be planned or predicted by the actors themselves: “the 
specific meaning of each deed can lie only in the performance itself and neither in its 
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motivation nor its achievement” (HC: 206). The greatest example of this is located in the 
“backward glance of the historian, who indeed always knows better what it was all about than 
the participants” (ibid: 192). Furthermore, meaning is not dependent upon the goals or ends - 
acting does not have to reach a successful conclusion in order to be meaningful. The 
instrumental logic of identifying and measuring the meaning of an act according to its success 
strikes Arendt as the wrongful application of the logic of homo faber upon politics (see chapter 
two for a detailed discussion of this). For Arendt, the modern mind is predisposed to view 
political action simply in terms of goals and ends, of which meaning is subsumed within the 
relationship between the two - i.e. did the end match the goals? Theoretically, this movement 
occurred with Plato's terminological splitting-apart of political action in the Statesman into 
'beginning' and 'achieving', in opposition to the prior Greek understanding which stressed 
their inherent interconnectivity. There those who begin, and those who achieve: "knowing 
what to do and doing it became two altogether different performances" (ibid: 223). This 
models action as a kind of fabrication, progressing in the following manner: "first, perceiving 
the image or shape (eidos) of the product-to-be, and then organizing the means and starting 
the execution" (ibid: 225). An individual or group dictates the political ideal, and the subjects 
act towards it; in this mode of thinking, "action has become the mere 'execution of orders'" 
(ibid: 223). Political action, therefore, is judged according to the level of success it has in 
manufacturing its end-product. To use a modern example: the revolutionary vanguard grasps 
the possibility (or, rather, inevitability) of a distant community through the material dialectic 
of history, and utilises the proletariat as executors of the given idea. If the workers are the 
motor, then the philosopher-revolutionary must be driver. It is no surprise then that Marx 
attempted to devise a philosophy of practical activity whereby theory exerts direct influence 
over action, with the task of the philosopher as that of world-changing revolutionary 
instigator.  
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 Because the term ‘action’ is "loaded and overloaded with tradition" (ibid: 12), Arendt 
accepts that it is very difficult for us to understand what constitutes a free act - an act which is 
not dominated by the logic of fabrication. Her concern in The Human Condition with re-
acquainting ourselves with the distinction between human activities (labour, work, and action) 
through an exposition of Greek political culture stems from a critique of the Platonic levelling 
of these distinctions and the modern obliviousness toward them. Her answer for thinking of 
action in terms not dictated by fabrication is found in the “fourth element [of political action], 
which, although it is never the direct cause of action, is nevertheless what first sets it into 
motion. Following Montesquieu…I would like to call this element the ‘principle of action,’ and 
in psychological terms, one might say that it is the fundamental conviction that a group of 
people share” (PP: 194-195). And as she writes in ‘What is Freedom?’: 
 Action, to be free, must be free from motive on one side, from its intended goal as a 
 predictable effect on the other...Action insofar as it is free is neither under the 
 guidance of the intellect nor under the dictate of the will- although it needs both for 
 the execution of any particular goal- but springs from something altogether different 
 which (following Montesquieu's famous analysis of forms of government) I shall call a 
 principle (BPF: 150) 
Crucially, she considers a principle to be that which allows us to think of action in its freedom, 
away from the instrumental 'mode of making' and the subsequent "degradation of politics into 
a means for something else" (HC: 230). This desire to think of action as something to be valued 
outside of a fabrication framework animates her entire political agenda, and informs her 
unwavering critique of the Western tradition of political philosophy. Arendt and Heidegger, by 
Dana Villa, is one of the most comprehensive interpretative attempts to seriously engage with 
this 'self-contained' (or as it sometimes described, ‘neo-Aristotelian’) understanding of action, 
within which he rightly claims that her theory of action "should be read as the sustained 
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attempt to think of praxis outside the teleological framework" (Villa, 1996: 47). However, Villa 
does not adequately address the role of principles in Arendtian thought, referring to them only 
in an endnote (see Villa, 1996: 251). The other pioneering book of this 'self-contained' nature, 
Jacques Taminiaux's The Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker (1997), excludes any 
mention of principles. Undeniably, Arendt's understanding of principles has been largely 
ignored by commentators. Canovan (1992: 195) and Disch (1994: 37) devote some time to the 
concept, though it doesn’t play a key role in either of their arguments; Knauer (2006), is one 
exception, though he unfortunately conflates the concept of ‘meaning’ with ‘principle’. As 
should hopefully become apparent, a focus upon principles can complement and advance this 
reading very well, for it is the principle which is the constituent element of action which makes 
it independent from instrumentalism. On the other hand, we should be careful not to fall into 
the trap which Habermas did when he wrote his influential critique of Arendt, arguing that she 
is opposed to combining politics with strategy (Habermas, 1977: 16). Recognising the 
importance of the distinctions she makes regarding these issues is necessary to move beyond 
this misrepresentation, as she certainly accepts strategy as part of the constituent elements of 
political action. 
 So, to be more specific, what is a principle? In order to answer this question it is best 
to look at the intellectual source of the term. It first emerges in Arendt's 1954 essay 'On the 
Nature of Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding', and is present in the final chapter of 
The Origins of Totalitarianism - with the latter derived in part from the former. In both 
instances, the term emerges out of a discussion of Montesquieu's classification of 
government-types and its relevance for her attempt at understanding the 'essence' and 
'nature' of the distinctly totalitarian. Montesquieu, famously, was interested in what makes 
states act as they do, and developed the notion that each governmental form (republic, 
monarchy, and despotism) has an associated principle, described as the “human passions 
which set in motion” (Montesquieu, 1989: 3.1). The principle of republican government, 
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according to Montesquieu, is virtue, the love of equality; the principle of monarchical 
government, honour, the passion for distinction; and the principle of despotism, fear, the 
concern with personal security. These 'passions' or sentiments are essential to the effective 
functioning of the government, and whilst Montesquieu admits that in reality the constitution 
of the body politic is not quite so two-dimensional (in a monarchy, for example, there may 
well be individuals who act out of virtue, not honour, and vice versa), the relevant principle 
still holds the clue as to why individuals and governments act as they do - and even why they 
succeed or fail in their acts. "Formerly the wealth of individuals constituted the public 
treasure", he says of ancient democratic Athens, "but now this has become the patrimony of 
private persons" (ibid: 3.3). In other words, the decline of democratic Athens was rooted in 
the decline of virtue and the (un-republican) rise of ambition; the result being a certain kind of 
political contestation whereby the individual desires power over their equals and seeks control 
over public life rather than the pleasure that comes with political equality. Arendt is 
unequivocal in her commendation of Montesquieu's theory of principles:  
 Montesquieu's moving and guiding principles- virtue, honor, fear- are principles 
 insofar as they rule both the actions of the government and the actions of the 
 governed. Fear in a tyranny is not only the subjects' fear on the tyrant, but the tyrant's 
 fear of his subjects as well. Fear, honor, and virtue are not merely psychological 
 motives, but the very criteria according to which all public life is led and judged...He 
 analyzes the public life of citizens, not people's private lives, and discovers that in this 
 public life- that is, in the sphere where all men act together concerning things that are 
 of equal concern to each- action is determined  by certain principles (EU: 331-332) 
A similar statement is found in Origins: 
 a 'principle of action'...different in each form of government, would inspire 
 government and citizens alike in their public activity and serve as a criterion, beyond 
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 the merely negative yardstick of lawfulness, for judging all action in public affairs (OT: 
 467) 
Montesquieu describes principles as the ‘human passions which set [action] in motion’, and 
Arendt describes them as ‘the fundamental conviction that a group of people share’, ‘a 
criterion for judging all action in public affairs’. Principles, importantly, must be understood as 
the inspiration of the act, though they are certainly not what she labels ‘motivations’ - of 
which goals and ends are categorised - which she considers too closely related to the 
phenomenon of human will. A motivation always works toward a particular end or goal and is 
exhausted once the end has been achieved, whereas the inspiration of an act "loses nothing in 
strength or validity through execution...the principle of action can be repeated time and again, 
it is inexhaustible" (BPF: 151). Similarly, "in distinction from its motive, the validity of a 
principle is universal, it is not bound to any particular person or any particular group" (ibid: 
151). Unlike motivations (true knowledge of which is always limited to the actors themselves), 
a principle can be observed by non-actors and become a shared phenomenon. It is this quality 
which also sets them apart from concepts and ideas, which can be grasped by the mind 
without recourse to the external world. In distinction, principles can only appear to us through 
action, so their requirement is the external sensory world.  
 In comparison to personal motivations and objects of thought, a principle is a lot less 
fixed in nature. It should be understood as something broader and less well-defined; as Knauer 
puts it, a principle is “too general to prescribe (or cause) any particular goal (or act)” (2006: 
296). While Arendt does not supply a strict definition of what a principle is, I think that it is 
best to think of principles as hermeneutic prejudices (or prejudgments), understood as 
conditions for judgment. This prejudice is not plucked from the sky but comes directly from 
the experience of action itself, or to be more specific, from the spectating of acts. These 
prejudices then enable and inform judgment of present and future acts. Principles are 
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essentially formed through repeated human action, and “the extraordinary significance of 
these principles is not only that they first move human beings to act but that they are also the 
source of constant nourishment for their actions” (PP: 195). This ‘constant nourishment’ is 
another way of thinking of political tradition, and the transferral of authority. Principles 
emerge against the backdrop (or ‘horizon’) of past acts, constantly reinvigorating and building 
upon something concrete that is shared between individuals. In this way, principles carry a 
strong world building element. In fact, for Arendt principles are the necessary element of the 
transferral of the conditions of all true political association. The question we must now turn to 
is why, according to Arendt’s analysis, we have reached a point in the modern era in which 
“principles of action no longer inform our thinking about politics” (ibid: 197).  
 
4.2 Principles and Values 
 
At this point it is necessary to also consider another distinction that Arendt makes: between 
political principles from moral principles and social values, and it is in making this distinction 
that the importance of her account of political principles further comes to light. According to 
Arendt’s analysis, one of the most distressing aspects of the totalitarian moment was the 
mockery it made of the prior belief in the inviolability of moral principles, which suddenly lost 
their power and “stood revealed in the original meaning of the word, as a set of mores, 
customs and manners, which could be exchanged for another set with hardly more trouble 
than it would take to change the table manners of an individual or people” (RJ: 50). Those 
moral principles which had seemed unshakably firm were being increasingly unsettled in the 
modern age, with the final certainty of this occurrence manifesting itself in the terror of Nazi 
Germany and Stalinist Russia. “Were these things or principles,” Arendt asks, “from which all 
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virtues are ultimately derived, mere values which could be exchanged against other values 
whenever people changed their minds about them?” (ibid: 51). She refers to this world-
changing moral phenomenon as the ‘de-valuation of values’, drawing from what Nietzsche 
commented upon with characteristic style in The Antichrist with his description of the ‘trans’ 
or ‘re’-valuation of Christian values.   
 The use of the term ‘value’ is important for Arendt because for her the phrase reflects 
an inherent moral relativity which is paralleled in the relativity of the exchange market, within 
which the value of an object is in a constant state of change in relation to the other objects 
available. Objects within the market hold no intrinsic value outside of exchange as their value 
is not self-evident, based as they are on the objects with which they can be exchanged. ‘Value’ 
serves to indicate “only the relationship between things” (HC: 166n). Obviously, thinking of 
moral principles in these terms as something with the status of relative value greatly 
undermines the force behind the inspiration of the principle itself. The transformation from 
moral principle to value means that it becomes just another “social commodity which could be 
circulated and cashed in in exchange for all kinds of other values, social and individual…[and] 
in passing from hand to hand they were worn down like old coins. They lost the faculty of 
arresting our attention and moving us” (BPF: 200-201). If we are to look upon the public realm 
as a market-place, which it is so commonly described as since John Stewart Mill used the 
metaphor, moral principles become just another collective object that one can pick up or 
throw away as though they were items.  
 If we may return to a statement from chapter one: "if somebody appears who, for 
whatever purposes, wishes to abolish the old 'values' or virtues, he will find that easy enough, 
provided he offers a new code" (T: 177). It is clear that Arendt considers the appeal to values 
as something fickle and amenable to sudden change, particularly under conditions such as 
those explored in chapter one. For this reason Arendt does not trust the role of values in 
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politics, as she perceives them to be relatively groundless. They are shown to wither under the 
spotlight of thinking (as shown in the example of Socrates), and they verge too close toward 
blind acceptance to be self-aware of their limitations. There is no cast-iron method for 
adjudicating between values, no 'standards and universal rules', and any attempts to provide 
such a method will ultimately falter. Such a realisation can lead one to nihilism, but Arendt's 
treatment of principles suggests a potential to move away from such a position. For Arendt's 
turn to principles of action is an attempt to revive the 'objectiveness' of intersubjective 
worldliness, as principles are always derived from the fundamental experiences of 'living 
together' (more on this topic shortly), and promote a solidity in those categories of thought. 
Principles, for this reason, represent the most 'real' experience from which we can be freely 
inspired to act and judge action. The superiority of principles is lost if we relegate them to 
'mere' values which can traded or discarded as easily as we can physical objects. It is as though 
she is clearing a space for the entrance of principles when she writes in The Human Condition:  
 The much deplored devaluation of all things, that is, the loss of all intrinsic worth, 
 begins with their transformation into values or commodities, for from this moment on 
 they exist only in relation to some other thing which can be acquired in their stead. 
 Universal relativity, that a thing exists only in relation to other things, and loss of 
 intrinsic worth, that nothing any longer possesses an 'objective' value independent of 
 the ever-changing estimations of supply and demand, are inherent in the very concept 
 of value itself...It is this loss of standards and universal rules, without which no world 
 could ever be erected by man, that Plato already perceived in the Protagorean 
 proposal to establish man, the fabricator of things, and the use he makes of them, as 
 their supreme measure (HC: 165-166) 
To consider principle as a 'social value' is to overlook its foundation in action itself and render 
it politically worthless and meaningless. Principles have a worldly 'objectivity' which Arendt 
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believes cannot be matched by anything else. The worth of a social value is dictated by its 
prevalence in society - which in the modern era, Arendt believes, will tend toward subjectivist 
political aberrations and result in either terror or public decay. The modern understanding of 
action which is shaped by the logic of fabrication undermines the capacity to discern principles 
from values, destroying the hermeneutic base which makes up the world and playing its role in 
the generation of loneliness as the predominant form of human association. Thus, the 
devaluation of values is very much tied to the condition of modern worldlessness. As we shall 
see in the following sections, the loss of principles through their transformation into values is a 
key part to understanding both her critique of totalitarianism and her analysis of modern 
revolution.  
 
4.3 The Principle of Totalitarianism 
 
Montesquieu's three principles - virtue, honour, and fear - should be primarily understood as 
interpersonal relationships with one's peers in the body politic. This means that 
Montesquieu's theory of principles is a kind of political sociology; in the words of Ramon Aron: 
"the theory of principle obviously leads to a theory of social organization" (1965: 21). The 
principle of virtue, Aron continues, "is dependent on a certain sense of equality" (ibid: 22), 
which lends itself to republican government because "a republic is a form of government in 
which men live by and for the group...the members of the group regard themselves as citizens 
and therefore, ultimately, as equals" (ibid: 22). On the other hand, honour - "the sense of what 
each man knows he owes to his rank and station" (ibid: 22), lends itself to monarchic rule 
because it is "based on discrimination and inequality" (ibid: 23). The social forms which 
accompany each principle highlight the incompatibility of, say, the inequality of honour with a 
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republican government (hence, by Montesquieu's analysis, the decline of Athens). In this 
sense, principles are not simply beliefs or opinions about governmental systems, they are 
related to certain core interpersonal values which go beyond ideas. It is this interpersonal 
dimension of Montesquieu's principles which really interests Arendt, and she approaches it in 
'On the Nature of Totalitarianism' with her characteristically existential verve. Through this 
argument Arendt further develops Montesquieu's theory of principles and gives it a 
conceptual depth which it was clearly lacking before. This is evident in the following passage, 
in which she explains the reason for her positive consideration of principles:   
 The fundamental experience upon which monarchies and, we may add, all hierarchical 
 forms of government are founded is the experience, inherent in the human condition, 
 that men are distinguished, that is, different from each other by birth...The 
 fundamental experience upon which republican laws are founded and from which the 
 action of its citizens springs is the experience of living together with and belonging to a 
 group of equally powerful men (EU: 336) 
Likewise, she describes Montesquieu's classification of government types as 'authentic' 
 because the grounds on which their structures are built (the distinction of each, 
 equality of all, and impotence) and from which their principles of motion spring are 
 authentic elements of the human condition and are reflected in primary human 
 experiences (ibid: 338) 
The references to the 'human condition' are particularly revealing, and here we can identify 
the philosophical kernel which would come to underpin much found within the pages of The 
Human Condition, informing many of her concepts such as natality and plurality. Because of 
the chronology of these formative reflections upon principles it is possible to read her account 
of action as derivative of our present inquiry.  
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 As we discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, Arendt often engages with issues 
concerning the 'living-together-of men' (a re-thinking of Heidegger's Dasein), and the terms 
which were discussed - solitude, isolation, loneliness, and togetherness - were drawn from the 
elucidation of principles in 'On the Nature of Totalitarianism' and Origins. In particular, they 
arise from an attempt to apply the question of principles to the totalitarian phenomenon 
through a highly original examination of the principle of despotism: fear, which, despite the 
implication of its name, is not characterised as a psychological emotion. This principle, Arendt 
argues, 
 is fundamentally connected to that anxiety which we experience in situations of 
 complete loneliness...fear is the despair over the individual impotence of those who, 
 for whatever reason, have refused to 'act in concert.' There is no virtue, no love of 
 equality of power, which has not to overcome this anxiety of helplessness, without 
 recourse to action, if only in the face of death. Fear as a principle of action is in some 
 sense a contradiction in terms, because fear is precisely despair over the impossibility 
 of action. Fear, as distinct from the principles of virtue or honour, has no self-
 transcending power and is therefore truly anti-political (ibid: 336- 337) 
If we view honour and virtue as principles of action in a positive sense - where the individual 
or group is capable of action, fear is a principle of action in a negative sense - where the 
individual or group is incapable of action (impotent, as Arendt phrases it). The 'despair over 
the impossibility of action' means that fear is a subjectivist principle in which all genuine 
interpersonal relations with others are unattainable. Because of the individual's inability to 
construct 'objective' relations with their peers, the social condition of despotism is loneliness, 
and the individual is "imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience" (HC: 58). 
The result of this, Arendt asserts, is a culture of political hostility: "one man against all others 
does not experience equality of power among men, but only the overwhelming, combined 
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power of all others against his own" (EU: 337). Tyranny (or despotism in Montesquieu's 
writings) is the result of this socio-political condition:  
 Out of the conviction of one's own impotence and the fear of the power of all others 
 comes the will to dominate, which is the will of the tyrant. Just as virtue is love of the 
 equality of power, so fear is actually the will to, or, in its perverted form, lust for, 
 power. Concretely and politically speaking, there is no other will to power but the will 
 to dominate (ibid: 337) 
Tyranny, therefore, is borne of the individual's polluted desire for action, and their fear of 
impotence due to the overbearing presence of others. To what extent, Arendt asks, does 
totalitarian governance conform to this principle of action?  
 Lucy Cane distinguishes between two types of principles, ‘degenerative’ and 
‘regenerative’: degenerative principles have a “quality that makes politics ‘destroy and 
alienate itself’” such as fear, and regenerative principles have a “quality such that they 
reinforce the vitality of the public realm in which they operate” (Cane, 2015: 67) such as virtue 
and honour. There is certainly a connection between totalitarianism and tyranny through the 
mutual base of social atomisation and the impotence of action, which suggests a shared 
degenerative type of principle at play even if they may not be exactly the same. Importantly, 
Arendt locates a considerable difference between the two in their relation to laws. The 
characteristic of tyranny is the arbitrariness of lawmaking, decided on the whim or (fearful) 
self-interest of the tyrant or tyrants. This is the fundamental distinction between tyrannies on 
one side, and republics and monarchies on the other, whose laws set limits upon the actions 
of those wielding power. Law is the essence of constitutional governments, be they 
monarchies or republics: 
 Montesquieu needed principles of action because for him the essence of 
 constitutional government, lawfulness and distribution of power, was basically stable: 
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 It could only set up limitations on actions, not positively establish their principles. 
 Since the greatness, but also the perplexity, of all laws in free societies is that they 
 only indicate what one should not do, and never what one should do, political action 
 and historical movement in constitutional government remain free and unpredictable, 
 conforming to, but never inspired by, its essence (ibid: 343- 344) 
For Montesquieu, principles support laws and are directly relatable to it; however it is not the 
law which is action-guiding, but the principle. In constitutional government, law permits the 
inspirational action-guidance of principles. In monarchies and republics the sources of 
authority grounding the positive laws of man, such as the Commandments of God, hold a 
permanent 'timeless presence'. Yet the laws which are derived from these permanent 
authoritative sources "remained distinct...from the actions of men" (ibid: 340), and therefore 
allow scope for modification with changing circumstances. Positive laws, as a result, denote 
"the framework of stability within which human actions were supposed to, and were 
permitted to, take place" (ibid: 341). In short, the field of action and human will is maintained 
with the practice of lawmaking in constitutional government.  
 We may be inclined to believe that totalitarian lawmaking is arbitrary, like that 
exercised in tyrannies; if this were the case, totalitarianism could be categorised as a modern 
form of despotism. Arendt, however, seeks to emphasise the 'lawful' nature of totalitarian 
governance, built around the influence of ideology, those "systems of explanation of life and 
world that claim to explain everything past and future, without further concurrence with 
actual experience" (ibid: 349-350). Operating under the process-driven influence of modern 
science (see chapter two), ideologies claim to explain the laws of nature or history by 
identifying the hidden motor behind human action. Going "straight to the sources of authority 
from which all positive laws...receive their ultimate legitimation" (ibid: 340), totalitarian 
ideology circumvents the positive laws of man completely. The totalitarian interpretation of 
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law is dominated by a concern with movement, and law becomes "the very expression of 
these motions themselves" (ibid: 340-341). Legitimation for the Nazi interpretation of law 
came from the belief that humanity is still in a state of genetic progress towards a higher 
species-being (the master-race), whereas the Marxian legitimation sprang from the historical 
movement of classes and the ultimate elimination of them through the compete victory of 
One. Totalitarianism, therefore, "operates neither without guidance of law nor is it arbitrary, 
for it claims to obey strictly and unequivocally those laws of Nature or of History from which 
all positive laws have always been supposed to spring" (OT: 461). Humanity is the bearer, the 
embodiment, of these laws of motion, and nothing, no legal framework crafted by the hand of 
fallible individuals, must stand in way of the human process: 
 Its defiance of positive laws claims to be a higher form of legitimacy, which, since it is 
 inspired by the sources themselves, can do away with petty legality. Totalitarian 
 lawfulness pretends to have found a way to establish the rule of justice on earth- 
 something which the legality of positive law could never attain...It applies the law 
 directly to mankind without bothering with the behaviour of men...Totalitarian policy 
 claims to transform the human species into an active unfailing carrier of a law to which 
 human beings otherwise would only passively and reluctantly subjected (ibid: 462) 
The laws of monarchies and republics establish stable boundaries within which individuals 
operate. In totalitarian conditions, "every means is taken to 'stabilize' men, to make them 
static, in order to prevent any unforeseen, free, or spontaneous acts" (EU: 342). All agential 
capacity is suspended; and whilst we may be loath to accept that freedom exists in tyrannies, 
the tyrant is free in the restricted sense that they can still implement the wishes of their 
subjective will. In perhaps the sharpest contrast with tyrannical lawmaking, the totalitarian 
ideological individual "does not believe that he is a free agent with the power to execute his 
arbitrary will, but, instead, the executioner of laws higher than himself." (ibid: 346). As in 
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tyrannies, legality is completely hollow under totalitarian conditions, though this does not 
necessarily mean that it is arbitrary - there is an extraordinary form of logic to it.  
 No principle of action operates as inspirational guide under the totalitarian condition. 
The totalitarian leader is not inspired to limit the citizen's access to the public sphere out of 
fear, they do so because it is deemed redundant by ideology. And if we were to ask them why 
they annihilate the public sphere they might reply as such: why did we need the public sphere 
in the first place? Everything outside of ideology is deemed meaningless and can only 
represent a problem to be solved by destruction or control. A free space of speech and action 
is nothing but a hindrance. Totalitarian movement is completely driven by an endless cycle of 
ends, and action is merely an instrument in the fabrication of the laws of History and Nature 
towards that end. A principle, as Arendt understands it, has no end, and principles, therefore, 
are irrelevant to ideology. There is no place for principles of action in ideology; to the 
ideologist, principles are fumblings in the dark. "In a perfect totalitarian government", Arendt 
asserts, 
 where all individuals have become exemplars of the species, where all action has been 
 transformed into acceleration, and every deed into the execution of death sentences- 
 that is, under conditions in which terror as the essence of government is perfectly 
 sheltered from the disturbing and irrelevant interference of human wishes and needs- 
 no principle of action in Montesquieu's sense is necessary (ibid: 343) 
Supplanting the "human will to action" in its entirety, and driven by the "craving need for 
some insight into the law of movement" (OT: 468), ideology occupies the space which 
principles of action had previously occupied. In previous chapters we noted Arendt's claim that 
totalitarian government is the 'rule of nobody' and that it protects against individual 
responsibility; her principle-driven approach to action matches this claim entirely.  
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 Strictly speaking, the substitute for principles of action in totalitarianism is not 
ideology. Arendt is not concerned with the actual content of ideologies, whether they explain 
the historical movement of classes or races. The new principle of action is the logicality which 
underpins ideology. And logic - unlike virtue, honour, and fear - has no basis in the human 
condition, its standard lays in the abstraction of reasoning. The problem for Arendt is that logic 
has no connection to the human activities (labour, work, and action) or the non-cognitive 
mental activities (thought, will, and judgment). Hitler, Arendt notes, took great satisfaction in 
his "ice cold reasoning", and Stalin in the "mercilessness of his dialectics" and Lenin's 
"irresistible force of logic" (Hitler and Stalin as cited by Arendt, OT: 471-472). "This stringent 
logicality as a guide to action", Arendt continues, "permeates the whole structure of 
totalitarian movements and governments" (ibid: 472).  Logic, despite its cognitive merit, 
always exists in a state of thoughtlessness. And thought, by Arendt's standard, seems to be 
opposed to logic in the way that it always emerges from a basic questioning without 
foundation. Logic, on the other hand, with its roots in the deductive process, must always 
proceed from an unquestionable premise towards a definitive answer. Without any source in 
the human psychical and mental qualities: 
 ideological thinking orders facts into an absolutely logical procedure which starts from 
 an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything else from it; that is, it 
 proceeds with a consistency that exists nowhere else in the realm of reality. The 
 deducing may proceed logically or dialectically; in either case it involves a consistent 
 process of argumentation which, because it thinks in terms of a process, is supposed 
 to be able to comprehend the movement of the suprahuman, natural or historical 
 processes (ibid: 471) 
If one accepts the premise that the communist party is the legitimate vessel of historical 
transition between a bourgeois and classless society, to stand against the will of the party, 
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therefore, would mean standing against the will of History, which would mean that "you 
contradict yourself and, through this contradiction, render your whole life meaningless" (ibid: 
473). And by the laws of logic there must be no contradiction. Hitler and Stalin, Arendt notes, 
were disposed to arguing in a logical manner: "you can't say A without saying B and C and so 
on, down to the end of the murderous alphabet. Here, the coercive force of logicality seems to 
have its source; it springs from our fear of contradicting ourselves" (ibid: 472-473). Arendt 
labels this fear of contradiction the 'negative coercion of logic', which controls the mind as if it 
were a straitjacket, compelling and pressing the individual mind "almost as violently as he is 
forced by some outside power" (ibid: 470). It is with this observation that the absolute 
difference between the principles of logic and authentic principles of action is patent, as 
compulsion and inspiration are two very different phenomena. Principles of action outline 
possibilities against a backdrop of human examples (as found in the authority of tradition), 
whereas principles of logic force action down a path with the compulsion of non-
contradiction.  
 
4.4 Principles in the Great Revolutions 
 
Besides her analysis of totalitarianism, the other greatest application of Arendt's political 
thought is found in her comparative historical analysis of the French and American 
Revolutions, On Revolution. It is also the best account of how the notion of principles inform 
her wider political arguments, and how principles can be applied as a distinct form of political 
analysis. I hope to display how principles play a major role in the book’s narrative, further 
offering clues as to Arendt’s critique of modern social values, whilst also highlighting how 
principles set the stage for a discussion of freedom. On Revolution makes the following basic 
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historical claims: the American and French Revolutions were both inspired by a concern with 
public freedom; whereas the American revolutionaries were successful in maintaining this 
political impulse throughout the 'event' of revolution, the French revolutionaries' impulse to 
act shifted away from the political concern with public freedom and toward the 'social' 
concern with liberation - to its eventual demise. However, the American Revolution failed to 
maintain public freedom in the long-term, again, through the encroachment of private social 
concerns. As we shall see, Arendt’s theory of principle is central to this argument.  
 Arendt makes it very clear that the American and French revolutionaries initially 
shared a similar inspirational principle of action:  
 If the men who, on both sides of the Atlantic, were prepared for the revolution had 
 anything in common prior to the events which were to determine their lives, to shape 
 their convictions, and eventually to draw them apart, it was a passionate concern for 
 public freedom much in the way Montesquieu or Burke spoke about it (OR: 118) 
This understanding of public freedom has something 'old-fashioned' about it in the sense that 
it shares much with the ancient republicanism of Greece and Rome, disclosing a "passion for 
freedom for its own sake" (ibid: 125). Both sets of revolutionaries devoured the same books of 
political and philosophical thought as each other - namely, the 'classics': "It was their search 
for political freedom, not their quest for truth, that led them back to antiquity, and their 
reading served to give them the concrete elements with which to think and to dream of such 
freedom" (ibid: 123). They were not, therefore, necessarily operating from competing 
philosophical positions, and the experience of each revolution cannot be explained away by 
emphasising a rigid difference in philosophical approach to politics; there is more connecting 
Locke and Rousseau than meets the eye. The revolutionist’s account of freedom, Arendt 
explains, "could only exist in public; it was a tangible, worldly reality, something created by 
men to be enjoyed by men rather than a gift or a capacity, it was the man-made public space 
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or market-place which antiquity had known as the area where freedom appears and becomes 
visible to all" (ibid: 124). Freedom, by this understanding, is spatially determined; the 
individual is free insofar as they are able to speak and act within a space of publicity. By 
extension, this implies a participatory political forum, within which the citizen has "right of 
access to the public realm...to be 'a participator in the government of affairs' in Jefferson's 
telling phrase" (ibid: 127). This way of thinking about freedom is thoroughly intersubjective in 
the manner that its fundamental requirement is the space which exists between individuals. 
As we shall see, the encroachment of subjectivist passions (as opposed to intersubjective 
political principles) into each nation facilitated the revolutions' mutual failures - almost 
immediately in France, and shortly after the 'event' in America.  
 One of the most important things to note is that both sets of revolutionaries were 
initially very cautious about the path they were taking. Their early care suggests that they 
were not motivated by a political end - the idea of revolution was certainly not 
predetermined. The goal, in the awakening of the revolutionary spirit, was still unclear: 
 Public or political freedom and public or political happiness were the inspiring 
 principles which prepared the minds of those who then did what they never had 
 expected to do, and more often than not were compelled to acts for which they had 
 no previous inclination  (ibid: 123) 
The revolutions proceeded not according to a predetermined course, but were spontaneous 
arousals to action brought about by the inspirational principle of public freedom. In this sense, 
Arendt's claims about the early stirrings of revolt and revolution is consistent with the 'self-
contained' understanding of free action - in which action remains "free from motive on one 
side, from its intended goal as a predicable effect on the other" (BPF:150). The revolutionaries, 
according to Arendt, were both displaying the characteristics of a truly autonomous initiatory 
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form of political action. The narrative Arendt supplies of each revolutionary failure is intriguing 
because they highlight how delicate this understanding of principles is.  
 With the onset of violence in 1789 the French Revolution took a sharp turn away from 
the nature of the confrontations which marked its early stages. It is often remarked that this 
transition was precipitated by the poor harvest of 1788, set against a backdrop of an economic 
crisis, mass unemployment, and extreme rural and municipal poverty. A vast body of 
individuals moved by biological want was created and this mass of poverty-stricken individuals 
quickly became synonymous with le peuple, with their emergence as the vehicle of revolution 
further cementing this position. “Poverty”, Arendt clarifies, “is more than deprivation, it is a 
state of constant want and acute misery whose ignominy consists in its dehumanizing force; 
poverty is abject because it puts men under the absolute dictate of necessity” (OR: 60). Of 
course, this level of poverty and misery was not an experience specific to the moment of the 
French Revolution, and therefore we must ask the question: why did misery become ‘political’ 
in France, 1789? 
 We are dealing with a modern event, perhaps the modern event, which for Arendt 
means that we are speaking of a moment when radical subjectivism begins to exert an 
increasingly recognisable influence upon politics; Arendt terms this transition ‘the rise of the 
social’. One of the defining features of modern subjectivism is political intimacy, manifest as a 
desperate desire to destroy the space which exists between individuals and distinguishes 
them, in order to occupy a single space (see chapter two). For the French Revolution, the 
move to the intimate is displayed in two key areas: the shift in emphasis from the republic 
(that is, the political public space), to the people (representing the intimate space); and the 
shift from public freedom as the principle of action to compassion. Institutionally, the point of 
this turn in the French Revolution occurred with the rise of the Jacobins, who “believed in the 
people rather than in the republic” (ibid: 75); as Robespierre revealingly phrased it, “under the 
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new constitution…laws should be promulgated ‘in the name of the French People’ instead of 
the ‘French Republic’” (as cited by Arendt, ibid: 75).  
 With the dramatic rise of the impoverished onto the French Revolutionary scene, what 
had started as a political revolution, one which aimed at the imposition of a constitution, now 
became a social revolution aimed at the alleviation of misery from the population of France. 
This led to its abrupt failure to create an authentic space for speech and action, and hence, 
public freedom:  
 the new republic was stillborn; freedom had to be surrendered to necessity, to the 
 urgency of the life process itself...the revolution had changed direction; it aimed no 
 longer at freedom, the goal of the revolution had become the happiness of the people 
 (ibid: 60-61) 
It was not the poor themselves which moved the Revolution to failure, but the reaction to 
their terrible condition by the Jacobin elite, stirred by a sentiment represented by Rousseau's 
modern belief in our "innate repugnance at seeing a fellow creature suffer" (Rousseau as cited 
by Arendt, ibid: 71). This sentiment Arendt labels as 'compassion', and with it the language of 
the French Revolution suddenly became inherently moral. Arendt identifies this transition in 
the manner in which virtue changed meaning from a 'love of equality' (as in Montesquieu) to 
complete selflessness. To be against the urgent needs of the people was to be against the will 
of the nation, and what this required was the total cessation of individual will and self-interest 
on the part of the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries now appeared to believe in themselves 
as martyrs, something which Arendt attributes to all revolutions since: "the value of a policy 
may be gauged by the extent to which it will contradict all particular interests, and the value of 
a man may be judged by the extent to which he acts against his own interest and against his 
own will" (ibid: 79). To the virtuous and selfless revolutionary, what mattered was the 
"capacity to lose oneself in the sufferings of others, rather than active goodness, and what 
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appeared most odious and even most dangerous was selfishness rather than wickedness" 
(ibid: 81). One need only skirt over the totalitarian justifications of violence to see the 
similarities here.  
 Rousseau "found compassion to be the most natural human reaction to the suffering 
of others, and therefore the very foundation of all authentic 'natural' human intercourse" 
(ibid: 80); and what Rousseau had elevated into political thought was now promulgated in the 
words and deeds of the Jacobins as they witnessed the cries of the poor around France. 
Compassion was a powerful revolutionary guide to action because it could be used to attack 
the previous feudal order, whose indifference to the plight of the starving masses amounted - 
under the new criterion of modern subjectivist reasoning - to a denial of humanity. Those 
wealthy who refused to selflessly dedicate themselves to the alleviation of poverty were, 
therefore, deemed to be wicked. A similar argument is recognisable in the denouncement of 
the bourgeoisie, who would quickly become the wicked class after the disintegration of 
feudalism in Europe. The subjectivism of compassion "abolishes the distance, the worldly 
space between men where political matters, the whole realm of human affairs, are located", 
and because of this "it remains, politically speaking, irrelevant and without consequence" 
(ibid: 86). The intersubjectivity of politics, based on the communicative distance of judgment, 
is extraneous to a body politic moved by compassion, because compassion is mute; it 
 speaks only to the extent that it has to reply directly to the sheer expressionist sound 
 and gestures through which suffering becomes audible and visible in the world. As a 
 rule, it is not compassion which sets out to change worldly conditions in order to ease 
 human suffering, but if it does, it will shun the drawn-out wearisome processes of 
 persuasion, negotiation, and compromise, which are the processes of law and politics, 
 and lend its voice to the suffering itself, which must claim for swift and direct action, 
 that is, for action with the means of violence (ibid: 86-87)  
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There is a great similarity between compassion as a guide to action and the totalitarian 
principle of logic: both are inherently compulsive, rather than inspiring. We should be careful 
not to confuse Arendt's criticism of compassion as a guide to action with a lack of interest in 
the concerns of the impoverished, as many commentators have wrongly accused (for a 
discussion of this confusion, see Pitkin, 1998). The problem with their argument is that they 
fail to recognise that her critique of the French Revolution (and the 'social' more generally) is 
based on her theory of principles. Arendt, in fact, points to a principle of action which can 
achieve these ends whilst maintaining political freedom: the principle of solidarity. Her 
thought actually lends itself to addressing poverty through her claim that biological necessity 
places the individual outside of human, political, associations. The poor, Arendt claims, cannot 
be free. The problem she identifies with standard approaches to poverty is that they tie the 
alleviation of poverty with non-political notions such as social justice or the destruction of 
politics altogether. Solidarity as a principle of action is recommended by her because it still 
remains tied to the human condition, that is, of the 'primary experience' upon which 
Montesquieu's virtue is founded: the 'experience of living together with and belonging to a 
group of equally powerful men'. Arendt's (sadly, brief) espousal of the principle of solidarity is 
discussed in distinction to pity, "the sentiment which corresponds to the passion of 
compassion" (OR: 88). "Terminologically speaking," Arendt differentiates, "solidarity is a 
principle that can inspire and guide action, compassion is one of the passions, and pity is a 
sentiment" (ibid: 89). With pity the distance between individuals is broken down and the 
space for judgment is closed as all judgment requires the ability to observe phenomena from 
multiple positions.  
 Arendt is rather more celebratory of the American revolutionary experience. For her, 
it remains one of the few instances of authentic political action, and is, sadly, the lost 
'treasure' of the true revolutionary spirit. The American revolutionaries remained throughout 
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what the French could not: individuals moved by the political principle of public freedom. 
What brought these individuals together in action  
 was 'the world and public interest of liberty' (Harrington), and what moved them was 
 'the passion for distinction' which John Adams held to be 'more essential and 
 remarkable' than any other human faculty...The virtue of this passion he called 
 'emulation', the 'desire to excel  another', and its vice he called 'ambition' because it 
 'aims at power as a means of distinction'. And, psychologically speaking, these are in 
 fact the chief virtues and vices of political men (ibid: 119) 
That the language of distinction is present suggests to Arendt a connection with the 
intersubjective human condition, which is the characteristic of political principles. And as with 
Montesquieu, the revolutionaries noted the fragility of the 'public-spiritness' of distinction and 
how easy it was for it to be corrupted by the concerns of the individual.  
 The greatest difference between the American and French Revolutions was the 
absence of the terrible extremities of poverty in America. There were, of course, poor 
Americans, though  “what were absent from the American scene were misery and want rather 
than poverty…the laborious in America were poor but not miserable…they were not driven by 
want, and the revolution was not overwhelmed by them” (ibid: 68). Arendt describes the 
American Revolution as being conducted in something akin to an ivory tower, "into which the 
fearful spectre of human misery, the haunting voices of abject poverty, never penetrated" 
(ibid: 95). Not only was the American Revolution the only successful revolution of its kind, but 
it is also the "the only revolution in which compassion played no role in the motivation of the 
actors" (ibid: 71). For this reason, the American revolutionaries "remained men of action from 
beginning to end...their sound realism was never put to the test of compassion" (ibid: 95). And 
because the American revolutionaries never experienced the magnitude of a mass moved by 
the desperation that biological necessity brings, the idea of a people or populace united in the 
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manner which would usurp the French Revolution was alien to them. Terminologically, the 
"word 'people' retained for them the meaning of manyness, of the endless variety of a 
multitude whose majesty resided in its very plurality" (ibid: 93). The people were always 
understood as a collection of unique individuals in their plurality, and the negative elements of 
the social never encroached upon their commitment to their principle of action.  
 Arendt rightly concedes that the 'primordial crime' of slavery was a large factor in the 
absence of misery, as was also the case with the republics of antiquity. If we were to take into 
account the experience of African-American slavery then we would still have to concede that 
the "percentage of complete destitution and misery was considerably lower in the countries of 
the Old World" (ibid: 71). However, unlike the poor of France, the enslaved inhabitants of 
America were simply not able to make their presence felt in public, and thus never had a 
direct effect upon the outcome of the revolution. Interestingly, the criticism of the institution 
of slavery around the time of the American Revolution highlights how political principles are 
not as morally sterile as one might be inclined to believe. Those Americans such as Thomas 
Jefferson who wrote of slavery that they "trembled when [they] thought that God is just" (as 
cited by Arendt, ibid: 71) were saying so because "they were convinced of the incompatibility 
of the institution of slavery with the foundation of freedom, not because they were moved by 
pity" (ibid: 71). Of course, to be enslaved means that one cannot be a 'participator in 
government' which is the basic claim of public freedom, and thus public freedom can achieve 
the ends of liberation without necessarily being undermined by its sheer emotional force.   
 But whereas the French Revolution died at inception, the American Revolution failed 
shortly after its initial successes, for a reason not dissimilar to the former. There are, Arendt 
argues, two necessities for a successful, free, revolution - both of which the American 
Founding Fathers were acutely aware. They proceed chronologically: first comes the act of 
foundation, whereby a constitution is implemented with enough authority to ensure its 
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continuity; second, the maintenance of the revolutionary spirit and the continuation of the 
principle of public freedom. Whilst the American Revolution was successful with the former, 
the latter was never achieved, and the reasons for its failure are of interest to us. Arendt 
neatly phrases the predicament in the following manner: 
 even in America where the foundation of a new body politic succeeded and where 
 therefore, in a sense, the Revolution achieved its actual end, this second task of 
 revolution, to assure the survival of the spirit out of which the act of foundation 
 sprang, to realize the principle which inspired it- a task which, as we shall see, 
 Jefferson especially considered to be of supreme importance for the survival of the 
 new body politic- was frustrated almost from the beginning (ibid: 126) 
This failure is best understood through an analysis of two competing principles of action: 
public freedom and private welfare. There has always been disagreement as to whether the 
American Revolution was a political or economic revolution. Some consider political and 
economic freedom to be one and the same, perhaps both understood as negative freedoms. 
For Arendt, however, there is a sharp distinction between the two, and the blurring of this 
distinction in American political culture and in modern political theory is a cause of great 
concern for her. Ultimately, Arendt's identification of the failure of the revolutionary spirit in 
America is a critique of contemporary liberal democracies and the economisation of politics 
and political discourse rife in her time and ours.  
  The Declaration of Independence, which famously refers to the 'unalienable rights' of 
'Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness', was, by author Jefferson's words, "intended to be 
an expression of the American mind" (as cited by Arendt, ibid: 130). It is, therefore, possibly 
one of the most reliable sources for understanding the principles which inspired the thirteen 
colonies to revolt. Arendt is interested in it for precisely that reason, and she proceeds in her 
analysis with a discussion of how the desire for 'happiness' which it proclaims was, and is, 
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interpreted. Arendt splits happiness between a 'public happiness' which is synonymous with 
public freedom (prevalent in the literature of the day) and participatory government, and a 
'private happiness' which amounts to private welfare and the constitutional protection of 
economic rights. Jefferson, she claims, "was not very sure in his own mind which kind of 
happiness he meant" (ibid: 127), and the lack of clarity on his part proved to be, in hindsight, 
quite unfortunate. Certainly, he was a staunch proponent of the principle of public freedom, 
and Arendt concludes that Jefferson chose 'happiness' because he meant the term to be 
inclusive of both public and private concerns: 
 the Declaration of Independence, though it blurs the distinction between private and 
 public happiness, at least still intends us to hear the term 'pursuit of happiness' in its 
 twofold meaning: private welfare as well as the right to public happiness, the pursuit 
 of well-being as well as being a 'participator in public affairs'. But the rapidity with 
 which the second meaning was forgotten and the term used and understood without 
 its original qualifying adjective may well be the standard by which to measure, in 
 America no less than France, the loss of the original meaning and the oblivion of the 
 spirit that had been manifest in the Revolution (ibid: 132) 
What Arendt identifies in the one-sided interpretation of 'happiness' is the conquest of the 
political principle of public freedom by the social principle of private welfare. This has great 
repercussions for how citizens understand and relate to their government, and, 
fundamentally, the manner in which governments and citizens act and are judged.  
 Vivasvan Soni has argued that Arendt should be implicated in endorsing “a broad 
hermeneuticist structure that privileges freedom to the exclusion of happiness, placing 
emphasis on the forms of politics without regard for its ends and purposes” (Soni, 2010: 34). 
Soni instead offers an expanded notion of public happiness largely influenced by Solon, which 
prioritises “judgment about a life’s narrative” and “implies a concrete institutional site where a 
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politics of happiness can find social expression through the act of biographical narration” (ibid: 
41-42). I believe that Soni actually overemphasises Arendt’s exclusion of happiness with 
reference to modern revolutions, and that the kind of freedom articulated by Arendt actually 
incorporates a vision of happiness very similar to that which Soni attributes to Solon. Whilst I 
agree that “happiness is not merely political participation, virtue, comfort, pleasure, or 
security but an indeterminate and capacious idea that is the subject of public deliberation and 
available to public scrutiny and judgment” (ibid: 36), this distinction is taken too far, driven in 
part by a rather hasty reading of Arendt’s On Revolution. When Arendt talks about public 
happiness she is actually referring to the kind of public disclosure referenced by Soni, as 
spoken about in the past two chapters of this thesis. Arendt does not simply locate freedom in 
public participation, but also in the connection between disclosure and judgment (we shall 
speak of this notion further in the following chapter). I also feel that any discussion of 
happiness in Arendtian theory needs to have a strong grounding in Arendt’s critique of 
modern intimacy (see chapter two); a proper analysis of intimacy helps to close the gap that 
Soni locates between Arendtian happiness and freedom. Central to this is recognising the 
importance of the distinction that Arendt draws between public freedom and private welfare 
as we are presently discussing, and its relationship with her critique of the modern 
revolutions.  
 One of the biggest incongruities of the victory of private welfare is the irrelevance of 
republican government. The system of government matters little if all one asks of it is the 
protection of civil liberties. If the new government were to simply serve the in the interests of 
private freedoms, any non-tyrannical constitutional government would be legitimate, such as 
a constitutional monarchy. The distinction between these two understandings of happiness 
amounts to a discussion as to "whether the new government was to constitute a realm of its 
own for the 'public happiness' of its citizens, or whether it has been devised solely to serve 
and ensure their pursuit of private happiness more effectively than the old regime" (ibid: 133). 
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If we were to accept or prioritise the latter interpretation, the very foundation of 
republicanism - the 'equality of men' - is pushed to the side. By Montesquieu's theory of 
principles, the portrait that Arendt paints of post-revolutionary America does not fit the 
criteria befitting a true republic - it seems very similar to his analysis of the decline of Athens. 
Republicanism is redundant without due focus upon participation and the equality of this 
mode of 'living-together'. It is perhaps the case that civil liberties are a prerequisite of public 
freedom, however, they are by no means a guarantee of it (this issue is discussed in greater 
depth in the following chapters). Arendt's critique of private happiness is best understood if 
we consider the following quotation:  
 ...public freedom, public happiness, public spirit. What remained of them in America, 
 after the revolutionary spirit had been forgotten, were civil liberties, the individual 
 welfare of the greatest number, and public opinion as the greatest force ruling an 
 egalitarian, democratic society. This transformation corresponds with great precision 
 to the invasion of the public realm by society; it is as though the originally political 
 principles were translated into social values (ibid: 221) 
We find a similar claim with the French experience as well: 
 the [French] revolutionists learned that the early inspiring principles had been 
 overruled by the naked forces of want and need, and they finished their 
 apprenticeship with the firm conviction that it was precisely the Revolution which had 
 revealed these principles for what they actually were- a heap of rubbish. To denounce 
 this 'rubbish' as prejudices of the lower middle classes came to them all the easier as it 
 was true indeed that society had monopolized these principles and perverted them 
 into 'values' (ibid: 221)  
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Here we arrive at the distinction between principles and values. In both instances the 
inspiration for action which drove the early revolution toward the grand demands for public 
freedom had been transformed and distorted into something very different. In so doing, the 
action of individuals degenerates into something that Arendt would call non-political, 
ultimately resulting in a failure to produce a sphere in which public freedom could be 
manifest.  
 
4.5 Toward Freedom 
 
Individuals insofar as they act lead through example, creating the exemplary validity which is 
the source of all political principles. I define these principles as hermeneutic prejudices which 
come to form the world upon which human action is judged and inspired. Notably, this 
prejudice is based (following Montesquieu) on the individual’s relationship with their peers. 
The manifestation of principle is important for the creation of friendship and worldly 
responsibility, and its power is rooted in the authority of a tradition of action which inspires 
further action. I have argued that Arendt is keen to distinguish principle from value, and her 
reason for doing so is to grant principles a greater validity; values exist outside of tradition, 
they can be swapped and changed at whim without recourse to the past or the world. This 
condition, which Arendt associates with modernity, I have argued is central to her critique of 
totalitarian action, in which the certainty which the world had formerly granted is substituted 
with the cold principle of logic which needs no justification outside of itself. It is this 
substitution of principles of action with principles of logic which helps form the justification of 
totalitarian terror. I then built upon this analysis with reference to Arendt’s narrative of the 
American and French revolutions and the perceived reasons for their failure. In both instances 
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Arendt argues that the principles which inspired the revolution were ruined by the subjectivist 
tendencies of modernity, resulting in the transformation of their revolutionary principles into 
social values. My hope in discussing principles has largely been to justify my belief in their 
significance for Arendtian political theory. However, it also serves a further purpose which will 
become apparent in a claim made in the next chapter: that Arendt’s theory of principle is a 
necessary theoretical foundation upon which her particular account of freedom is built, an 
account which I term freedom as rhetoric. 
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Chapter Five 
Freedom as Rhetoric 
 
We are now nearing the end of the main body of this thesis, and so must turn toward the 
central concept of Arendtian political thought: freedom. I argue that the theory of freedom is 
the most unique aspect of her writings, clearly distinguishing her from other thinkers of the 
age who broached similar topics; it is therefore of the utmost importance to understand. As 
was outlined in the introduction, her account of freedom can be identified throughout all of 
her major political texts and draws together disparate strands of thought which at first glance 
do not seem entirely related. Precisely for this reason it remains her most difficult concept to 
appreciate given the breadth of its scope and the variety of elements which she draws 
together to give it form. I have sought in part to lessen this problem through the application of 
the terminological method through which we analyse the relationship between terms in order 
to provide a base from which a discussion of Arendtian freedom can occur. In the following 
pages various aspects of thought from previous chapters will be integrated into the discussion 
of freedom so as to grant the term a clearer sense of meaning. Central to my argument is the 
observation that Arendt closely connects freedom with rhetoric. 
 Section one briefly presents the importance of the term for Arendt and the reasons 
why she kept returning to it. In section two it is argued that Arendt’s account of freedom is 
established with reference to physical movement, from which she critiqued the post-Platonic 
philosophical tradition of freedom which identifies it in the mental faculty of willing. Following 
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this, it is argued that this notion of movement is the base for her prominent theory of action, 
which she in turn identifies as the source of all political association. Section three explores the 
idea of founding as the highest manifestation of movement and Arendt’s grappling with issues 
surrounding it. I introduce Arendt’s underexplored notion of the ‘relatively absolute’ as her 
response to some of these issues, and particular attention is paid to her claim that authentic 
founding requires a strong consciousness of tradition, so that the founders view their activity 
as a fresh restatement of the old. This is then linked in section four to the topic of the previous 
chapter - principle, and I argue that it is principles which are the content of this historical 
consciousness is the emergence of principle. Section five seeks to wed this notion of principle 
with Arendt’s theory of judgment and her theory of friendship. It is argued that principles form 
the hermeneutic base upon which judgment can take place and political community is 
achieved. Drawing upon the term isēgoria from chapter one, I argue that when principles 
inform judgment, freedom emerges, and I label this account of freedom: freedom as rhetoric. 
Thinking of freedom in this way, I propose, can help us to bridge the gap between different 
interpretative positions relating to action. The final section examines the implications of this 
move for our labelling of Arendt. I propose that Arendt’s theory of freedom as rhetoric 
necessitates a re-evaluation of her thought in hermeneutic terms. It is suggested that she is 
best represented through the following term: hermeneutic republican.  
 
5.1 Freedom as the Meaning of the Political 
 
It is generally accepted - validated repeatedly by her own statements - that Arendt’s turn to 
political theory was triggered by witnessing the totalitarian phenomenon, something she felt 
urgently compelled to destroy. Our 'preliminary understanding' of totalitarianism (which is 
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based on the hermeneutic notion of prejudgment) 'decided', Arendt claims, that "our fight 
against it is a fight for freedom" (EU: 310). There are two key aspects to this: first, Arendt's 
political thought arose as a response to an identified threat to freedom; and second, she had 
in her grasp only a tentative understanding of freedom, with a true understanding of it yet to 
emerge. As Arendt's understanding of totalitarianism deepened, so too did her understanding 
of freedom, and their interdependence is crucial to understanding Arendtian political thought. 
It is this author's opinion that Arendt's thought and intent is best perceived within this 
context.  
 There are two elements to this, both of which are rooted in her advancement of the 
particularly German critique of modernity. The first can be referred to as the 'ideological 
critique' which addresses the totalitarian ideologies themselves. In this sense Arendt's thought 
complements the vast collection of thinkers in decrying the totalising tendencies within 
ideology. Her intervention pertains specifically to how the modern emphasis on process affects 
our understanding of freedom. Placing the process of historical development at the centre of 
politics, as the totalitarian ideologies did, results in the belief that freedom "is assigned to a 
process that unfolds behind the back of those who act and does its work in secret, beyond the 
visible arena of public affairs" (PP: 120). The products of freedom brought about by "human 
beings in their action and interaction" become nothing but a hindrance for the process of 
historical development: "the model for this concept of freedom is a river flowing freely, in 
which every attempt to block its flow is an arbitrary impediment" (ibid: 120). Freedom by the 
totalitarian account is a flow which must clear all human impediments. 
 The second element - which emerged as she expanded the ideological critique's 
theoretical foundation - addresses the understanding of freedom prevalent in modern 
philosophy; we might refer to this as the 'philosophical critique'. For this reason it is a more 
mature and immersive analysis which leads into the development of a unique theory of 
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freedom  drawing upon Heidegger, Jaspers, Kant, Augustine, Duns Scotus, and Aristotle, 
among others. It is this philosophical critique which concerns us here, and much of the 
thought behind it has been explored in previous chapters. Modern philosophy is particularly 
applicable to Arendt's insights due to the resurgence and elevation of the concept of freedom 
within it. This resurgence, however, has been particularly one-sided in that it identifies the 
locus of freedom within the private sphere and not the public. It is the belief in the 
manifestation of freedom in private that unites liberal and the more socialistic accounts, 
despite their apparent differences; both negative and positive freedoms fall into the trap of 
locating freedom in the private interests of the person, and not in the public sphere - or world. 
One quotation stands out in this respect: "History knows many periods of dark times in which 
the public realm has been obscured and the world become so dubious that people have 
ceased to ask any more of politics than that it show due consideration for their vital interests 
and personal liberty" (MDT: 11). As we shall see, Arendt’s theory of freedom is a highly 
complex mesh of concepts, a body of satellite terms which all feed into the notion of what it is 
and means to be free. As we shall see throughout this chapter, her response is a return to the 
experience of freedom in classical politics in an attempt to reposition the public realm into the 
centre of the phenomenon of freedom. When her attempt to understand totalitarianism 
inevitably moved onto more philosophical terrain, the question of freedom became the next 
locus for her investigations, shaping her entire theoretical agenda. For this reason the 
following chapter inevitably draws upon a wide selection of her texts in order to answer the 
question: what, exactly, is Arendtian freedom? 
 Anyone acquainted with texts such as The Human Condition and Between Past and 
Future will be aware of the close connection Arendt draws between politics and freedom; they 
"are related to each other like two sides of the same matter" (BPF: 147) as "the raison d'être 
of politics is freedom" (ibid: 145). “Freedom is exclusively located in the political realm” (HC: 
31) insofar as the political realm is characterised by political equality, and freedom is defined 
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as the ability “to move in a sphere where neither rule nor being ruled existed” (ibid: 33). But 
there is much more to this topic than these brief quotations suggest, and we will need to 
explore the assumptions behind these statements in much greater depth. What we uncover is 
a definition of freedom derived from a heavily politicised phenomenology of movement, and it 
is the argument of this chapter that Arendt actually develops two accounts of movement, one 
rooted in the physical realm and represented in action, and another rooted in the mental 
realm, represented in judgment. These two movements come together in the activity of 
persuading, rhetoric. As Arendt writes:  
 The ability to see the same thing from various standpoints stays in the human world; it 
 is simply the exchange of the standpoint given us by nature for that of someone else, 
 with whom we share the world, resulting in a true freedom of movement in our 
 mental world that parallels our freedom of movement in the physical one. Being able 
 to persuade and influence others, which was how the citizens of the polis interacted 
 politically, presumed a kind of freedom that was not irrevocably bound, either 
 mentally or physically, to one’s own standpoint or point of view (PP: 168) 
In the following section we shall examine the basis of this claim, and how in promoting this 
position she sought to counter certain accounts of what it means to be free. 
 
5.2 Movement as the Basis of Freedom  
 
I suggest that Arendt's categorisation of the physical and mental activities under six names 
(labour, work, action; thought, will, and judgment) amount to categories of movement. At 
their most basic, I believe that these categories attempt to reveal the changes involved with 
the transition between a state of inactivity to activity. Conceiving of each activity in this 
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manner allows Arendt to comprehend each in their autonomy, and this is how her studies are 
structured in The Human Condition and The Life of the Mind. Despite this, the primary 
activities of labouring and thinking are the only two which can be truly independent in relation 
to the other activities, as Arendt is clear in the necessity of each prior activity to enable the 
latter. Thus, action requires both labour and work, as judgment requires thought and the will. 
In addition, action and judgment are so closely interconnected, bridging the physical and 
mental categories, that both must be present for the other. Arendt's categorisation of 
movement appears likes two chains, both of a different elemental composition, linked at the 
top. As we move further up the chain, we move toward a genuine platform for politics as she 
understands it.   
 All of these activities assume a base level of freedom. We cannot labour, for example, 
if we are not physically free to do so. Indeed, all of the physical activities are presupposed on 
the freedom of moving from a physical state of inactivity to activity, just as the mental 
faculties presuppose a mental freedom. Arendt would translate this into the language of 
'beginning' and 'initiative', for all movement - the transition from inactivity to activity - must 
be begun or initiated: "this sense of initiative...is inherent in all human activities" (HC: 9). Thus, 
Arendt considers movement to be not only the perfect metaphor for freedom, but the very 
founding experience upon which the notion of freedom itself is derived. She would make the 
following claims: 
 Freedom of movement, the power of moving about unchecked by disease or master, 
 was originally the most elementary of all liberties, their very prerequisite (W: 200) 
And, 
 Freedom, wherever it existed as a tangible reality, has always been spatially limited. 
 This is especially clear for the greatest and most elementary of all negative liberties, 
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 the freedom of movement...What is true for freedom of movement is, to a large 
 extent, valid for freedom in general (OR: 275) 
This, coupled with her account of the human activities suggests the primacy of movement as 
central to any account of human freedom. Negative accounts of freedom, therefore, seem 
particularly compelling because of their innate opposition to hindrance, as coercion and 
compulsion are restrictions upon free movement understood in the broadest terms. The 
ancient Greek word for freedom, eleutheria, Arendt maintains, is derived from eleuthein hopōs 
erō, meaning 'to go as I wish', and "there is no doubt that the basic freedom was understood 
as freedom of movement. A person was free who could move as he wished; the I-can, not the 
I-will, was the criterion" (W: 19). The use of the phrase 'I-can' is important here as it is her 
reply to the widespread equation of freedom with free will (‘the I-will’) and free thought, as 
opposed to an "accessory of doing and acting" (BPF: 163). Arendt's most intensive 
considerations of freedom lead her directly toward the topic of the 'will', which features 
initially in Between Past and Future's 'What is Freedom?' and is further developed in the 
second book of The Life of the Mind. We will not be concerned in this chapter with criticising 
Arendt's notion of will as some have done, rather, I seek to counter trends such as that 
expressed by one commentator that "the concept of spontaneous will is quite expendable in 
Arendt's philosophy" (Jacobitti, 1988: 65). As we shall see, it is of the utmost importance for 
her theory of freedom, and by extension the meaning of the political.  
 Arendt is definitely not against the inclusion of the will in her considerations of 
freedom. Her writings on the will are actually an attempt at integration, a theoretical 
balancing of the 'I-can' on one hand with the 'I-will' on the other; for "only when the I-will and 
the I-can coincide does freedom come to pass" (BPF: 160). Her attempt is to extract the idea of 
freedom itself away from the strict theoretical confines of will and toward "an objective state 
of the body" (W: 19) prefigured on movement. Questions of freedom, Arendt asserts, have 
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been torn between the twin 'anti-political' influences of the Christian tradition and post-
Platonic philosophy, of which two particular aspects trouble her: firstly, the will has repeatedly 
been placed under the control of reason, and secondly, it has repeatedly been rejected as 
illusory. In order to differentiate between the freedom of movement articulated in antiquity 
(the 'I-can' of doing and acting) and the later Christian/post-Platonic idea of internal freedom, 
Arendt describes two fundamentally divergent notions: philosophic freedom which 
emphasises the will, and political freedom which emphasises movement - a distinction drawn 
from Montesquieu, who clearly favoured the latter. Drawing upon the ancient tradition of the 
polis and republic, "it was obvious [to Montesquieu] that an agent could no longer be called 
free when he lacked the capacity to do" (BPF: 159). But political freedom was not divorced 
from the will; it incorporates it as part of action itself, meaning that political freedom actually 
consists in "being able to do what one ought to will" (ibid: 159), linking willing (I-will) with 
doing (I-can) so that "one could do as one pleased" (W: 19). It is essential that willing is not 
separated from movement.  
 Arendt traces the rise of philosophic freedom back to the Apostle Paul for whom it 
"was experienced in complete solitude" (BPF: 156). Paul, when reflecting on the teachings of 
Jesus, was wracked by the problem raised by Jesus' demand that one must not only do good 
deeds, but want to do good deeds: 
 It was the experience of an imperative demanding voluntary submission that led to 
 the discovery of the Will, and inherent in this experience was the wondrous fact of 
 freedom that none of the ancient peoples- Greek, Roman, or Hebrew- had been aware 
 of, namely, that there is a faculty in man by virtue of which, regardless of necessity 
 and compulsion, he can say 'Yes' or 'No,' agree or disagree with what is factually given, 
 including his own self and his existence, and that this faculty may determine what he 
 is going to do (W: 68) 
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Paul realised that he had the inner conviction or volition to say 'no', to go against that which 
demands obedience, and initiate the "fight between the I-will and the I-nill [the I will not]" 
(ibid: 69). He had discovered the human ability to break with obedience, the inner faculty 
which causes the individual to oppose external demands. In short, Paul recognised the 
individual's mental capacity and inclination toward being free: 
 the point is that every I-will arises out of a natural inclination toward freedom, that is, 
 out of the natural revulsion of free men toward being at someone's bidding. The will 
 always addresses itself to itself; when the command says, Thou shalt, the will replies, 
 Thou shalt will as the command says- and not mindlessly execute orders (ibid: 69)  
However, he conceived of it as a strictly internal struggle between 'willing and nilling' and in 
doing so divorced will from its natural sibling – movement - the 'I-can'. For Arendt the will 
must be connected to our capacity for physical movement, the 'I-can', otherwise willing 
becomes a kind of paralysis felt in solitude, a mere accessory of thinking "relevant only to 
people who live outside political communities, as solitary individuals" (ibid: 199). And as we 
know from chapter two, the solitary condition is opposed to friendship and worldliness.  
 In the opening pages of 'What is Freedom?' Arendt turns to the question of freedom 
and its relation to causality. Freedom, she maintains, will seem illusory if we consider all 
human acts as stemming from causal chains, such as in the thought of Hume or Spinoza. On 
the one hand we understand ourselves to be freely responsible for our own actions, and on 
the other as individuals subject to the principle of causality. Arendt repeatedly refers to how 
this tension was explored by Kant through the act of rising from his chair: upon his rising Kant 
created a 'new series' which constitutes an absolute beginning, yet it can also be interpreted 
as "the continuation of proceeding series" (Kant as cited by Arendt, ibid: 29). She refers to this 
as 'the problem of the new', a problem associated with the "power of spontaneously 
beginning" (ibid). This problem is the creation of memory, that is, our ability to reflect and 
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think about acts which have occurred. For this reason thinking and willing deal with two very 
different temporal phenomena: the past (as the object of thought) and future (as the object of 
will): "the willing ego, looking forward and not backward, deals with things which are within 
our power but whose accomplishment is by no means certain" (ibid: 37-38). "[E]very thought 
is an after-thought" because "all thought arises out of experience" (T: 87), and for this reason 
"thought itself...makes freedom disappear" (BPF: 144). In other words, objects of thought will 
always appear to be causally dependent, and will always be open to being understood as 
inevitable. As she phrases it: 
 In the perspective of memory, that is, looked at retrospectively, a freely performed act 
 loses its air of contingency under the impact of now being an accomplished fact, of 
 having become part and parcel of the reality in which we live (W: 30) 
Philosophies of history conform to this triumph of causality brought about by memory and 
thought. As we are incapable of conceiving just how different reality could be, we believe that 
the phenomena which exist must exist necessarily. Thus the development of human history, 
from politics to the arts, is inevitably viewed in linear terms as a progression, with one 
phenomenon giving birth to the next; to use two established examples: capitalism as the 
parent of socialism, or romanticism as the parent of modernism. In both of these cases it is 
inconceivable that the latter could have spontaneously arisen without the former, just as it 
would be impossible to have spontaneously produced the quantum revolution without 
electrical science. Indeed, the equation of political development with scientific development, 
that is, as a kind of progressive technical sequence, represents the twilight of modern linear 
temporal thinking.  
 If philosophers place the will under the confines of causality and necessity (à la 
determinism) then they will unavoidably reject the notion of freedom as illusory. Thus, 
Arendt's writings on willing are an attempt, firstly, at defending the existence of the will, and 
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second, at emphasising that the will has the power to break with the laws of causality and 
initiate truly free and spontaneous action. "What will be at stake here", she claims, "is the Will 
as the spring of action, that is, as a 'power of spontaneously beginning a series of successive 
things or states' (Kant)" (ibid: 6). For the will "is either an organ of free spontaneity that 
interrupts all causal chains of motivation that would bind it or it is nothing but an illusion" (T: 
213).  
 The most significant contribution of Arendt's to the discussion of this dimension of will 
is found in her reflections on Augustine. Despite Augustine's introduction of the apostle Paul's 
account of free will into philosophy (and a commitment to the idea of free will as the choice 
between 'willing and nilling' rather than spontaneous beginning), she credits him as "the first 
to formulate the philosophical implications of the ancient political idea of freedom" (BPF: 166). 
This is based on his statement that "to will and be able are not the same" (W: 87/ BPF: 157), 
the important point being that the two may come into tension with each other and that 
freedom cannot be isolated to the mental faculty of willing, as the above distinction between 
political and philosophical freedom suggests. It is no coincidence that Arendt's return to 
Augustine after her doctoral thesis was in The Human Condition, chapter 'Action'. What 
follows in Arendt's account of Augustine is a heavily existential reading of his City of God which 
concludes that Augustine pointed the way toward - but failed to properly acknowledge- that 
"the freedom of spontaneity is part and parcel of the human condition. Its mental organ is the 
Will" (W: 110).  
 Augustine, Arendt argues, was still an individual shaped by Roman experiences of 
politics, and his only strictly political text, City of God, broke from the equation of freedom 
with free will and conceived of freedom "not as an inner human disposition but as a character 
of human existence in the world. Man does not possess freedom so much as he, or better his 
coming into the world, is equated with the appearance of freedom in the universe" (BPF: 165-
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166). Arendt coined a new term – natality - to reflect this stance, derived from Augustine's 
phrase: "that there be a beginning, man was created before whom there was nobody" (as 
cited by Arendt, HC: 177). Natality represents the fact that each of us is born in uniqueness as 
a 'new beginning', that is, each of us is born an individual capable of willing and initiating a 
new chain of movement which breaks from the past. Each individual and their 'life story' 
comprised of speech and deed is unprecedented and cannot be foreseen prior to their 
insertion in this world. "Only if we rob the newborn of their spontaneity, their right to begin 
something new," Arendt states in her 'Introduction into politics', "can the course of the world 
be defined deterministically and predicted" (PP: 127). The spontaneous 'miracle' of natality 
"saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, 'natural' ruin" (HC: 247).   
 Through the articulation of natality Arendt attempts to create an ontological 
foundation for action, being "born into a world that was there before him and will be there 
after him" (PP: 113). Our birth is itself a beginning, and political action resembles something of 
a "second birth" (HC: 176), a reaffirmation of our own beginning. Action, it must be noted, is 
not the same as beginning, but all true action that breaks from causality must have a 
beginning, a break from that which preceded it.  Arendt's point is clear: freedom is bound to 
our human capacity to act "because he is a beginning, man can begin; to be human and to be 
free are one and the same" (BPF: 166). Her intention is to supply an ontological basis from 
which to counter the mirage of absolute causality - what constitutes for her the ultimate 
denial of freedom and free action. For the "touchstone of a free act is always our awareness 
that we could also have left undone what we actually did" (W: 5), a recognition of our capacity 
to influence as an actor and not just as vessel for something beyond us.  
 
5.3 The Act of Founding as the Relatively Absolute 
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So far we have located two basic elements that dictate whether something or someone can be 
described as free or not: firstly, there needs to be a movement of some kind, and secondly, 
the movement must not have been pre-determined. We have yet to identify what form an act 
would have to take in order to satisfy these basic criteria, and in order to do so we must first 
elaborate on Arendt’s celebration of pre-modern historical narrative as a documentation of 
spontaneous events. The greatest of these events is undoubtedly located in the act of 
founding, which results, in turn, in the creation of principles of action with which we were 
concerned in the last chapter.  
 Kant supplied a distinction between 'relative' and 'absolute' beginnings: between 
actions which can be recognised in causal and temporal terms, and actions which are 
absolutely new, divorced entirely from the causality of the past. Arendt locates a similar 
distinction between the relative and absolute in Augustine's principium and initium. Augustine 
reserves the term principium (from which ‘principle’ derives) for the creation of heaven and 
earth which exists outside of temporal considerations, reflecting the absolute; and initium for 
the creation of Man, who exists in temporality, the relative. In the case of natality, the 
newborn cannot fit perfectly within either the absolute or relative, for they are a product of 
the parents and hence the causal past, but they also constitute a new life and possibility as 
they represent someone who has never existed before, and will never exist again once they 
are gone. Arendt seems to suggest that it is through natality that this very distinction is 
reconciled, and she then uses it to introduce the idea of 'relatively absolute spontaneity': 
 had Kant known of Augustine's philosophy of natality he might have agreed that the 
 freedom of a relatively absolute spontaneity is no more embarrassing to human 
 reason than the fact that men are born- newcomers again and again in a world that 
 preceded them in time (W: 110) 
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With this notion of the relatively absolute, Arendt is very clearly opening the space for the 
argument that new beginnings need a connection to the past, and that spontaneous action 
can be understood as being historically embedded at the same time as being profoundly new. 
The implications of the relatively absolute beginning has particular currency in Arendt's 
discussion of the great political act of foundation. 
 Arendt reserves a slightly underwhelming term for those rare instances of historical 
spontaneity: events, defined as "occurrences that interrupt routine processes and routine 
procedures" (OV: 7). By emphasising events Arendt is unreservedly arguing against the 
modern account of history as process and constant causality. It would be misleading, however, 
to think of events as characterised by randomness. Spontaneous action is neither random nor 
pre-determined, as both randomness and causal determinism inhibit the self-determination of 
the actor or actors, for to act randomly is to act as much without will as it would be to act out 
of sheer necessity. Her understanding of events draws upon the ancient form of historical 
narrative in which "the stress is always on single instances and single gestures...The subject 
matter of history is these interruptions- the extraordinary" (BPF: 42). This was the result of the 
ancient cyclical understanding of time, in which the natural biological world appears as a 
recurring cycle of life and death, with humanity alone capable of inserting some permanence 
against the constant fluctuation of the nature. Human events appear as a rectilinear intrusion 
into the natural circle, signifying the distinction between "the mortality of men and the 
immortality of nature" (ibid: 43) as well as the extraordinary nature of human action. The last 
major text to treat history in this manner, as a narrative of great acts and events was 
Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories, located at the cusp of the modern era.  
 Arendt would say of the new philosophy of history as foreseen in Kant: "once you look 
at history in its entirety (im Grossen), rather than at single events and the ever-frustrated 
intentions of human agents, everything suddenly makes sense, because there is always at least 
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a story to tell" (BPF: 82). In essence, one can theoretically manufacture historical causation 
retrospectively, as practiced, for example, in the thought of Hegel. Arendt's theorisation of 
labour, to use the most relevant example for her own thought, suggests that if an individual 
commits themselves to the labouring activity then they fail to break out of the biological circle, 
taking their place amongst the ebb and flow of natural process. She remarks that it is a 
modern phenomenon to think of biological life as linear, reinforced by the Darwinian theory of 
evolution which maps and categorises genetic development, as well as our relatively new 
knowledge that the world as we know it has a definitive beginning and end.  
 In an attempt to uncover what was precious about the pre-modern account of 
historical events Arendt turns to the phenomenon of political foundation. There is no greater 
moment of foundation, politically speaking, than the act of forming a constitution, and the 
authentic act of foundation represents, for Arendt, the greatest spontaneous event of human 
history. It is within this discussion that she weds the concept of foundation to the above 
notion of the relatively absolute as found in natality. This idea is worked through both in 
‘Willing’ and On Revolution’s chapter entitled 'Foundation II: Novus Ordo Saeclorum', aptly 
headed by the quote from Virgil: "The great order of the ages is born afresh" (OR: 179).  
Importantly, Arendt argues that successful and authentic foundations are best built with a 
sense of historical tradition in mind, so that the founders are both looking backward for 
inspiration as much as they look forward to their future possibilities. This argument is best 
summarised in her statement that "foundation, augmentation, and conservation are 
intimately interrelated" (ibid: 201). 
 In order to clarify this point, Arendt turns to the Roman concept of authority, 
auctoritas, which she argues was built around the augmentation and the increasing power of 
the foundation through tradition, as a foundation is always the basis for something to be 
raised upon - whether a building, or, in this case, a unique political tradition. As she phrases it, 
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the "notion of a coincidence of foundation and preservation by virtue of augmentation...was 
deeply rooted in the Roman spirit" (ibid: 202). From this observation Arendt draws a 
comparison between the Roman foundation myth and the birth of the American republic, with 
the American Founding Fathers emulating the ancient republic in an attempt to found a 'New 
Rome', just as, according to Virgil, Rome was a 'New Troy'. Whilst there is a crucial difference 
between the government of the two - ancient Rome was ‘political-advisory’ and republican 
America is ‘legal-interpretative’ - both exhibit the similar characteristic of accepting that 
"permanence and change were tied together" (ibid: 201). This character of tying innovation 
with conservation is found in the original meaning of 'revolution' as a kind of restoration of a 
previous order, such as the experience in England, 1688, and in the backward gaze to Rome of 
the French and American Revolutionaries. And it is precisely this argument of Arendt's that 
makes her so difficult to pin to a radical or conservative disposition as she would not be willing 
to accept such a polarity. 
 One of Arendt's most important insights regarding the act of foundation is the way in 
which the great foundation legends of history (Jewish, Christian, and Roman) relate to 
temporality; how their "significance lies in how the human mind attempted to solve the 
problem of the beginning, of an unconnected, new event breaking into the continuous 
sequence of historical time" (ibid: 204-205). In effect, the act of foundation raises similar 
perplexities as that of Kant rising from his chair - in that he is both beginning and continuing a 
causal chain. What Kant found so difficult to comprehend was how an absolute beginning can 
occur, that is, a beginning completely divorced from the past, facing only forward. Arendt's 
'solution' to this problem is found in the great foundation legends and how the Founders were 
"confronted with the riddle of foundation - how to re-start time within an inexorable time 
continuum" (W: 214). In the two great foundation legends of Western Civilisation, Roman and 
Hebrew, we come across a people liberated, "driven by the very momentum of the liberation 
process" (ibid: 210); in the first instance from the total destruction of Troy, and the second 
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from Egyptian slavery. What is important in this is that liberation, according to Arendt, breaks 
the causal chain, points to the 'abyss of freedom' (also referred to as the 'abyss of 
spontaneity') where there is "nothing left for the 'beginner' to hold onto" (ibid: 208). She 
refers to this moment as a 'hiatus' between past and future, a moment of stasis "between end 
and beginning, between a no-longer and a not-yet" (OR: 205). Liberation itself is no guarantor 
of freedom, though it is the necessary transition toward it. This mirrors the more existential 
slant of her argument in The Human Condition that freedom can only occur once one is 
liberated from the labouring activity, as in the case of slavery.  
 The act of revolution constitutes such a liberating hiatus, the most visible political 
manifestation of a transition, the "only political events which confront us directly and 
inevitably with the problem of beginning...not mere changes" (ibid: 21). The connection 
between revolution and 'the problem of beginning' is 'obvious' to Arendt. The hiatus is a 
moment in which a body of people have a radical break with that which preceded them, but 
have yet to claim that break from themselves in the act of foundation. The hiatus is 
represented in the wandering of the Israeli tribes in the desert, or, to use a modern 
equivalent, the so-called 'power vacuum' which immediately occurs with the overthrow of the 
previous political order such as the Ancien Regime. Arendt locates the 'hiatus' of the American 
experience in the 'colonial period': the "hiatus between leaving England and the Old World 
and the establishment of freedom in the new" (W: 206), an exodus not so dissimilar to the 
story of Aeneas or the Israelis, albeit not quite so fantastical or antagonistic. What connects all 
of these legendary acts of liberation is that the act of liberation is "told about from the 
perspective of new freedom" (ibid: 204), whilst also being concerned with "a future promise of 
freedom" (OR: 205).  
 The confrontation with the abyss of spontaneity is a fearsome position to be in for 
those actors who encounter liberation, for every act is open to the danger and prospect of 
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failure. Arendt suggests that the transition between liberation and the founding of new 
freedom needs something tangible to base itself upon or it is doomed to collapse. This sense 
of responsibility is to be found in all moments of authentic free action, a recognition that 
"whatever would be done now could just as well have been left undone", and that "once 
something is done it cannot be undone" (W: 207).  In the case of the American hiatus, the 
Roman foundation myth as portrayed by Virgil made the revolutionaries aware "that there 
exists a solution for the perplexities of beginning which needs no absolute to break the vicious 
circle in which all first things seem to be caught" (OR: 212). When the Founders of a new order 
recognise the sheer 'newness' of their endeavour, "the start of something unprecedented" (W: 
207), they turn to the past as a guide to the future in order to counter the radical 
'arbitrariness' inherent in all beginnings. The Virgilian legend was one of rebirth and 
rejuvenation: Rome as a 'new Troy'. Arendt has this to say of the American Founding Fathers: 
 They were quite aware of course of the bewildering spontaneity of a free act. As they 
 knew, an act can only be called free if it is not affected or caused by anything 
 preceding it and yet, insofar as it immediately turns into a cause of whatever follows, 
 it demands a justification which, if it is to be successful, will have to show the act as 
 the continuation of a preceding  series, that is, renege on the very experience of 
 freedom and novelty (ibid: 210) 
What we see here is a return to the notion of Augustinian natality, the potential "ontological 
underpinning for a truly Roman or Virgillian philosophy of politics" (ibid: 216), and the idea of 
the relatively absolute understanding of spontaneity. Authentic foundations, and their 
justification of the future through the past are never absolute beginnings, but relatively 
absolute beginnings, articulating an "understanding the new as an improved re-statement of 
the old" (ibid: 216). This is, of course, not the basis of an Augustinian or Virgillian philosophy of 
politics, but an Arendtian philosophy of politics. Thus, the American Founding Fathers turned 
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to Rome, as Rome turned to Troy, and "the great effort to reform and restore the body politic 
to its initial integrity (to found 'Rome anew') had led to the entirely unexpected and very 
different task of constituting something entirely new - founding a 'new Rome' (ibid: 207). The 
new growth of the body politic is directed toward the past, remaining new at the same time as 
being a continuum of something that has existed.  
 
5.4 Freedom and Principle 
 
Arendt’s reflections on the relationship between the act of founding and the relatively 
absolute are intrinsically connected to her theory of freedom. If you recall from the previous 
chapter, principles of action, understood as hermeneutic prejudgments of political relations, 
are what make an act free: “action insofar as it is free…springs from…what I shall call a 
principle” (BPF: 150). Principles are the basis of freedom because they initiate the movement 
that constitutes action:  
 Freedom or its opposite appears in the world whenever such principles are actualized; 
 the appearance of freedom, like the manifestation of principles, coincides with the 
 performing act. Men are free- as distinguished from their possessing the gift for 
 freedom- as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the 
 same (ibid: 151) 
I argued that these principles are rooted in the experience of public disclosure and how an 
individual embodies certain traits which inspire others and move them to judge and act 
according to what is disclosed. A principle is therefore inseparable from the ‘spectacular’ acts 
of individuals, what Arendt would describe as ‘great’ acts, which certainly do not require 
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grandiosity or aesthetic excess to be labelled as such. A great act can be as simple as the act of 
forgiveness when retribution is expected.   
 We have been interested so far in certain individuals - notably Socrates and Jaspers. 
Their action, which took the form of speech (more on this in subsequent sections), disclosed a 
principle by which human relations could be orientated. If you may also recall from the past 
chapter, principles are related to structural elements of the human condition; their validity is 
founded on certain basic elements of intersubjective existence such as human distinctiveness 
(upon which Montesquieu’s account of honour was derived). The actions of Socrates and 
Jaspers, to stay with their examples, force the question of how to relate to one another as 
equal peers, as friends. A single individual acting in a manner that embodies a principle does 
not carry significance simply because of the spectacle; its significance resides in its ability to 
draw others into joint enterprise (or ‘action in concert’, a phrase of Burke’s that Arendt was 
particularly fond of), its inspirational quality. Whatever this inspiring principle may be - 
whether virtue, honour, or perhaps moderation - it provides the basis for genuine human 
community and the construction of a plural ‘We’. And in essence this is what foundation is, the 
“supreme act in which the ‘We’ is constituted as an identifiable entity” (W: 203).  
 No foundation can come about simply through the endeavours of a single person, it 
requires a collective effort, and through this collective effort the principle which initiated the 
political bond becomes greater, more observable, and finally becomes an inextricable element 
of the foundation itself. In other words, the emergence of the principle of action is 
tantamount to the emergence of power, “the human ability not just to act but to act in 
concert” (OV: 44) which is necessary for all foundation. Power is the same thing as the 
collective ‘I-can’ of the ‘We’ (to phrase it in Arendt’s terms). And because the act of 
foundation is the greatest exercise of power, it represents the pinnacle of action and the 
greatest moment in which principles are actualised.  
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 Every authentic beginning, according to Arendt, holds the potential for arbitrariness 
because for it to constitute a beginning it needs to break with causal precedent in some way, 
“it is as though it came from nowhere in either time or space” (OR: 206). Arendt’s discussions 
regarding action often touch upon the problem that arises the moment that an individual or 
collective recognise their own power after the ‘hiatus’ in which they come face-to-face with 
the ‘abyss of freedom’. In this moment there exists only potential freedom, and the misguided 
impulse to reach toward an absolute which explains action according to some external 
movement (such as class or race) is ever-present. To phrase it somewhat differently, the abyss 
of freedom confronts the individual with the responsibility that comes with all action; and 
ideology, with its historical narrative of predictive progression and its logical principles simply 
serves to relieve the individual from the demands of responsibility. Relying upon judgment 
requires, at base, a courage because all beginning involves risk of some sort, a “stepping out of 
our private existence…[toward a] realm of great enterprise and adventures that a man might 
embark on and hope to survive only if he were joined by his equals” (PP: 122). As we know 
from chapter three, the responsibility in this moment is not geared toward the individual but 
the world. Political courage is about grasping the ability to create and shape a world 
independently without recourse to something greater than those who are the actors, and not 
just about being brave in the face of fear.  
 It is within the context of the ‘problem’ of human freedom that principles aid us. 
Principles form the hermeneutic base upon which judgment can take place (as a pool of 
intersubjective understanding regarding the objects that we encounter in the world), and this 
judgment helps bring a certain stability which exists outside of the strict confines of cold logic. 
Judgment outlines possible options without certifying them. The final pages of Arendt’s 
discussion of foundation in On Revolution hold the following passage, which I consider to be 
one of the most remarkable and ground-breaking statements to be found within Arendtian 
thought: 
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 the men of the American Revolution, whose awareness of the absolute novelty in their 
 enterprise amounted to an obsession, were inescapably caught in something for which 
 neither the historical nor the legendary truth of their own tradition could offer any 
 help or precedent. And yet, when reading Virgil’s fourth Eclogue, they might have 
 been faintly aware that there exists a solution for the perplexities of beginning which 
 needs no absolute to break the vicious circle in which all things seem to be caught. 
 What saves the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness is that it carries its own 
 principle within itself, or, to be more precise, that beginning and principle, principium 
 and principle, are not only related to each other, but are coeval. The absolute from 
 which the beginning is to derive its own  validity and which must save it, as it were, 
 from its inherent arbitrariness is the principle which, together with it, makes its 
 appearance in the world. The way the beginner starts whatever he intends to do lays 
 down the law of action for those who have joined him in order to partake in the 
 enterprise and bring about its accomplishment. As such, the principle inspires the 
 deeds that are to follow and remains apparent as long as the action lasts (OR: 212-
 213) 
Principles become an object open to observation as long as the act lasts and later become part 
of the hermeneutic prejudice through the act of founding, thus informing future judgment and 
being a necessary part of world-formation. Because they are initially objects of intersubjective 
viewing due to the fact that they are part of the action taking place, they are distinct from 
ideas and concepts which are, by nature, subjective. This aspect of principles makes them both 
in a sense stronger and at the same time weaker than objects of thought; they are dependent 
upon a shared experience and thus have a greater validity than an idea because an object of 
thought cannot be shared in its idealised form, but at the same time this principle is easily lost 
when the action ends. The question of how the inspirational power of the principle can be 
maintained is one of the key topics of Arendtian politics: How can the freedom which comes 
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about through mutual action be retained after the act? Or as she phrases it: “should freedom 
in its most exalted sense as freedom to act be the price to be paid for foundation?” (ibid: 232). 
Her fear is that when the act of foundation has passed there would be no space left “for the 
exercise of precisely those qualities which had been instrumental in building it” (ibid) and that 
the privilege of freedom to act be subsequently limited. According to her analysis in On 
Revolution, no modern act of founding has adequately provided a space in which the exercise 
of freedom can be further enjoyed. The fact that principle requires constant action to remain 
visible is of great importance for understanding why Arendt is so critical of the revolutionary 
tradition, as it is the very inspiration behind the individual act of founding which disappears 
when the action ceases. The manner in which inspiration is transmitted is through the 
authority of tradition. 
 It is my contention that Arendt believes that the disappearance of principle is 
tantamount to the loss of tradition and authority. I believe that tradition for her is the 
authoritative force through which principles become part of the self-understanding of the 
citizens of a body politic. This relationship between these terms is displayed in the following 
statement of hers: 
 Authority, resting on a foundation in the past as its unshaken cornerstone, gave the 
 world the permanence and durability which human beings need precisely because 
 they are mortals- the most unstable and futile beings we know of. Its loss is 
 tantamount to the loss of the groundwork of the world (BPF: 95) 
Relating principles with authority is interesting as both concepts are based on a form of non-
coercive persuasion - our acceptance of an inspiring phenomenon. The notion of authority 
admits an inherent hierarchy in which those or that which has authority is ‘above’ others. The 
authority of the Roman Senate (from which the term is derived) was rooted in the belief that 
they were augmenting the original foundation and drawing upon a tradition which provided a 
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world upon which action and judgment may take place. They were considered authoritative so 
long as they augmented the foundation of the Roman republic, being the necessary part of the 
constant nourishment and re-interpretation of tradition through action and the principles 
within it. The primary characteristic of Roman authority (from which the term is derived) was 
its non-coercion that goes beyond persuasion while at the same time retaining human 
freedom (ibid: 105). This does not mean that principles are untouchable, rather, it means that 
principles come to form the very fabric upon which persuasion and judgment takes place; they 
take the form of prejudices from which the world makes sense to us. In this manner, principles 
remain ‘above’ the power of persuasion. Once a principle has been established it forms a 
hermeneutic base which, whilst it certainly can still be challenged, influences the 
interpretative positioning of objects open to judgment. In the following section we explore 
further the importance of this hermeneutic foundation for Arendtian freedom as far as it 
enables persuasion.  
 
5.5 Freedom as Rhetoric 
 
I would now like to turn to the ‘question’ that was introduced at the beginning of this thesis 
regarding the proper relationship between action and speech. Throughout this thesis it should 
have been apparent that every element of Arendtian thought is dependent in some shape or 
form upon her concept of language, linking together a variety of disparate concepts. To use an 
example, speech is the very foundation for the life of the mind; thought, will, and judgment 
are all based on phenomena disclosed through language. We think about phenomena that are 
made visible through naming, we will these things, and we judge the world according to them. 
For this reason Arendt writes that language is "the only medium through which mental 
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activities can be manifest not only to the outside world but also to the mental ego itself" (T: 
102). It is "our mind that demands speech" (ibid: 98) in the sense that all thought is a 
conversation between ‘me and myself’ (see chapter one). Thus, speech is as crucial for the 
freedom of the mental activities as corporeal movement is for the physical activities, for 
without speech none of the mental activities are possible at all. Most importantly, all 
judgment of action and event takes place through language, and therefore the worldly 
community of friendship is dependent upon linguistic conditions. Deviations from this result in 
problems such as those explored in chapter one.  
 Of the three physical activities, it is clear that speech is tied to action, as labour and 
work can be performed in isolation. An individual, of course, does not require speech to act. 
However,  
 without the accompaniment of speech, at any rate, action would not only lose its 
 revelatory character, but, and by the same token, it would lose its subject, as it were; 
 not acting men but performing robots would achieve what, humanly speaking, would 
 remain  incomprehensible. Speechless action would no longer be action because there 
 would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if he is 
 at the same time the speaker of words. The action he begins is humanly disclosed by 
 the word, and though his deed can be perceived in its brute physical appearance 
 without verbal accompaniment, it becomes relevant only through the spoken word in 
 which he identifies himself as the actor,  announcing what he does, has done, and 
 intends to do (HC: 178-179) 
The ‘who’ of action, whether it is an individual or collective ‘we’, must be articulated through 
language so that they become an object that can be understood. Otherwise, the action lacks 
true meaning. In The Human Condition, words pertaining to action are often paired alongside 
speech, highlighting the mutuality of their ‘primordial’ relationship. The closeness of these two 
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concepts has led to the rise of the notion that they are one and the same. George Kateb, 
whose argument was introduced in chapter one, phrases this question in the following 
manner:  
 What is political action? Arendt frequently distinguishes between words and deeds, or 
 between talking and doing, as the basic modes of action. But given all that she 
 excludes as not properly political, the distinction cannot stand. It must collapse, with 
 the result that there is only one true mode of political action, and that is speech, in the 
 form of talking or occasionally writing, as with the Declaration of Independence and 
 other manifestoes or addresses to the world, writing that should be read aloud (1984: 
 15) 
Kateb’s claim has proven to be a highly influential, informing both Dana Villa and Seyla 
Benhabib's prominent interpretations of Arendt. Both, incidentally, categorise Arendt's theory 
of action along deliberative lines, with Villa stating that "genuine political action is nothing 
other than a certain kind of talk, a variety of conversation or argument about public matters" 
(1996: 31). His analysis of Arendtian action can be described as performative-deliberative, 
linking deliberation to a 'self-contained' vision of politics outside of instrumental concerns 
such as morality. Benhabib, on the other hand, advances a narrative-deliberative theory of 
Arendtian action based on how narratives are constituted through the activity of storytelling 
(for Benhabib's brief discussion of the two theories of deliberation, see Benhabib, 1996: xiv-
xviii). Ultimately, their difference is based on the proper form of Arendt speech in the public 
sphere, branded by Villa as the ‘bright light’ of the polis (performative) vs the ‘controllable 
seminar room’ (narrative), or by Benhabib as classical vs modern notions of public freedom.  
 Such distinctions are commonplace within the literature surrounding Arendt. 
Underlying Benhabib’s account is the idea expressed by Maurizio Passerin D’Entrѐves that 
Arendtian action is split between two different models which he labels the expressive and 
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communicative. Central to D’Entrѐves argument is the idea that these two models are 
incompatible (1994: 10). As is so often the case with competing philosophical positions, the 
reality is somewhere in between; even Benhabib accepts an element of artificiality in the very 
distinctions that she makes regarding Arendt (1990: 194). The reason why all of these 
distinctions are made can be traced to one unified concern: a major discomfort with Arendt’s 
critique of the modern social realm and its impact upon politics proper. Emphasising the 
‘communicative’ over the ‘expressive’ is often seen as a way of moving Arendt away from her 
fiery anti-modern language and toward the softer language of deliberative democrats. At play 
is also the labelling of the Arendtian public space as agonistic or consensus-based. Neither 
description fits adequately with Arendtian politics, as I hope to display in this section of the 
thesis, building on the discussion in chapter two. I agree wholeheartedly with Shmuel 
Lederman’s recent claim regarding agonism and deliberation that  
 “for Arendt those elements of political action were not mutually exclusive, but rather 
 complementary aspects that have to be brought together in order to recover the 
 meaning of politics and freedom. In this sense, going back to a more nuanced reading 
 of Arendt might serve us in overcoming some binary dichotomies that do not aid in 
 advancing our understanding of politics and the possibilities for political action in the 
 modern world” (Lederman, 2014: 335) 
It was noted earlier that the physical and mental activities presuppose a certain freedom of 
movement insofar as they require the ability to move from a state of inactivity to activity or a 
transition from one activity to another. Action, it was claimed, represents the highest faculty 
of physical movement itself because it represents the ability to spontaneously begin, and as 
we have seen, this is the basis of power and freedom. There are, however, repeated instances 
in which Arendt writes about speech as a movement in very similar terms as she does action. 
There are two essential movements directly connected with speech: the first is its 
172 
 
perlocutionary character, most notably expressed in the act of persuasion; and the second is 
its ability to judge from another’s standpoint, the ‘enlarged’ mentality as discussed in chapter 
three. Of course, the partial levelling of the difference between action and speech is not 
something unique to Arendt; it is no groundbreaking statement to suggest that words can be 
deeds given the amount of writing and interest in speech-act theory. If we look back upon 
many of the statements of this thesis we can see the relevance of the speech act in Arendtian 
thought; the political role of Socrates, for example, is profoundly perlocutionary in the manner 
that it affects the listener or partner in dialogue - such as bringing about curiosity, and hence 
thought. Similarly, rhetoric, the art of persuasion, is the basis of political life (see chapter one), 
and has an implicit perlocutionary effect if successful because you have actively altered the 
opinion of another through speech. The famous phrase regarding the United States: 'We, the 
people', is a performative speech act, whose 'act' is that of foundation. And, of course, 
foundation tends to be based on constitutionalism, a text; a text, furthermore, which binds 
people together through mutual promise, another act of illocution in what Searle would have 
categorised as both ‘declaratory’ and ‘commissive’. This is not to say that speech acts are 
always political in the Arendtian sense, as speech acts can also come in the form of commands 
- a pre-political form of rulership that Arendt considers pre-political. If we accept that Arendt's 
theory of action is closely linked to a theory of speech, then our attempt to understand 
Arendtian freedom needs to take account of this shift. As almost all of Arendt's writings 
concerning speech and politics are written as part of a broader discussion on ancient Greek 
politics, this will be the focus. For the Greeks, speech was the constituent part of freedom, it 
would be impossible for them to speak of freedom without it, and Athenian politics represents 
the zenith of this understanding.  
 The broad Greek term for freedom, eleutheria, was derived from eleuthein hopōs erō, 
meaning 'to go as I wish', the foundation of all free movement, and hence, action (the ‘I-can’). 
Eleutheria was closely tied to the collective self-determination of the polis and the equality of 
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shared citizenship and power. The term for a free constitution, isonomia, was understood in 
spatial terms, as a space of movement linked to equal participation through speech and 
persuasion - which was understood as a further account of freedom labelled isēgoria. The 
Greeks, as we know very well from chapter one, regarded speech as the triumph of civilisation, 
and it was rhetoric, the art of persuasion, with which they distinguished themselves from 
barbarians. Free political constitutions, Arendt claims, "all have the same claim to political 
activity, and in the polis this activity primarily took the form of speaking with one another. 
Isonomia is therefore essentially the equal right to speak, and as such the same thing as 
isēgoria" (PP: 118). Arendt's defence of this is rooted in a historical narrative of the 
development of action in Greece, starting with the Homeric epics, and is found in her 
'Introduction into Politics'. She traces the notion of isēgoria and the free constitution 
(isonomia) to Homeric times and the "example of the magnificent experience of life's 
possibilities among one's equals" (ibid: 124) in Homer's epic poetry. The Homeric protagonists 
represent the 'We' of a pure collective action, leaving their homes for enterprise and 
adventure, and founded the polis "from the conjunction of great events in war or other deeds- 
that is, from political activity and its inherent greatness" (ibid: 124). She describes the birth of 
the polis in the following terms: 
 The point of enterprise and of adventure fades more and more, and whereas what 
 before was, so to speak, only a necessary adjunct to such adventures, the constant 
 presence of others, dealing with others in the public space of the agora, the isēgoria as 
 Herodotus puts  it, now becomes the real substance of a free life. At the same time, 
 the most important activity of a free life moves from action to speech, from free deeds 
 to free words. 
 This shift is of great importance and possesses greater validity within the tradition of 
 our concept of freedom- in which the notions of action and speech are kept separate 
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 on principle, corresponding, as it were, to two entirely different faculties of man- than 
 was ever the case in the history of Greece. For it is one of the most remarkable and 
 fascinating facts of Greek thought that from the very beginning, which means as early 
 as Homer, such a separation on principle between speech and action does not occur, 
 since a doer of great deeds must at the same time always be a speaker of great words- 
 and not only because great words were needed to accompany and explain great deeds 
 that would otherwise fall into mute oblivion, but also because speech itself was from 
 the start considered a form of action (ibid: 124-125) 
Could this be a clue to understanding the curious problem of the relationship between action 
and speech in Arendtian thought (see chapter one)? Is this an admission by Arendt that speech 
and action are one and the same, and that this is the insight upon which freedom rests? This 
remains, perhaps, the most interesting and difficult perplexity of Arendtian thought - she 
herself admits that the topic of free speech has an "odd ambiguity" (ibid: 128) - and it is 
unfortunate that she wrote very little on this topic. It is difficult to accept that a thinker who 
places the art of distinction at the centre of her philosophical method would allow such a 
conflation and confusion surrounding two of the most important terms employed in their 
conceptual canon. There are three possible conclusions we can reach here: firstly, that Arendt 
rejects the conflation of action and speech by the time of writing The Human Condition; 
secondly, that there is a deliberate tension between the two terms; third, that there is a 
problem with the consistency of her thought on this issue. For this author, all three of these 
conclusions are unacceptable, and I wish to propose another: that speech and action are 
separate concepts in Arendtian thought, each pertaining to a separate dimension of freedom 
as long as it is understood as a kind of movement. 
 Arendt's 'Introduction into Politics' often broaches the topic of judgment. As was 
explored in Chapter Three, communicability (speech) is the base requirement of judgment, the 
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root of all true understanding between persons. Understanding is crucial for the authenticity 
of the public realm and the togetherness engendered within it, for "we are contemporaries 
only so far as our understanding reaches" (EU: 323). In her 'Introduction into Politics' Arendt 
appears to link phronēsis, the specifically political form of wisdom described by Aristotle, with 
the 'enlarged mentality' she speaks about in her Kant lectures.  
 With the split between action and speech in post-Homeric Greece which was noted 
earlier, Arendt points to the institutionalisation of each activity in a correlative form of 
contest: athletics for action, and oratory for speech: "two elements that appear almost 
undifferentiated in Homer- the sheer strength of great deeds and the ravishing power of the 
words that accompany them and sway the assembly of men who see and hear them- can later 
be seen very clearly separated from each other" (PP: 166). Both athletics and oratory are 
public events, but it is the publicity of the latter which interests Arendt. With the rise of 
oratory came the Sophists, whose "importance in liberating human thought from the 
constrictions of dogma we underestimate if, following Plato, we condemn them on moral 
grounds" (ibid: 167). But for Arendt it was not just thought which was liberated, but also the 
public realm, "the realm in which all things can first be recognized in their many-sidedness" 
(ibid: 167). Oratory was important not because of the rigorous argumentation process, but 
because it enables "the ability to truly see topics from various sides...with the result that 
people understood how to assume the many possible perspectives provided by the real world, 
from which one and the same topic can be regarded and in which each topic, despite its 
oneness, appears in a great diversity of views" (ibid: 167-168). Human plurality, "the twofold 
character of equality and distinction" (HC: 175), the curious phenomenon that we are equal in 
our uniqueness, is the condition of judgment.  
 Free speech, isēgoria, must be understood in this context of Arendt's thought, the 
basis of which is fundamentally hermeneutic: 
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 we know from experience that no one can adequately grasp the objective world in its 
 full perspective, which corresponds to his standpoint in the world and is determined 
 by it. If someone wants to see and experience the world as it 'really' is, he can do so 
 only by  understanding it as something that is shared by many people, lies between 
 them, separates and links them, showing itself differently to each and comprehensible 
 only to  the extent that many people can talk about it and exchange their opinions and 
 perspectives with one another, over against one another. Only in the freedom of our 
 speaking with one another does the world, as that about which we speak, emerge in 
 its objectivity and visibility from all sides (PP: 128-129) 
What we have here is an early summation of Arendtian judgment and its hermeneutic 
properties (see chapter three). Her theory of judgment is an exploration of the relationship 
between politics and hermeneutics, the art of understanding, whereby the both the world and 
ourselves as individuals within it are authentically disclosed in 'objectivity'. Therefore, Isēgoria 
must be understood in the context of Arendtian political hermeneutics: "the freedom of the 
political man definitely depended on the presence and equality of others. A thing can reveal 
itself under many aspects only in the presence of peers who regard it from their various 
perspectives” (ibid: 169).  
 But what is the most important point for our investigation is her discussion of 
judgment and political hermeneutics through the language of movement: 
 The ability to see the same thing from various standpoints stays in the human world; it 
 is simply the exchange of the standpoint given us by nature for that of someone else, 
 with whom we share the world, resulting in a true freedom of movement in our 
 mental world that parallels our freedom of movement in the physical one. Being able 
 to persuade and influence others, which was how the citizens of the polis interacted 
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 politically, presumed a kind of freedom that was not irrevocably bound, either 
 mentally or physically, to one’s own standpoint or point of view (ibid: 168) 
What we clearly see here is Arendt's integration of the language of movement into her theory 
of judgment, informing her later comments on the 'enlarged mentality' - the capacity to 
represent another’s opinion in one’s imagination or ‘mind’s eye’. This, of course, requires the 
spatiality of isēgoria insofar as judgment requires a public space of equality in speaking. 
Through isēgoria and the faculty of judgment which it unlocks - the "insight that enabled him 
to consider all standpoints" - the citizen of the polis "enjoyed the greatest freedom of 
movement" (ibid: 169). Movement must always be partnered with spatiality, as any 
movement can only take place within a space, and a political space can only exist with 
reference to others, intersubjectively based in equal participation in speech. As Arendt would 
write:   
 Before freedom can become a mark of honor bestowed on a man or a type of men- 
 Greeks, for instance, as opposed to barbarians- it is an attribute of the way human 
 beings organize themselves and nothing else. Its place of origin is never inside man, 
 whatever that inside may be, nor is it in his will, or his thinking, or his feelings; it is 
 rather in the space between human beings, which can arise only when distinct 
 individuals come together. Freedom has a space, and whoever is admitted into it is 
 free; whoever is excluded is not free (ibid: 170) 
The key to this is isēgoria, and the equality present within it.  
 Throughout this chapter we have repeatedly analysed the various concepts which feed 
into Arendt's reflections upon freedom with reference to movement. It has been suggested 
that Arendt supplies two versions of this account of freedom and movement: a physical 
account, and a mental account, which we can label as freedom of action and freedom of 
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speech. More often than not the two are spoken about in the singular, probably because it is 
difficult to juggle the large amount of conceptual baggage required as both draw upon 
different strands of thought. In the following quotation Arendt refers to political freedom as a 
freedom of movement, and distinguishes between the two versions of it: 
 This freedom of movement, then- whether as the freedom to depart and begin 
 something new and unheard-of or as the freedom to interact in speech with many 
 others and experience the diversity that the world always is in its totality- most 
 certainly was and is not  the end purpose of politics, that is, something that can be 
 achieved by political means. It is rather the substance and meaning of all things 
 political. In this sense, politics and freedom are identical, and wherever this kind of 
 freedom does not exist, there is no political space in the true sense (emphasis added, 
 ibid: 129) 
To conclude, we have identified the freedom of action, represented in the will, natality and 
our ability to begin and found anew through power. This theory is quite intuitive simply 
because the very language of movement is borrowed from our experience of the physical 
realm. And second, we have freedom of speech, rooted in the ancient concept of isēgoria 
whereby one is admitted to a public sphere of equality, imbued with a further hermeneutic 
element derived from phronēsis and judgment. Both accounts of free movement are not 
mutually exclusive, but appear together in the political-public space.  
 There is, however, an overlap between the two when we consider rhetoric, the art of 
persuasion, and its perlocutionary force. Rhetoric is both a form of speech where one discloses 
one's own point of view as well as potentially affecting another's as found for example in our 
discussion of Perelmans’s theory of epideictic speech in chapter three. It is with this 
understanding of rhetoric in mind that Arendt writes "political freedom...is peculiarly 
associated with action and speech insofar as speech is an act. This freedom consists of what 
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we call spontaneity, which, according to Kant, is based on the ability of every human being to 
initiate a sequence, to forge a new chain" (PP: 125-126). Significantly, Arendt describes 
freedom of speech in the following way in her Kant lectures: "the right of an individual to 
express himself and his opinion in order to be able to persuade others to share his viewpoint" 
(K: 39). The presence of the latter half of this statement is significant, for it roots the freedom 
of speech and opinion in rhetoric. As was mentioned earlier, freedom of opinion only becomes 
meaningful with the rhetorical context, that is, within the political sphere and not outside of it. 
When we divorce freedom of opinion from rhetoric we come to a solipsistic understanding of 
freedom such as that traditionally found within philosophy since the trial of Socrates.  
 
5.6 Towards an Arendtian Theory of Hermeneutic Republicanism 
 
Throughout this thesis we have repeatedly encountered the importance of language in 
Arendt’s thought, from her critique of ideological cliché and modern intimacy, to her theory of 
judgment and principle. Underlying all of this is a hermeneutic theory of understanding that 
emphasises rhetoric as the constituent element of freedom. In this final section I argue that 
Arendt’s theory of freedom as rhetoric, when combined with the historical consciousness of 
her theory of principle, is a form of what we might call hermeneutic republicanism. Thinking of 
Arendt’s thought in this way allows us to move away from the polarities associated with 
interpretations of Arendt and toward an inclusive reading which matches her existentialist 
elements with the communicative.  
 Hans Georg Gadamer’s account of hermeneutic conversation, which was introduced 
and compared to Arendt’s narrative of Socratic speech in chapter three, is a useful source for 
thinking through Arendt’s theory of freedom. As all conversation is conducted through 
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language, it takes place in a site of embedded historical prejudices which grant the language 
meaningfulness. Conversation does not exist in a temporal vacuum; because it always involves 
historical interpretation, it is never simply the echoing of the past but a fresh form of creating 
meaningfulness for the present. Conversation results in an augmentation of the previous 
meaning to something new. Thus, language has something of a 'living' quality, requiring us to 
undertake what Gadamer calls transposition: "To think historically means, in fact, to perform 
the transposition that the concepts of the past undergo when we try to think in them. To think 
historically always involves mediating between those ideas and one's own thinking" (Gadamer, 
2012: 398). The historically conscious speaker establishes a 'temporal distance' between 
themselves and the past - a recognition that the past exists in a perpetual state of 
interpretative motion, involving something of a loss of originary meaning and the gaining of 
the new. There is a great similarity here with Arendt’s ideas of Virgilian politics and authentic 
founding in which "permanence and change were tied together" (OR: 201); Virgilian freedom 
is similar to what Gadamer call the 'fusion of horizons', the reclaiming of history and prejudice 
for our time. 
 I see harmony between Arendt's theory of freedom and Gadamer's stated attempt to 
proceed with the "rehabilitation of authority and tradition" (2012: 278). With this 
consideration in mind her fondness of the following phrase of Tocqueville's becomes clearer: 
"as the past has ceased to throw its light upon the future, the mind of man wanders in 
obscurity" (as cited by Arendt, PAP: 453). Both Arendt and Gadamer see the Enlightenment 
attempt to deny the calling of prejudices as a form of historical alienation; from the vantage-
point of the principle of Cartesian doubt - the bedrock of modern philosophy - tradition 
appears as something like an 'unfounded judgment', a mere romantic pining for the certainties 
of a past fiction, a turning to a mythological past. But with the loss of tradition and the 
language pregnant with it, we lose, as Arendt phrases it, the "guiding thread through the past 
and the chain to which each new generation knowingly or unknowingly was bound in its 
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understanding of the world and its own experience" (BPF: 25). The tradition imparted by the 
historical consciousness of the authority of principle is a necessary part of worldliness and 
communal friendship. The Kantian notion of absolute spontaneity which Arendt critiques in 
The Life of The Mind's 'Willing' seems to suggest that tradition and freedom are incompatible. 
Does the commitment to tradition and principle undermine Arendt's statement that it is the 
quality of free politics to achieve the 'improbable and unpredictable' as found in the activity of 
beginning? Again, Arendt and Gadamer are similar in their response, as he asks a similar 
question: "Does being situated within tradition really mean being subject to prejudices and 
limited in one's freedom? Is not, rather, all human existence, even the freest, limited and 
qualified in various ways?" (2012: 277). Both thinkers embrace the recognition that free acts 
do not have to be completely divorced from the past. Freedom as rhetoric is Arendt's attempt 
to emphasise how tradition and freedom are mutually dependent and that freedom is not 
found in the absolute beginning, but the relatively absolute.  
 Modern political thinkers since Descartes genuinely "perceived their world as one 
invaded by new problems and perplexities which our tradition of thought was unable to cope 
with" (BPF: 27). Because of this, "reliance on tradition was no longer possible" (ibid: 25), and 
"only radicalization, not a new beginning and reconsideration of the past, was possible" (ibid: 
27). Thus, modern political thought was tasked with the attempt to make sense of a world 
almost from scratch. This is best represented in the rise (following Kierkegaard) of the 'absurd' 
as a way of understanding the human condition and its supposed structural meaninglessness. 
There is, Arendt admits, validity in the absurdist response to modernity, as she sees it as a 
genuine reaction to the loss of meaning in the modern age. However, for her, absurdity is not 
an inherent part of the human experience but a response to the process of growing 
meaninglessness as a result of the death of the public sphere in which principle could inform 
judgment. The totalitarian phenomenon represents to her the absolute manifestation of 
worldlessness and the near total collapse of tradition as a source of meaning and 
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intersubjective understanding, strongly facilitating the growth of absurdism in the post-war 
era. The principles of totalitarian action were drawn from the universal principles of logicality, 
a construct from a sphere outside of human understanding and judgment. There was, 
therefore, nothing of an authentic history to the development of totalitarianism, which 
explains the repeated assertion by Arendt that totalitarianism is a phenomenon of total 
historical novelty. In an age in which the ‘mind of man wanders in obscurity’, the ‘bannister’ of 
totalitarian logic and clichégenic language provide a desperate respite, according to Arendt, 
from the loneliness of mass society.   
 How does Arendt suggest that the past speak to us in the manner she suggests so as to 
realise the freedom that comes about through judgment? Certainly, she has grave reservations 
about the capacity for success of such a task in the modern age, and much to say about the 
failing of previous attempts (though the American Revolution provides her with a case of 
limited accomplishment). Theoretically, one of the best accounts of this question is to be 
found in Arendt's essay on Walter Benjamin in Men In Dark Times. Benjamin, Arendt asserts, 
"knew that the break in tradition and the loss of authority which occurred in his lifetime were 
irreparable, and he concluded that he had to discover new ways of dealing with the past" 
(MDT: 193). She builds upon this observation with her well-known reference to Benjamin as a 
'pearl diver' 
 who descends to the bottom of the sea, not to excavate the bottom and bring it to 
 light but to pry loose the rich and the strange, the pearls and the coral in the depths 
 and to carry them to the surface, this thinking delves into the depths and to carry 
 them to the surface, this thinking delves into the depths of the past- but not in order 
 to resuscitate it in the way it was and to contribute to the renewal of extinct ages. 
 What guides this thinking is the  conviction that although the living is subject to the 
 ruin of time, the process of decay is at the same time a process of crystallization, that 
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 in the depth of the sea, into which sinks and is dissolved what once was alive, some 
 things 'suffer a sea-change' and survive in new crystallized forms and shapes that 
 remain immune to the elements, as though they waited only for the pearl diver who 
 one day will come down and bring them up to the world of the living- as 'thought 
 fragments,' as something 'rich and strange,' and perhaps even as everlasting 
 Urphänomene [-pure phenomena] (ibid: 205-206) 
This compelling quotation has chiefly been interpreted by Benhabib as a theory of historical 
narration, a treatise on the art of political storytelling which create the 'web of relationships' 
that bind a community (see Benhabib, 1996: 93-94). I have great sympathy for this perspective 
and I believe the central observation to be correct, however, I believe that far more can be 
drawn out from it. Benjamin's quest, or at least Arendt's analysis of it, can be understood as a 
recognition of the hermeneutic effort to re-discover language which has been misplaced or 
ignored for whatever reason. Through his meticulous collection of quotations, Benjamin was 
attempting a re-connection with something lost, and he realised that the only manner in 
which this association could be reinstated - however flimsy it may be - is through a re-
connection with language and its historical meaning. As long as there is a ‘sea’ of language 
through which we can delve, there is always cause for optimism: “Any period to which its own 
past has become as it has to us must eventually come up against the phenomenon of 
language, for in it the past is contained ineradicably, thwarting all attempts to get rid of it once 
and for all” (MDT: 204). With such things in mind, Arendt smiles when asked in her interview 
with Günter Gaus as to what remains in the aftermath of the second world war, to which she 
replies: language (EU: 12). The theorist as pearl diver attempts to reclaim and re-interpret 
those moments and instances of past human grandeur and dignity, removing the past failures 
of interpretation, past misconceptions and erroneous derivations. We can witness this practice 
on almost every page of Arendt's texts, whether it be directed terminologically or at the 
differing forms of human togetherness both positive and negative. This is an activity of 
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terminological identification, cultivation, and preservation; and it can occur through the rather 
simple activity of retelling of histories. Here, I agree with Vivasvan Soni’s assertion that 
“through an exercise in classical reception, by remembering what politics meant in the polis or 
the early American republic, we can secure for ourselves the space of the political” (Soni, 
2010: 33). The act of re-interpretation through ‘classical reception’ certainly can allow us to 
“imagine once again, in concretely utopian ways” (ibid: 43). 
 I believe that Arendt thought that it is the role of the theorist to pursue 
communicative reflection upon past instances of the 'living together of men' as embodied in 
political principles. The peculiar form of historical narrative that the political theorist can 
employ, where the past appears as something mediated and unfixed, ripe for interpretation 
and appropriation is what results in the transposition of meaning - not the truth (as in 
traditional philosophy), or the causality of processes (as in modern history). Through doing so 
the theorist learns to re-think the past, critique the present, and inspire the future, without 
desiring conceptual and historical closure. As Lucy Cane correctly notes, “principles must be 
preserved in institutions, stories, political theory, poetry, and other cultural artifacts if they are 
to be kept vital” (Cane, 2015: 69), and our reception to this as theorists is vital. Of course, this 
does not mean that all historical discussion need be about principles. In the process of 
conversation we grasp a language which binds us and helps to shape the 'We' of political 
community, forming an agreement about the world and the objects within it. In this sense, 
historical conversation is as much about identity as it is about critique and freedom.  Neither 
does it slip into the romantic yearnings of classicism; as Arendt states: "restoration is never a 
substitute for new foundation" (MDT: 11). But 'new foundation' does require the transposition 
of tradition.  
 It is with these insights that Arendt offers the base for a new form of republicanism 
based on an account of freedom as rhetoric and the shared understanding that arises from it. 
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This form of hermeneutic republicanism requires a re-familiarisation with the language of a 
tradition which is partially lost to us, and a deliberation on how this tradition can grant 
meaning for the present. Arendt does not provide the answers; instead, she attempts to 
provide a highly developed approach to understand a language which potentially can provide 
some solidity in an age which remains highly unsure of itself.  
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Conclusion 
 
6.1 Thesis Summary  
 
We have been interested in providing an account of how certain terms and themes feed 
together into Arendt’s theory of freedom. We started with an exploration of the role that 
speech plays in her thought in a broad sense, locating in her writings a critique of totalitarian 
ideology as well as traditional forms of (post-Platonic) philosophy. Her engagement with the 
examples of Socrates and Karl Jaspers were linked with her celebration of Greek political 
culture, specifically, the role of the concept of isēgoria, which has no equivalent English word. 
Isēgoria was introduced as the specifically Athenian way of thinking about freedom, which is 
attained through the equal participation of citizens through the sharing of their opinions 
through speech and rhetorical persuasion. This was contrasted with the form of clichégenic 
speech that Arendt observes in totalitarian language.  
 Chapter two built upon this idea with reference, once again, to an ancient Greek term: 
friendship (philia). It was suggested that Arendt attempts to distinguish between ancient and 
modern forms of friendship in order to emphasise what has been lost and its implications for 
our notions of citizenship and political association. Arendt asserts that the modern individual 
lives largely in a condition of loneliness, described as a kind of alienation from one’s peers. 
This kind of loneliness is linked to her analysis of the loss of the world and the subsequent rise 
of meaninglessness which has come about through certain modern events, reaching its 
political apogee in the totalitarian movements of the twentieth century. I argued that Arendt 
located the ancient spirit of friendship in the manner which Socrates and Jaspers sought to 
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communicate with their peers, forming a basis upon which Arendt would come to think of 
authentic political citizenship and true political community.  
 In Chapter three it was argued that Arendt locates the source of political 
responsibility, which had been so evidently lacking in the totalitarian era, in the presence of 
friendship. I distinguished between personal and political responsibility, basing this distinction 
in Arendt’s critique of traditional morality. Our ability to ‘tell right from wrong’, it was claimed, 
lays in something greater than our own sense of guilt (the basis of personal responsibility), and 
this faculty is rooted in our capacity for judgment. The capacity to judge is dependent upon 
the presence of world, which creates a sphere in which the objects that we encounter are 
intelligible and meaningful. For Arendt, borrowing from Kant, the necessary component for 
judgment is common sense - our ability to grasp the multifaceted perspectives regarding the 
objects that comprise the world. Central to this worldly insight, I argued, is understanding. 
Because of this, I claimed that her political theory has a particularly hermeneutic element to it, 
as found in her accounts of citizenship which is dependent upon citizens being able to 
understand each other through the world. Drawing upon theories of rhetoric as found in 
Gadamer and Perelman, I argued that Arendt believes that rhetoric enables understanding 
through its disclosure of shared assumptions about the objects in the world, thus creating the 
foundation of political community. Following this, I returned to the examples of Socrates and 
Jaspers as individuals who were aware that true responsibility can only be brought about 
through rhetorical communication as it fosters a recognition that we are not just responsible 
to ourselves for our acts and deeds but also the world.   
 The fourth chapter examined the role that the concept of principle plays in Arendt’s 
thought, a term which I argued has been largely ignored by commentators. The chapter 
opened with a discussion of what Arendt understands by the term through distinguishing it 
from other constituent elements of action. I suggested that principles are the hermeneutic 
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prejudices which are necessary for judgment to take place. I then distinguished principles from 
values in Arendt’s writings, with values understood as something which lacks a basis in worldly 
phenomena, but have become the predominant ‘inspiration’ for action in the modern age. 
Principles, on the other hand, are always built upon the past action of others and the 
communication of that action among the present political community. The chapter then 
applied Arendt’s theory of principle and critique of values to her theory of totalitarianism, and 
it was suggested that Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism is dependent upon her distinguishing it 
from despotism, which a proper theory of principle is necessary to achieve. Following this, I 
analysed the importance of her theory of principle for her analysis of the American and French 
Revolutions, which I argued are her greatest application of the topic. I concluded by stating 
that Arendt strongly believed that principles are the necessary basis of a free politics, setting 
the argument for chapter five.  
 The final chapter focused on the main concept under investigation: freedom. Bringing 
together the arguments of the prior chapters, I sought to reinterpret Arendtian freedom as 
rhetoric. I argued that Arendt’s account of freedom is established with reference to physical 
movement, from which she critiqued the post-Platonic philosophical tradition of freedom 
which identifies it with the mental faculty of willing. Following this, I argued that this notion of 
movement is the base for her prominent theory of action, which she in turn identifies as the 
source of all political association. Section three explored the idea of founding as the highest 
manifestation of movement and Arendt’s grappling with issues surrounding it. I introduced 
Arendt’s underexplored notion of the ‘relatively absolute’ as her response to some of these 
issues, and particular attention was paid to her claim that authentic founding requires a strong 
consciousness of tradition, so that the founders view their activity as a fresh restatement of 
the old. This was then linked to the topic of the previous chapter - principle, and I argued that 
it is the emergence of principles which is the content of this historical consciousness. I sought 
to wed this notion of principle with Arendt’s theory of judgment and her theory of friendship. 
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It was argued that principles form the hermeneutic bedrock upon which judgment can take 
place and political community is achieved. Drawing upon the term isēgoria from chapter one, I 
argued that when principles inform judgment, freedom emerges, and I label this account of 
freedom: freedom as rhetoric. Thinking of freedom in this way, I proposed, can help us to 
bridge the gap between different interpretative positions relating to action. The final section 
examined the implications of this move for our labelling of Arendt. I proposed that Arendt’s 
theory of freedom as rhetoric necessitates a re-evaluation of her thought in hermeneutic 
terms. I finally suggested that she is best represented as endorsing a unique form of 
hermeneutic republicanism.  
 
6.2 Considering Freedom as Rhetoric 
 
It is clear from Arendt’s writings that she is attempting to counter three particular broad ways 
of understanding freedom: the first is the post-Platonic equation of freedom with free thought 
or will, which, as was explained in chapter five, locates freedom in the subjective mind without 
recourse to the outside world. This way of thinking results in the well-known theoretical 
problem of the happy slave, an individual who wills their own servitude, and thus is free. The 
inner freedom found in thought and will needs no reference point outside of it, which makes it 
something ‘politically irrelevant’ due to its solipsistic and worldless essence. Arendt associates 
this account with the traditional philosopher’s desire for solitude and the early Christian’s 
desire for spiritual contemplation, forming the basis of the medieval celebration of the vita 
contemplativa as the free life.   
 The second is the conventional liberal account of freedom as non-interference or 
absence of constraint - a ‘freedom from politics’ - characterised by a serious distrust and 
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suspicion of politics itself. In this way it is somewhat related to the above post-Platonic ideal, 
though instead of the focus upon the freedom of the mind its core is the freedom of the 
individual’s property and person. Following Arendt, I think that we can distinguish between 
two distinct accounts of non-interference: one being tied to ideals of security (as found in the 
early modern writings of Hobbes, for example), and the other being tied to the high modern 
fascination with the “life process of society as a whole” (BPF: 149), as found in socialism and 
later varieties of liberalism. In both cases, security enables a kind of freedom that exists 
outside of the sphere of politics, though the emphasis is different in each example: in the 
former the individual is the subject of security, whereas in the latter it is society as a whole 
which is the subject. This distinction is important because it highlights historical changes that 
Arendt perceives in the modern mind (see chapter two) in which we move from a 
prioritisation of the individual to the process of social development. Arendt likens the latter to 
the freedom of a river, something bound with biological nature and totally removed from the 
specifically human world. Any intervention which is perceived to block flow of the necessary 
processes of production and consumption is considered to be an affront upon the freedom of 
human development and progress.  
 This leads us to the third idea, which is the doctrine derived from the philosophy of 
history that views freedom in terms of the correlation between the action of the individual 
with a predefined historical movement, evident in ideologies such as Nazism and Marxism. 
According to this position the individual is free insofar as they follow the principles of logic set 
out by the ideology toward a desired endpoint. If the prior ways of thinking about freedom are 
politically irrelevant then this way is most definitely politically disastrous because it actually 
seeks to destroy the world instead of simply ignoring or protecting against it. Arendt does not 
hold back in her scathing rejection of all three, though she obviously considers the third to be 
the most dangerous and indicative of totalitarian governance. What is underlying all of these 
accounts is a rejection of the positivity of politics, all of them are accounts of freedom that 
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have no positive reference to the world, and in one case is predisposed toward the destruction 
of the world itself. Freedom as rhetoric, I hope to have shown throughout this thesis, attempts 
to match freedom with worldliness. In an attempt to close the gap between freedom and 
politics Arendt emphasises how the freedom that comes about through collective action is 
inseparable from human speech - in particular our ability to understand and judge from 
another’s perspective of shared objects of language.  
 How should we label Arendt’s theory of freedom if we accept that it is fundamentally 
tied to rhetoric? In particular, I wish to focus upon two of the key debates regarding the 
classification of divergent forms of freedom as found in the writings of Benjamin Constant and 
Isaiah Berlin. Constant famously articulated the position that there is a distinction between 
classical and modern forms of freedom: classical freedom being related to the collective self-
determination and popular rule of the citizens which no individual was truly protected, and 
modern (i.e. liberal) freedom is related to the security of civil society against authority so that 
citizens may advance their personal and private interests which should be of little concern to 
government. Whether or not we might define Arendt as an ‘anti’-modern thinker is a highly 
contentious topic, spurred in part by Benhabib’s influential text The Reluctant Modernism of 
Hannah Arendt. As should have been clear throughout this thesis Arendt certainly draws more 
upon the classical form of freedom, which Benhabib admits with the use of the adjective 
‘reluctant’. Benhabib’s critique of Arendtian anti-modernism focuses on the “categorical 
oversimplifications that stare at us from the pages of The Human Condition” (Benhabib, 1996: 
139). Her argument is dependent upon the successful divorcing of Arendt’s “complex 
historical-cultural analyses” (ibid) from her anti-modernist classicism, which is an impossible 
task given the interrelationship between her conceptual terminology and her historical 
analyses. One cannot exist without the other. What is at stake in side-lining the classicist 
elements of Arendtian thought (which I have hopefully shown to be so important to her) is the 
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very foundation of her philosophy. If we remove it we risk gutting her political thought of the 
terminology which makes her thought so profound and attractive to theorists today.  
 Underlying this attempt by Benhabib is a fear that Arendt’s account of freedom 
remains open to the criticism of dangerous populism, a desire to return to the unfettered 
authority of the community over the individual that Constant sought to assign to ages past. It 
is easy to cast Arendt as a proponent of the Verfallsgeschichte narrative of a post-Roman 
human decline, and certainly her criticisms of the modern era feed into such depictions. Her 
critical tone is partly borrowed from the German tradition from which she heralded, but also 
from her personal observations as well as her philosophical constructs. But what these 
thinkers are ignoring is that the classical-modern distinction that Arendt employs is very 
different to that of Constant; for her, this issue is not about the extent to which the 
community can exert their will over the individual but about the extent to which citizens may 
participate in the formation and maintenance of a common world. It would also seem that 
much of the discourse on Arendt’s anti-modernism misses this point, choosing instead to 
emphasise how concepts that she employs such as ‘society’ apparently harbour inherent elitist 
tendencies. Pitkin (1998) and Wolin (1983) accuse Arendt of unwittingly endorsing an elitist 
form of politics through an exclusionary vision of action. As I hope to have conveyed 
throughout this thesis, such a readings fail to account for the importance of equal 
participation through rhetorical speech which stands in stark contrast to traditional forms of 
elitism.   
 Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative freedom would have us classify 
Arendt as a proponent of positive freedom, possibly falling into the neo-Aristotelian subset. If 
it can be classified in this manner then it may be open to the standard criticisms of positive 
freedoms, or the ‘exercise’ form of freedom as Charles Taylor labels it, whereby freedom is 
attained through the exercise of a certain act - in this case, rhetorical deliberation. Casting 
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Arendt’s theory of freedom in this manner is perfectly acceptable, though it is possible to 
counter it, as Dana Villa does with reference to freedom’s ‘performative’ nature in Arendtian 
thought. According to Villa, Arendt espouses "a freedom prior to negative and positive 
freedom, a freedom that is the condition of possibility for both. This freedom...[is] found in the 
'engagement in the disclosure of beings as such'" (Villa, 1996: 126). What he means by this is 
that the freedom found in action does not concern ‘absence of constraint’ or ‘readiness for 
what is required or necessary’; it concerns, as he puts it, “a freedom for the world” (ibid). 
Unlike the forms of positive and negative freedom as described by Berlin, Arendtian freedom 
as rhetoric is based not on the individual but the world. Moving the emphasis away from the 
individual toward the presence of a proper intersubjective space potentially sidesteps the 
problems with associating freedom with the individual participating in a specific activity. 
Certainly, the manifestation of world is based in individuals partaking in certain actions (i.e. 
speaking and judging), though it is possible to argue, as Villa does, that it is the world which is 
the condition of the very individuality necessary for negative and positive freedoms. It is, if you 
will, a freedom which exists ‘between’ them.  
 Finally, I wish to briefly examine what freedom as rhetoric means for the division 
between the agonistic (see Honig, 1993) and consensualist readings of Arendt (see Habermas, 
1977). The former reading suggests that Arendt supports a heroic politics of individualistic 
disclosure, with the latter suggesting that Arendt emphasises the binding power of common 
deliberation. The agonist reading is easily countered by pointing to the emphasis that Arendt 
places upon the topics of understanding and friendship. On the face of it, freedom as rhetoric 
seems to fall into the consensualist category, however, I believe this to be slightly misguided; I 
am highly sceptical that Arendt would accept that speech should aim toward truth or that 
political discourse should attempt to promote resolution - two of the key assumptions 
underlying it. There is a gulf between dialogue which facilitates understanding and "the 
formation of a common will in a communication directed to reaching agreement" (Habermas, 
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1977: 4). Whilst there are definitely some similarities between Arendt and the speech-
orientated and persuasion-based form of consensus politics, for her this rhetorical 
conversation must never aim at the conceptual closure necessary for agreement. The 
pluralistic nature of human understanding as experienced in worldliness is intrinsically 
opposed to such attempts.  
 
6.3 Considering Hermeneutic Republicanism 
 
I now wish to explore the relationship between Arendt and republican political thought. 
Scattered throughout the various commentaries on Arendt are references to her 
republicanism which suggests that there is considerable agreement on her situation as a 
republican thinker, but not necessarily the specific content of it. And whether it is recognised 
or not, contemporary republican theory has been greatly shaped by Arendt's writings - her 
reception is somewhat divisive, with various thinkers happily accepting her influence whilst 
others deliberately position themselves against her. Yet despite this, it is generally agreed that 
Arendt has much to say on the topics which republicans generally concern themselves - in 
particular, the relevance of the relationship between freedom, citizenship, and political 
participation. But what I believe links her to contemporary republican philosophy more 
generally is the recognition that a radical change of political terminology is necessary for 
countering many of the assumptions which grip modern politics.     
 Maurizio Viroli is undoubtedly one of Arendt’s most sympathetic republican theorists; 
in his book From Politics to Reason of State he manages to provide a forceful critique of a 
language and way of thinking about politics which still affects us today (Viroli, 1992). There are 
strong similarities between this approach and Arendt's: he attempts to re-claim away from 
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modern thought what politics actually is through the analysis of linguistic patterns and 
changes. All of this is pursued in the context of a broader attempt to restore dignity and praise 
upon political activity in the face of a perceived degeneracy. Viroli seems to be the republican 
thinker most willing to engage with Arendtian themes, describing her writings in the following 
way: "from the perspective of civil philosophy, Hannah Arendt's words are a sweet and 
familiar music" (ibid: 286). He correctly notes that "for her, genuine political action is 
'conversation' between free equals, conversation that fosters deliberation on matters of public 
importance...only in political action, in direct participation in political conversation, can we 
attain freedom" (ibid: 285).  
 The emphasis which Viroli places upon civil philosophy is very much in tune with 
Arendt's criticism of philosophy as the contemplative life. It would be a very simplistic analysis 
of Arendt to believe that she conceives of philosophy as something completely apart from 
politics, and her analysis of Jaspers and Socrates highlights how she believes that philosophy 
can be brought back down to earth and serve a political function. In this conversational model 
of political thought, the thinker is very much a part of political discourse through their 
responsibility to worldliness and their contribution to the spaces in which understanding and 
friendliness can arise. Viroli's ideal civic philosopher appears very much like Arendt's 'citizen of 
the world'. The problem, as he admits, is very much a part of the linguistic tradition of politics 
which we have inherited, because the language of civil philosophy has "become [viewed as] a 
sort of language of nostalgia or utopia- a language apt to dream about republics of the past or 
to long for a republic to come" (ibid: 9). Through advancing a critical history of the tradition, 
with the intention of reviving the language of a tradition past, Viroli is performing a task very 
similar to Arendt: a reinvigoration of our capacity to understand certain historical moments 
and what they can mean for the present, without falling into the characteristic tropes of 
romantic classicism.  
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 On the other hand, Philip Pettit, in his highly regarded text Republicanism, carefully 
distances his own theory of republicanism from the communitarian ‘populism’ of Arendtian 
politics which, according to him “may ensure the ultimate form of arbitrariness: the tyranny of 
the majority” (Pettit, 2010: 8). Clearly, Pettit's fear is that of mob rule, and warns against a 
theory of republicanism which treats democracy as a 'bedrock value'. While Pettit is not 
necessarily talking to or about Arendt here - more so at contemporary communitarians - this 
brings us to another topic of Arendt's thought: her relationship with democracy. As should 
have been apparent throughout this thesis, Arendt's thought is clearly opposed to mass forms 
of politics. She views the political mass as the result of radical socio-political individuation, and 
is acutely sceptical of democratic politics in the post-war period, which she labelled the 
'society of labourers'. For sure, the isonomic democratic culture of ancient Greece is 
celebrated by Arendt, though more for its relationship with language and citizenship than its 
democratic structure as such. And she is equally venerating of aspects of Roman political 
language (such as authority) - its republican form a far cry from Athens. She is, however, 
undoubtedly no more fond of political elites, including those of classical republican eras.  
 Whilst Pettit's book consciously positions itself against Viroli and Arendtian themes, 
we see a very important premise: that contemporary political thought desperately needs to 
transform the language of politics, and that is best carried through by a re-acquaintance and 
modification of past traditions. What unites Arendt and these republican thinkers is a critique 
of modern political understanding, in particular, liberal conceptions of freedom as non-
interference. They all supply, in different yet relatable ways, a narrative of misguided 
modernity. J.G.A. Pocock in his influential The Machiavellian Moment notes the importance of 
Arendt to this narrative and the subsequent re-emergence of republican language:  
 In terms borrowed from or suggested by the language of Hannah Arendt, this book has 
 told part of the story of revival in the early modern West of the ancient ideal of homo 
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 politicus (the zōon politikon of Aristotle), who affirms his being and his virtue by the 
 medium of political action, whose closest kinsman is homo rhetor (1975: 550) 
Just like On Revolution, a book to which I believe that several comparisons can be drawn, 
Pocock supplies a narrative of the rise of classical republican ideals in the Renaissance, its 
transformation in the Atlantic tradition, and its eventual deterioration. What he has achieved 
is a kind of historical transposition of tradition, one which grants due attention to how 
changes in language alter political action.  
 The practice of the historian, Pocock convincingly argues, is inherently linked with the 
criticism of tradition, and there was no tradition which he considered more necessary to 
critique than the tradition of political theory as Arendt would also have understood it. Taking 
up the task set by Pocock is Quentin Skinner, who in his essay 'Liberty Before Liberalism', 
describes his task as a historian is to "uncover the often neglected riches of our intellectual 
heritage and display them once more to view" (1998: 118-119). Drawing upon the Renaissance 
republican tradition, Skinner attempts to 'uncover' the classical Roman understanding of the 
master-slave relationship as a form of dependence - with the slave as a dependent agent. He 
labels this the 'neo-Roman' account of freedom, prefigured on an understanding of what it 
means to be un-free, firmly rooted in the notion of the self-determination of the city-state. 
Skinner, as with Pettit (who draws upon him), is keen to rebuke the classical liberal theory of 
freedom as non-interference founded by Hobbes, and rendered into its fullest account by 
Isaiah Berlin, which they believe have founded a political culture of excessive individualism 
and non-participation. Whilst the theory of freedom promoted by Skinner bears little 
conceptual similarity to Arendt’s they are strikingly similar with respect to certain issues: they 
both emphasise that political participation is essential to freedom, and that the primary means 
of political participation is through rhetorical intercourse which promotes the “ethics of glory 
and the pursuit of civic greatness” (ibid: 64). As Skinner elsewhere states: 
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 The appropriate model will always be that of dialogue, the appropriate stance a 
 willingness to negotiate over rival intuitions concerning the applicability of evaluative 
 terms. We strive to reach understanding and resolve disputes in a conversational 
 way...This humanist vision has by now been so widely repudiated that the very idea of 
 presenting a moral or political theory in the form of dialogue has long since lost any 
 serious place in philosophy. I hope, however, that I may have succeeded in presenting 
 more sympathetically the values of the early modern rhetorical culture against which 
 the practice of modern philosophy was to rebel so successfully (1996: 15-16) 
This statement could easily have been written by Arendt, easily matching her critical tone and 
linguistic eloquence. Arendt has a lot to offer republicanism because she articulates many of 
the deepest republican impulses through a hermeneutic language which contemporary 
theorists have often ignored. From her theory of friendship to her theory of political 
responsibility, Arendt offers a potential set of categories and terms which can be appropriated 
to covey the republican cause in different ways to the standard Anglo-American terminology. 
This is not to say that the writings of the individuals are lacking, but that Arendt is someone 
whose thought proceeds from similar observations and provides an opportunity to further 
enhance both our understanding and our response to them.  
 
6.4 Thinking About the Past for the Present 
 
It is no coincidence that many of contemporary republican theorists are also concerned with 
questions regarding the inheritance of past tradition: how can a language borrowed from a 
bygone era be of service for the present? This question, I believe, is the question which 
contemporary republicans must seek an answer. We might be content to advance 
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republicanism as a system of values to be chosen or rejected in the marketplace of ideas, set 
in particular against ideological rivals such as liberalism. But the task for republicans is and 
should be far greater than that: it is first and foremost an attempt at reacquainting ourselves 
with a language that has for some time been deprived of its meaning and relevance, but which 
we feel has something to offer to us as political beings. Skinner, borrowing the phrase from 
Foucault, refers to himself in his later writings as an archaeologist, “bringing buried intellectual 
treasure back to the surface, dusting it down and enabling us to reconsider what we think of 
it” (1998: 112). The risk is obvious: that we succumb to a classicist romanticism, and to use the 
words again of Skinner, use the “past as a repository of alien values to be foisted of on to an 
unsuspecting present” (ibid: 117). This is a problem for all republicanism, whose grand 
language of public virtue and humanism has become obsolete, particularly in an era in which 
politics and economics are inseparable, where the public and private have become blurred.  
 As we know from the introduction to this thesis, Arendt’s method of conducting 
political theory was guided by a close terminological analysis which often sought to contrast 
classical and modern political vocabularies. In so doing, Arendt attempted to give a voice to 
something which is largely lost, the loss of which she speaks of with profound sadness 
throughout her texts. I consider Arendt’s theory of principles to be an intriguing medium for 
exploring how past acts can speak to the present, particularly with reference to our 
understanding of terms such as freedom. According to Arendt, political language only has 
meaning and authority if it is tied to our experiences of human action; these concepts alone 
will lack proper political meaning unless they become embodied in the action of public 
individuals. Only then may they become principles of action and lay the foundations of a new 
political tradition. She believes that the principles of the past can only be reclaimed through 
the public action of individuals, not through the reading of texts in a university. She does not 
attempt to prescribe an answer in the traditional manner when confronted with the problem 
of the past; through opposing the role of traditional philosophy in politics she is limiting the 
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role of the theorist as the political authority. Her answer is rather simple: "answers are given 
every day, and they are matters of practical politics, subject to the agreement of many; they 
can never lie in theoretical considerations or the opinion of one person, as though we dealt 
here with problems for which only one solution is possible" (HC: 5). It would be very easy to 
leap to the conclusion that Arendt felt that philosophy had no role in politics. Arendt does in 
fact offer a proposal as to how the theorist can have a significant role - in fact, a necessary role 
- in the political realm. In order to do so, however, the theorist much renounce the stance 
which they have adopted for over two thousand years. The truth which the philosopher has 
sought to transpose upon the realm of politics bypasses persuasion entirely, frustrated with 
the fact that as soon as their thought is vocalised and appears as speech it becomes just one 
opinion among many. By emphasising rhetoric, Arendt appeals directly to an account of 
politics as a realm dissociated from violence and force which philosophers and bureaucrats 
have in various ways come into conflict with.  
 Drawing upon the Socratic qualities of midwifery, just as Jaspers did, the theorist must 
enter once again into conversation not as an expert but as a peer. Nothing is more dangerous 
for the political realm than technocratic capture, with its hierarchy and conditions of political 
entry; technocracy, in fact, is probably more of a worry for Arendt than the paradisiacal 
philosopher's kingdom. Conversation, of the sort which has been analysed within the previous 
pages, requires the theorist to be instigator and conserver. Drawing upon the Socratic qualities 
of midwifery, conversation enables worldly individuation, distinct from the individuation of 
solitudinous contemplation or fabrication. In the rhetorical-conversational model our opinions 
become open to contestation and amelioration, and Arendt conceives of the political forum as 
a site of conceptual contestation and judgment formation based on the plurality of 
perspectives correspondent with the human condition. I think that Arendt came to view the 
task of the theorist as someone who can, as she puts it, "help establish this kind of common 
world, built on the understanding of friendship, in which no rulership is needed" (PAP: 436-
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437). Even if Arendt was not a public intellectual in the same way as Jaspers or Socrates, there 
is a strong sense of their world-building influence within her writings. When such a world 
exists, Arendt argues, political freedom becomes a reality, and power can truly oppose 
domination in its assorted forms.  
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